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Abstract 
 
Legal responses to the individual manifestation and expression of religion in the 
workplace in England and Wales: a conceptual framework 
 
Andrew Hambler 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse legal approaches in England and Wales towards 
the manifestation and expression of religion by individuals in the workplace. 
 
It begins by considering the nature of ‘religion’ and then seeks to understand and 
categorise the ways in which it is held by individuals at work through: inner belief, 
identity, association with others and, most significantly, outward manifestation or 
expression. Forms of manifestation which are potentially contentious are identified and 
classified, for analytical purposes, into three categories: negative, passive and active 
manifestation. These categories are utilised as headings in the later chapters of the thesis 
to provide a logical structure for analysing the relevant case law, as it is argued that there 
are legal issues which specifically apply to each.  
 
The thesis continues to discuss theoretical positions which might be adopted in a liberal 
state towards workplace religious expression and considers and critiques the possible 
rationale underlying each. It is proposed that there are six possible models: 
 
(I) the exclusion model which aims to suppress religious expression;  
(II) support for a preferred historic (‘majority’) religion only; 
(III) laissez-faire (leaving the matter to the employer’s discretion alone); 
(IV) protection, but only within ‘islands of exclusivity’ (religious organisations); 
(V) protection; and 
(VI) protection for minority religions only.  
 
These models are used as reference points in discussing statute law applying in the legal 
jurisdiction of England and Wales and, in subsequent chapters, case law. Although 
features of each model are discerned, particularly ‘protection’, ‘exclusion’ is identified 
as the dominant legal model in respect of many of the most contested forms of 
manifestation of religion in the workplace. It is submitted that, given the primary 
significance of religious expression to many individuals, the law should move further in 
the direction of the protection model.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Issue 
 
In March 2010, six bishops and former bishops of the Church of England wrote 
to the Sunday Telegraph as follows: 
 
We are deeply concerned at the apparent discrimination shown against 
Christians and we call on the Government to remedy this serious development. 
In a number of cases, Christian beliefs on marriage, conscience and worship are 
simply not being upheld. There have been numerous dismissals of practising 
Christians from employment for reasons that are unacceptable in a civilised 
country.
1
  
 
These comments are reflective of a growing perception that the expression of 
Christian beliefs, in the workplace and elsewhere, is becoming increasingly 
difficult due to the hostility of others.
2
 An interim report from the longditudinal 
survey of religious discrimination in Britain 2000-10 also tentatively concluded 
that discrimination (or at least perceptions of discrimination) against Christians 
had increased over the period.
3
 A Parliamentary report in 2012 found evidence 
that ‘Christians in the UK face problems in living out their faith and these 
problems have been mostly caused and exacerbated by social, cultural and legal 
                                                 
1
 Letter to the Editor, The Sunday Telegraph (London, 28 Mar 2010) 1; signed by: Most Rev 
Lord Carey of Clifton, Former Archbishop of Canterbury; Rt Rev Michael Scott-Joynt, Bishop of 
Winchester; Rt Rev Michael Nazir-Ali, Former Bishop of Rochester; Rt Rev Peter Forster, 
Bishop of Chester; Rt Rev Anthony Priddis, Bishop of Hereford; Rt Revd Nicholas Reade, 
Bishop of Blackburn. 
2
 This is also the view taken by the Archbishop of York, see: J Sentamu, ‘The intolerance towards 
Christians in the public sector is an affront’ Daily Mail (London, 13 February 2009) 17. 
3
 P Weller, Religious discrimination in Britain: A review of research evidence, 2000-10 (EHRC 
Research Report 73, 2011) 32-36. 
9 
changes over the past decade.’4 There is also evidence that some Christians in 
general agree with this perception. For example, in a ComRes survey, conducted 
in May 2009 for the Sunday Telegraph, 19% of 496 Christian respondents agreed 
with the statement ‘I have faced opposition at work because I am a Christian’; 
44% of 512 Christian respondents agreed with the statement ‘I have been 
mocked by friends, neighbours or colleagues for being a Christian’; 5% agreed 
with the statement ‘I have missed out on promotion at work because I am a 
Christian; and 6% agreed with the statement, ‘I have been reprimanded or 
cautioned at work for sharing my faith.’5  
 
However, the perception of Christians, and perhaps other faith groups, that they 
face hostility in the workplace is not met with universal sympathy. For example, 
Terry Sanderson, President of the National Secular Society, adopts a rather 
different perspective, identifying religious expression, rather than discrimination 
against the religious, as the core problem: 
 
The never-ending religious demands are now beginning to permeate the 
workplace. ... When the religious agitators realise that they have a new legal 
weapon at their disposal [discrimination law]… [t]hen will come the demand for 
prayer rooms and the conflict that they bring in their wake, then special holidays 
and after that uniform exemptions to be followed by dietary restrictions that will 
have to be imposed on everyone else. The work place should be a secular space. 
People should leave their religion at the door because once it’s over the 
threshold, it will cause mayhem as it does everywhere else.
6
 
 
                                                 
4
 Christians in Parliament, Clearing the Ground inquiry: Preliminary report into the freedom of 
Christians in the UK (February 2012) 5; copy at: << http://www.eauk.org/current-
affairs/publications/upload/Clearing-the-ground.pdf>>, accessed 30 April 2012. 
5
 Copy at: <<http://www.comres.co.uk/poll/70/the-sunday-telegraph-cpanel-poll-june-
2009.htm>>, accessed 30 April 2012. 
6
 Anon, Religion In The Workplace Becomes An Issue (National Secular Society, 23 February 
2007); copy at: << http://www.secularism.org.uk/religionintheworkplacebecomesani.html>>, 
accessed 16 May 2012. 
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There are thus different perceptions of freedom of religious expression in the 
employment sphere. There is the view that Christians, and perhaps members of 
other religions, face an increasingly hostile climate in the workplace, some of 
which has been caused by political and legislative change. There is a second 
view that, facing hostility or not, it is the religious employees who are the 
primary problem, with their disruptive and divisive desire to express their 
religious convictions in the workplace – a secular forum in which religion has no 
place.  
 
A number of questions arise from these two perceptions. These concern the 
nature of religious expression and why religious people might consider it 
important to express their religious beliefs in the workplace; is it true that 
employees face hostility and what is the exact cause of this hostility? They also 
concern the rationale for trying to keep religion out of the workplace; how 
convincing is it, and what alternative positions are there on the issue?  This in 
turn provokes the question, who are the actors involved? Clearly the religious 
employees are affected, and by extension the employer but who else has an 
interest? Given the ‘legal’ developments referred to, the Government, Parliament 
and the courts are surely also significant actors, given their respective roles in 
determining and adjudicating on the parameters of religious freedom in the 
workplace, once the decision has been taken to regulate it by means of law-
making. 
Research aims 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate these questions. In particular, it seeks 
to define what is meant by religious expression by individual employees, and the 
motive underlying it, and sets out the different ways it might have an impact on 
the workplace, in both uncontroversial and potentially controversial ways. The 
preferred term in European human rights jurisprudence is ‘manifestation’, 
although this term is more narrowly defined than expression (see Chapter 4). In 
practice, in this thesis, the two terms will be used interchangeably to a certain 
degree, although the term ‘expression’, because of its greater breadth of meaning, 
is generally preferred. 
11 
 
The thesis attempts to identify different principled responses to workplace 
religious expression within a liberal state. It also considers the extent to which 
the law in England and Wales reflects these differing responses, both at a 
legislative and policy level, and at a court and tribunal level. The ultimate aim of 
the thesis is to determine the extent to which freedom of religious expression for 
the individual enjoys legal protection in the workplace in England and Wales, 
and whether or not there is a case for changing the law to strengthen that 
protection. 
 
In the context of its research aims, this thesis uses the terms ‘employee’ and 
‘worker’ interchangeably. Although in employment law there is a distinction 
(employees work under ‘a contract of service,’ and workers do not necessarily do 
so),
7
 in practice this distinction is of limited consequence when discussing 
religion and belief in the workplace, as the protections under discrimination law 
apply equally to workers and employees.
8
 The only substantial area where the 
distinction is significant is in the discussion of the protections of unfair dismissal 
law – these apply only to the narrow category of employees. A more significant 
distinction overall may be between public servants and employees/workers more 
generally. Where this distinction is relevant it is highlighted in the text of the 
thesis.  
Materials 
Legal materials 
 
This thesis is confined in scope to a discussion of religious expression in the 
workplace in England and Wales. It therefore draws most heavily on domestic 
law, in particular employment discrimination law: most significantly, the 
Equality Act 2010 and the Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) 
                                                 
7
 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 230. 
8
 Equality Act 2010, ss 39-52. 
12 
Regulations 2003.
9
 The majority of the case law which is subjected to analysis 
consists of judgements brought under the ‘religion and belief discrimination’ 
head of claim. There are a growing number of relevant cases which have 
progressed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) or beyond, but there 
remain important areas where the law has not been authoritatively clarified and 
there is a need to rely, albeit with caution, on any developing doctrines which can 
be inferred from first instance judgments, at an employment tribunal, albeit that 
these can only have persuasive effect on other employment tribunals.10 Where 
employment tribunal decisions are considered in this thesis, these are based on 
case reports which have been made public by the one of the parties; these have 
been sourced initially through a link from summary case notes prepared for the 
Equal Opportunities Review.
11
 
 
The legal materials used are not confined, however, to employment 
discrimination law. Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) concerning freedom of religion and belief is 
also considered in some depth, in particular its application to the workplace by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, indeed, by British courts. 
The relevant cases, some of which go beyond the employment situation, are 
discussed. 
 
There are a small number of occasions where this thesis will draw on case law 
relating to religious expression in some foreign jurisdictions. The purpose of 
referring to such case law is not to attempt a comparative analysis, rather it is 
restricted to identifying how another jurisdiction has treated a problem relevant 
to the discussion but which has not yet been fully considered by an employment 
tribunal or court in England and Wales. Particularly useful for this purpose are 
examples from the United States where ‘the Supreme Court has developed over 
                                                 
9
 SI No.1660. 
10
 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Cook [1997] ICR 288. 
11
 See <<http://www.eordirect.co.uk/>>, accessed 20 March 2012. 
13 
time a sophisticated and useful jurisprudence on the free exercise of religion’;12 
however, examples from other jurisdictions with a history of litigation over 
religious rights are also useful, such as those of Canada and Australia. 
Non legal materials 
 
In addition, this thesis considers a range of other published sources, including: 
codes of practice and published guidance on religion and belief in the workplace; 
professional codes of practice; parliamentary reports; and government-sponsored 
research reports. It also uses materials published by pressure groups which have 
a particular interest in religion and belief in the workplace (with a view either to 
promoting it or opposing it), such as the Muslim Council of Britain, the Christian 
Institute, the Christian Legal Centre, the National Secular Society and the British 
Humanist Association. This material will be used to supplement the legal 
materials either to fill gaps in those materials or to enrich and deepen the overall 
analysis by providing additional reference points. 
Literature 
 
This thesis also draws on a wide range of academic writing from various 
disciplines, principally law, political philosophy, ethics and sociology, in support 
of the theoretical constructs which will be presented in Chapters 2 and 3. Some 
of these constructs draw on well-established literature, particularly on the role of 
religion in public life and the nature of equality, dignity and autonomy. In the 
later chapters, particular use is made of a more recent and expanding literature 
which expressly engages with religious freedom in the workplace and often 
includes analysis of particular cases. Some of this literature is sourced from 
                                                 
12
 C Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2000), 
5. 
14 
specialist religion and law journals, such as the Ecclesiastical Law Journal
13
 and 
Religion and Human Rights.
14
 
 
The most comprehensive published study of religious freedom in the workplace 
to date is the book by Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious 
Discrimination and the Workplace.
15
 This book is referred to at intervals in this 
thesis. It deals with the interaction of discrimination law and human rights law to 
create a framework for freedom of religion and it identifies a number of issues 
which, at the date of publication, had yet to be fully addressed, including 
approaches to resolving various conflicts between the rights of ‘religious’ 
employees and organisations and the rights of other actors such as employers, 
non-religious employees and employees protected under other strands of 
discrimination law. Vickers’ book seeks to develop frameworks and approaches 
and is consequently, to a certain extent, speculative in character. It also tends to 
view the question using an entirely secular worldview and from a societal 
perspective rather than from the viewpoint of either employees or 
organisations.
16
  
This thesis is concerned with the same questions of religious freedom in the 
workplace but is different from the Vickers study in two respects: firstly, it 
approaches the issue primarily from the perspective of the religious employee; 
and, secondly, it enjoys the benefit of the developments in jurisprudence since 
the publication of Vickers’ study and is able to draw stronger inferences based, 
inter alia, on rather more case law.  
                                                 
13
 Published by Cambridge Law Journals; see << 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=ELJ>>, accessed 15 May 2012. 
14
 Published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; see << http://www.brill.nl/religion-human-rights>>, 
accessed 15 May 2012. 
15
 (Hart 2008). 
16
 For a fuller critique of this book, see A Hambler, ‘Book Review: Religious Freedom, Religious 
Discrimination and the Workplace by Lucy Vickers’ (2009) 11 Ecc LJ 220.  
15 
Outline Structure 
 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to arrive at a principled understanding of what 
constitutes legitimate ‘religious expression’ in the workplace. Three key areas 
will be explored – the meaning of religion, categorising religious expression, and 
how to determine the underlying authenticity of individuals making claims. 
Chapter 3 will consider how a liberal state might respond to the challenge of 
religious expression by employees. It will set out six models representing 
approaches which might be taken, ranging from exclusion to full protection in 
law and the justification for these approaches. These models, and their attendant 
implications, will in turn be subjected to critique.  
The purpose of Chapters 4 to 7 is to consider the application of both religious 
expression and of the models of response in the context of the United Kingdom. 
Chapter 4 considers the broad legislative and policy landscape. The following 
chapters examine the way in which employment tribunals and courts have 
responded when faced with claims concerned with religious expression. Such 
claims will be examined with reference to a categorisation of religious 
expression set out in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 will be concerned with an examination 
of tribunal responses to a claimant’s desire to absent himself from work either at 
certain times (for reasons of religious devotion) or in order to avoid certain tasks 
because they clash with his religious-based conscience. In Chapter 6 the legal 
issues surrounding employees’ desire to adopt particular styles of dress, 
jewellery or personal grooming will be considered. In Chapter 7, an assessment 
will be made of the employee’s freedom to witness or proselytise and to object to 
or challenge the behaviour of others.  
In Chapter 8, overall conclusions will be developed and a final assessment of the 
role of law as a support for, or a constraint on, religious expression in the 
workplace will be made, followed by recommendations as to how, and in what 
ways, the law could better protect religious expression. 
16 
Chapter 2: Conceptualising ‘Religious Expression’ in the 
Workplace 
Introduction  
 
Religious expression differs from self-expression. The former commands 
stronger loyalties and deeper feelings, perhaps the deepest feelings of all; at best, 
it is less a matter of an individual choice, but an inevitable and unavoidable 
response to divine obligation. Thus the individual with strong religious beliefs 
will have an over-riding interest in expressing these beliefs in some way. This is 
as likely to apply to the workplace as to other fora.  
 
In expressing their religious beliefs, workers are responding to what they view as 
a divine imperative, which, if it conflicts with other actors, such as an employer 
or a co-employee, is likely to be afforded greater weight by the religious 
employee. Self-expression, on the other hand, although an important human 
freedom, cannot make claims of this nature – it cannot invoke divine command 
to support the choices it has elected and thus is more easily circumscribed with 
reference to the requirements of others. Some indeed have argued that self-
expression is not a human right in the fullest sense as the nature of self-
expression varies according to societal and other contextual factors.
1
 Religion 
however is different and thus, in an important sense, ‘special’. 2  It is also, 
potentially, and most immediately for the employer, a ‘problem’.3 Two examples 
may help to illustrate this latter point. First, a retail employer may engage in 
Sunday trading and may require that all employees are available to work, by 
rotation, that day. A Christian objects on the basis that Sunday is a day set apart 
and by divine command she cannot work on Sundays. Second, a supermarket 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, L Alexander, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression? (CUP 2005). 
2 A term helpfully explained in S Bedi, ‘Debate: What is so Special About Religion? The 
Dilemma of the Religious Exemption’ (2007) 15 Journal of Political Philosophy 235. How 
special is a matter of debate which will be considered in the next chapter. 
3
 D Hicks, Religion and the Workplace: Pluralism, spirituality, leadership (CUP 2003), 71. 
17 
chain requires that checkout staff process all customer purchases. A Muslim store 
assistant objects that this will mean she must handle alcohol which she believes 
is contrary to Islamic teaching. How should the employer respond to such 
instances as these where its own (or other) interests conflict with the fundamental 
beliefs of his religious employees? This important dilemma, amongst others, will 
be debated in Chapter 3. What this chapter is concerned with, however, is a 
necessary precursor to that question: how can this special, but potentially 
problematic, religious expression be recognised?  
 
It is submitted here that recognition is required on two levels. At the first level, 
there is a ‘positive’ recognition of forms of expression which stake a claim to be 
considered religious and therefore potentially fall into the ‘special’ category. 
Within this level, it will be possible to categorise such expression in various 
ways and, in so doing, to identify those which are also, potentially, a ‘problem’ 
to employers.
 
For these types of expression, in particular, it may be thought 
desirable to consider a second level of recognition, which would consist of an 
attempt to determine the legitimacy of that form of expression on the assumption 
that not all claims to religious expression have a right necessarily to be 
recognised as such. This could be characterised a form of ‘negative’ recognition 
as it is designed to limit the number of claims to be admitted into the ‘special’ 
category.  
 
This chapter is thus divided into two parts: the first is concerned with an attempt 
to identify and classify ‘religious expression’ in its broadest terms; the second is 
concerned with the identification of principled approaches to distinguish between 
what might be regarded as ‘legitimate’ forms religious expression and what 
might not be. 
Identifying Religious Expression: A typology 
 
The purpose of this section is to attempt to provide a broad classification of what 
is could be considered prima facie as ‘religious expression’. As an initial 
reference point, the term will be used in its widest sense to encompass the ways 
in which an employee might wish to bring his or her religious beliefs into the 
18 
workplace. From the religious employee’s perspective, this may be very wide 
indeed, encompassing all forms of human activity (internal and external). As 
Ahdar and Leigh perceptively note: 
 
The most mundane of human behaviours can be ‘spiritualised’ and take on a 
religious connotation. One is practising one’s religion when one eats, drinks, 
works, plays and gardens, as much as when one reads scripture, prays or 
meditates. … On this view there is no activity which is not generated by one’s 
obedience (or disobedience) to God.
4
 
 
If all human activity is inherently religious, it would then follow that forms of 
classification are unlikely to be significantly meaningful to the religious 
employee. Nevertheless, from the perspective of an employer, forms of 
classification are likely to be very useful, not least in order to identify and cluster 
thematically examples of religious expression which are, respectively, least and 
most likely to pose a ‘problem’ to others. For this reason, the mapping out of a 
typology of religious expression will be attempted here. 
 
The ECtHR has developed the notion of two fora in which religion and belief 
may be expressed – respectively, the forum internum5 and the forum externum.6 
The forum internum, by strict definition, refers to that which is internal to the 
individual – a sphere of activity which is private in nature. Holding a religious 
belief is a function of this forum internum; it is entirely internal to the believer 
and therefore no one else need be aware of his religious convictions.
7
 The forum 
externum, by contrast, involves those forms of religious expression which are 
overt and sometimes highly visible. This division is potentially helpful, as it 
allows courts to distinguish between the two categories, potentially giving an 
                                                 
4
 R Ahdar and I Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (OUP 2005), 155. 
5
 First used in ECHR jurisprudence by the Commission in C v the United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 
142. 
6
 See also discussion of these two terms in Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European 
Convention, 72-73. 
7
 As Trigg puts it, ‘How does one know what someone believes if it is never manifested?’, R 
Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (OUP 2012), 99. 
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absolute guarantee of freedom to the former, and a more qualified approach to 
the latter.
8
 The problem with the forum internum/externum dichotomy
9
 does 
become apparent, however, when considering the concept of belief in slightly 
wider terms. If an individual has publicly identified himself as holding religious 
beliefs, for example by attending church or placing a religious symbol on his car 
which he uses to travel to work, then, strictly speaking, he has stepped outside of 
the forum internum as he has acted on his beliefs.
10
 However, because this 
activity has taken place, in private (i.e., in this case, outside of work)
11
, including 
it as part of the forum externum would seem to so stretch that term as to render it 
less helpful analytically, particularly if the term is also used to describe much 
stronger forms of overt religious expression such as proselytism of co-workers.  
 
An alternative form of classification therefore may be a simple private/public 
divide where ‘religious activities’ in private are potentially viewed differently 
from religious activities in public. However, identifying where to draw the line 
between the two may also be problematic. Assuming the terms are employed in 
the popular sense of distinguishing between a ‘private life’ and a ‘public life’, 
then private religious activities are likely to be inclusive of attending, for 
example, mosque or gurdwara. However, what exactly constitutes ‘public’ may 
be less straightforward. The workplace, for example, may be generally described 
as a public space but it does not necessarily follow that all activities which take 
place in it can be labelled ‘public’.  
 
Both the forum internum/externum and the public/private distinctions are 
arguably of limited analytical use due to the limitations imposed by a simple 
bifurcation on what is actually rather more nuanced an issue and a more 
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 See also discussion of this distinction within the text of Article 9 ECHR in Chapter 4. 
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sophisticated framework would be advantageous. Such a framework is provided 
by Edge who proposes a fourfold typology of individual religious rights.
12
 These 
are: the right to hold a religious belief; the right to a religious identity; the right 
to be a member of a religious community; and the right to act on such belief, 
identity or membership of a community. Edge’s framework was not specifically 
designed for application to the workplace; however it will be employed here in 
order to categorise the different means by which individuals may wish to bring 
their religious beliefs into the workplace but in a slightly adapted form. The 
fourth category of the typology – the right to act on belief, identity or 
membership of a community – will be subdivided in order to create two 
categories, the right to act on belief, etc, outside of the workplace; and the right 
to so act within the workplace.  
Belief 
 
Drawing on Edge’s first category, employees who hold religious convictions 
will, by definition, bring these into the workplace at the most fundamental level 
of holding a belief. If this is a form of expression, it is entirely an internal one 
and thus corresponds to a narrow definition of the forum internum. In its own 
terms, it has no impact on others and so cannot be a problem. Belief, or internal 
religious expression, is the most basic and least intrusive form of religious 
expression, occupying, as it were, the bottom rung on any hierarchy of 
expression.  
 
Although such an internal form of expression cannot pose a problem to others, it 
nevertheless remains ‘special’ and it is possible that its exercise could be 
subjected to interference by an employer. This scenario might arise if an 
employer sought to foster a particular set of organisational values which might 
run counter to the religious beliefs of some employees, and did so, for example, 
through intensive briefing and training, perhaps reinforced through the appraisal 
system or through other organisational policies and practices. If such values were 
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 P Edge, ‘Religious rights and choice under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2000) 
3 Web JCLI.  
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promulgated with sufficient force, then this might put irresistible pressure on the 
integrity of the inner religious belief.
13
 Within a modern workplace context, 
values associated with ‘diversity’ might, in some circumstances, fulfil these 
criteria.
14
  
 
Employing a slightly wider understanding of the forum internum, there may be 
further instances where pressure might be placed on internal beliefs through the 
imposition of oaths of office for certain public sector roles and in certain 
professions. Whereas it is possible that such oaths might have a religious content 
or a holy book might be the vehicle by which such oaths were authenticated (and 
thus highly problematic to those of a different, or without, religious faith),
15
 it is 
equally possible that an oath, or a proxy for an oath such as a signed commitment 
to certain professional standards of an entirely secular nature, might have the 
effect of requiring public commitment to values which would not be in keeping 
with an individual’s inner beliefs. Although some individuals may be willing to 
accommodate the resulting tension, others might be extremely uncomfortable 
about such a compromise.
16
 An example might be a magistrate, sitting on a 
children’s bench, who by oath is forced to adjudicate in all cases even in 
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circumstances where the law is fundamentally opposed to his religious beliefs, 
such as requiring him to issue an adoption order in favour of a same-sex 
couple.
17
 Another example might be a Christian school teacher who, as a 
requirement of registering with the appropriate professional body, is forced to 
accept a code of conduct requiring her to ‘promote equality and value diversity in 
all [her] professional relationships and interactions’; allowing ‘equality’ and 
‘diversity’ to be defined by the employer and potentially in a way which might 
force her to promote homosexual lifestyles in the classroom.
18
 
Identity 
 
Edge’s second category is that of religious identity. An individual may be known 
to identify with a particular religion through observable external evidence; for 
example, church attendance or subscription to a religious interest journal. It is 
submitted that this is unlikely to cause any form of workplace conflict and, in 
general, the ‘special’ status will be of limited importance. There are perhaps two 
exceptions. Firstly, some religious beliefs may be considered so offensive to 
others that merely to identify with them (particularly if there is some kind of 
formal or official connection) might be sufficient to cause conflict in the 
workplace. As an indirect example, involving political rather than religious 
identity, the offence given by BNP membership alone in the UK has been 
sufficient to lead the Home Office to ban officers in the police and prison 
services from joining up.
19
 Secondly, some organisations either religious in 
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character or with quasi-religious overtones may fall under suspicion due to 
secrecy rules, and solemn oaths of fraternity, and the resulting concerns that 
members may have divided loyalties which might compromise their operational 
roles. A good example in the UK is public concern (including two parliamentary 
enquiries) about police officers and members of the judiciary who are also 
members of secret societies, and who are sometimes suspected of feeling that 
they owe a greater loyalty to their fellows than to the general public.
20
 Such 
secret societies include the freemasons and the Opus Dei.
21
  
 
Membership of a Religious Community 
 
As with religious identity, it seems unlikely that mere membership of a religious 
community, such as a church, would create a workplace ‘problem’ unless, as 
before, it was the particular religious community, or the activities of some 
members of that community, which are considered offensive to others or 
dangerous in some other way. For example, some individuals may be excluded 
by the state from some areas of employment, not on the basis of overt expression 
of religious beliefs but by association with other individuals or groups suspected 
of subversive activity which may be motivated by their religious convictions. 
Such individuals are likely to be identified through some form of security vetting 
process either before or during employment.
 22
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24 
Acting on Belief, Identity or Community outside of the Workplace 
 
When an individual chooses to act on (or ‘manifest’ or ‘practise’)23 her beliefs, or 
identity, alone or in community of others outside of the workplace, there might 
reasonably be a general assumption that this is unlikely to pose ‘a problem’ to 
employers. This is based on the view that an individual should be free to express 
himself as he sees fit outside of the workplace (including participation in any 
religious activities) and that freedom should not generally be fettered by the 
employer. Nevertheless, there may be exceptions to this general rule for specific 
reasons. A senior civil servant, for example, might be required to avoid political 
activity in order to preserve the perceived political impartiality of the role.
24
 
Where the employer does seek either to prevent employees from particular 
activities outside of the workplace, or to discipline them for non-work behaviour, 
this is most likely to be considered fair in circumstances when the nature of such 
expression can be shown to potentially compromise an employer or otherwise to 
bring the employer into disrepute. Employers may consider themselves 
potentially compromised if employees are seen to act, albeit outside of the 
workplace, in ways that are contrary to the core values of that organisation, or the 
role which they occupy.
25
 Although not strictly a workplace example, it is 
nevertheless instructive to note that this was the argument voiced by members of 
the European Parliament in 2004 when they rejected the appointment of Rocco 
Buttiglione as European Commissioner for justice and security, a portfolio 
carrying responsibility for the implementation of EU anti-discrimination and 
human rights law.
26
 Buttiglione was a committed Roman Catholic who had, in 
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25 
the past, publicly endorsed official Roman Catholic teaching that homosexuality 
is a sin and expressed traditional views on gender roles and the family.
27
 MEPs 
argued that his expressed views made him unsuitable for the portfolio he was to 
receive, and could not accept Buttiglione’s own argument that he would separate 
his own private convictions from his public actions.  
 
Equally, a religious organisation, espousing, for example, Christian values, might 
decide to dismiss an employee known to have engaged in extra-marital sex and 
thus compromised the aims and religious integrity of the organisation.
28
 
Employers may also take the view that their businesses have been brought into 
disrepute by employees who have committed a criminal act; or who have 
publicly criticised their employer online; or who have worn the company 
uniform (in full or in part) whilst engaging publicly in behaviour which might 
offend others; or who have caused (potentially) great offence to other employees 
or clients by their published opinions. An example of the latter, concerning 
offence on religious lines, involved the senior press officer of the British Council 
who was exposed as the author of a series of articles in the Daily Telegraph 
attacking ‘the black heart of Islam.’29 An investigation was carried out and the 
British Council dismissed him for writing articles ‘offensive to Islam’ and, 
presumably, thereby bringing the British Council itself into disrepute.
30
 A 
relevant second example might be the dismissal of Glenn Hoddle as the England 
football team coach in 1999. Hoddle, who held a religious belief in reincarnation, 
was dismissed following a public outcry over the ‘offence’ given by his public 
remark that ‘disabled people were paying for sins committed in previous lives’.31 
                                                 
27
 Anon, ‘EU panel opposes justice nominee’ BBC News (London, 11 October 2004); copy at: 
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3734572.stm.>>, accessed 10 March 2011. 
28
 Per the facts of O’Neill v Governors of St Thomas More RCVA Upper School [1996] IRLR 
372. 
29
 For example, W Cummins, ‘The Tories must confront Islam instead of kowtowing to it’ The 
Daily Telegraph (London, 18 July 2004) 21 
30
 H Muir, ‘British Council official sacked over anti-Islam articles’ Guardian (London, 2 
September 2004) 1. 
31
 J Davison and L Gregoriadis, ‘Hoddle 0, Disabled 1(Hoddle o.g.)’ The Independent (London, 3 
February 1999) 1. 
26 
 
Discipline, and particularly dismissal, for conduct outside of the workplace is 
highly contested and rights arguments are advanced to limit as far as possible 
employers’ freedom of action in this regard. Mantouvalou observes that 
employer action in respect of conduct outside of work is usually justified on the 
basis of the public nature of that conduct (what she terms spatial criteria).
32
 Most 
human rights instruments (including Article 8 of the ECHR, which she quotes) 
are concerned with the right to a private life. Thus rights arguments can be 
circumvented by courts in dealing with behaviour, including of course religious 
expression, outside of the domestic sphere.
33
 In seeking to overcome this, 
Mantouvalou argues that a spatial understanding of the private/public dichotomy 
is inadequate: 
 
Private life is not to be restrictively interpreted as encompassing one’s home and family 
circle only; the right to privacy does not merely encapsulate activities that take place in a 
secluded inaccessible location.
34 
 
Mantouvalou prefers to view privacy as ‘contextually-dependent’, a theme she 
goes on to develop. Certainly this involves the extension of privacy to encompass 
activities which might otherwise be regarded as taking place in public, but 
outside of work. If it were not so, then: 
 
The imposition of a duty to act in a certain way or to refrain from engaging in certain 
conduct in a person’s private time can be detrimental to … freedom of expression, the right 
to private life, and freedom of religion … In the context of employment, being watchful and 
alert when engaging in leisure activities, and being fearful that they may impact on the 
retention of employment, may be damaging … .
35 
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27 
 
Mantouvalou does concede, however, that there may be occasions when 
employers will be entitled to dismiss employees for conduct outside of work, but 
she requires a test of proportionality (which is not particularly clearly set out in 
her article) before this is allowed. Overall, the conclusion is that an employee’s 
time after work ‘is covered by a strong claim to privacy against employer 
interference.’36  
 
When applied to freedom of religious expression outside of the workplace, 
Mantouvalou’s conclusions do not provide the basis of any more concrete 
protections for religious employees. However, the analysis does imply the 
possibility of a greater extension of the right to privacy. Quite how far this might 
extend is open to question. Should, for example, a non-work conversation about 
religion between two work colleagues, where one is offended by what she hears, 
be regarded as a purely private matter, or public and of interest to the 
employer?
37
 
Acting on Belief within the Workplace 
 
Thus far, religious belief, identity and expression outside of the workplace have 
been considered and the relatively rare, and often hypothetical, examples of 
occasions when that expression might pose a ‘problem’ to employers (and thus 
require a response) have been explored. The discussion will now turn to forms of 
religious expression which occur within the workplace and initially the first of 
Edge’s categories – acting on belief. There is clearly potential for this category to 
merge into the one which follows it – acting on religious identity in the 
workplace. For analytical purposes, however, the definition of belief used earlier, 
as something potentially unknown to others, will be employed here, thus creating 
a distinctive category.   
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Actions of course cannot remain private – but the source, in terms of the 
underlying motivations, of those actions might remain unknown to others. One of 
the areas in which examples are most likely to be found is in relation to 
workplace ethics. Amongst the effects of Christian belief, for instance, might be 
fidelity to an employer, maintaining the ‘highest moral and ethical standards of 
behaviour and attitudes’38 and a concern for the health and well-being of co-
workers. These are legitimate expressions of the Christian belief in the workplace 
and yet do not require any overt public identification with Christianity – Jesus 
Christ need not be mentioned by an employee who helps his co-worker, or who 
adheres strictly to the time limits during ‘breaks’. For Muslims, similarly, a 
strong workplace ethic is a requirement of Islam. This need not require the 
invocation of religious beliefs but simply that ‘the good Muslim businessman 
should be guided by his conscience – and by God’s written instructions – to do 
the right thing by other people.’39 
 
Another important example of acting on religious belief lies in commitment to 
career and workplace. Within Christianity, for example, work in all its forms is 
highly esteemed. Martin Luther regarded human work as a direct extension of 
God’s ongoing creative work on earth and made the colourful claim that God 
even milks the cows through those he calls to work.
40
 This view of work, charges 
it with spiritual significance – by working, men and women fulfil a specific 
calling to be ‘cultivators and stewards of all the good gifts of his creation’ in 
whatever work role or position they hold.
41
 Calvin added to this sense of work, 
however humble, as divine vocation, a particular stress on its role in allowing the 
Christian to serve others and society.
42
 This reformation view of work is now a 
mainstream Christian position,
43
 although now liberated from its least attractive 
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feature – the concept of ‘one’s place’ in an inflexible social order.44 This high 
view of work, essentially as a divine calling, should translate in practical terms in 
the workplace to a discerning choice of job role and then a strong commitment to 
that job role, the worker diligently seeking to carry out its demands to the best of 
his ability in order to serve others and, in so doing, to serve and please God.
45
  
 
As these examples in the realm of ethics and workplace commitment are 
normally aligned to organisational interests, they also lie within a wider category 
of religious responses in society identified by Robert Audi as ‘secularly-aligned 
religious obligations’.46 In other words, the religious beliefs produce actions and 
attitudes which would gain approval by the non-religious, regardless of the initial 
motivation which may therefore remain undisclosed.
 47
 In terms of the original 
proposition, such religious expression will not normally be expected to constitute 
a ‘problem’.  
 
There are, however, two qualifications to add to this analysis. Firstly, it assumes 
that the organisation is itself practising organisational virtue (akin to civic virtue 
in Audi’s wider application to society). If this is not the case, then a dilemma 
may arise for those acting on religious belief. This dilemma is not of course 
necessarily exclusive to the religious employee but is likely to be particularly 
acute for him. A good illustration of this is the position of the ‘whistleblower’ 
who may feel obliged to act on his beliefs and report abuse of power, corruption 
or unlawful activities within the workplace. Secondly, it assumes that 
organisational virtue will generally travel in the same direction as religious virtue 
such that, at this level, there is unlikely to be a conflict. However, it remains 
possible that such a conflict may arise if the organisation conceptualises virtue in 
a very different way to the religious individual. The virtues of ‘respect’ and 
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‘tolerance’ which might form part of a dignity at work policy or a wider 
‘diversity’ approach have potential to create conflict for some religious 
employees who may be discouraged under this policy from speaking openly with 
others about their Christian faith, or offering advice on lifestyles, etc. This 
conflict is, however, most likely to emerge at a more overt level of religious 
expression, of the kind to be discussed in the next section. At the level discussed 
here it is difficult to envisage a conflict. 
 
Thus, religious expression can be uncontroversial, where it is aligned with 
organisational virtues and where the specifically religious motivation remains 
internalised. Controversy is only likely to arise if the behaviour of managers or 
colleagues is contrary to the principles of organisational virtue – the resulting 
conflict is unlikely to be perceived as a specifically religious problem, however.
 
48
 Religious expression is most likely to be potentially ‘a problem’ when it is 
both externalised and is identifiably religious in character.
49
 Inevitably, given its 
potentially controversial nature, it is this aspect of religious expression which is 
of most interest in this chapter. 
Acting on Religious Identity within the Workplace 
 
Actions within the workplace which are identifiably and overtly religious in 
character are potentially many and varied. Such actions, or forms of expression, 
will differ in the level of challenge that they pose to the employer, but all are 
potentially problematic. One way of categorising these overt forms of religious 
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expression is in terms of their effect on aspects of the employment contract.
50
 
Thus, religious expression can be identified in terms of requests for time off for 
religious devotions; implications for the company dress code; the effect of 
conscience in terms of a desire not to engage in a particular aspect of the job or 
workplace regime because it is considered distasteful, or even sinful; the desire 
to ‘witness’ to, or seek to convert co-workers; or to challenge their behaviour. 
Hambler uses a different approach to categorisation which focuses on the 
character of the form of expression. Thus identifiably ‘religious’ expression is 
manifest either ‘passively’, ‘negatively’, or ‘actively’, with the latter representing 
potentially the greatest challenge to the organisation.
 51
 Examples of ‘passive’ 
manifestation include the wearing of an Islamic headscarf, or a Christian cross or 
the decoration of workstations to form so-called ‘employee-created sacred space 
or altars’.52 ‘Negative’ manifestation involves either, seeking to be absent from 
work at specified times (such as Sundays for mainstream Christian groups, and 
Saturdays for Jews and Seventh Day Adventists) in order to engage in collective 
religious devotion outside of the workplace, or seeking exemption from some 
aspects of a work role due to a conflict with religiously-inspired conscience. An 
example of ‘active’ manifestation would be proselytism, with a view to gaining 
converts, in the workplace.  
 
An adapted version of this method of categorisation will be utilised in the 
analysis presented in the later chapters of this thesis. 
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Acting on Religious Community within the Workplace 
 
The final element of Edge’s typology to be applied to the workplace is the desire 
to act on membership of a religious community. This could manifest itself in 
terms of a wish for people with the same religious convictions to meet together 
on the workplace premises, perhaps at lunchtimes or after work, in order to 
engage in collective religious devotion or prayer, or to meet for mutual 
encouragement or outreach to others. In the United Kingdom, there is an 
organisation known as ‘Christians at Work’, which exists to support individuals 
and ‘Christian fellowships’ meeting in the UK workplaces. According to its 
website, ‘there are over 100 workplace Christian Fellowship groups affiliated to 
[Christians at Work].’53 On the basis that there are other non-affiliated groups, 
then it may be assumed that a number of Christians, at least, actively engage in a 
form of collective religious expression in the workplace. Similarly, Muslims, 
who are required individually by Islam to engage in short periods of daily prayer, 
may wish to do so ‘in congregation’.54 In these cases, there may be a consequent 
desire for the employer to provide some appropriate facilities to enable the 
collective religious activities to take place.
55
 
Religious Expression – a test of legitimacy 
 
Thus far, an initial attempt to categorise, in various ways, expression which 
might stake a claim to be considered ‘religious’ has been made. It is now 
necessary to consider the extent to which such claims should be accepted. The 
reason why this is necessary is because, as argued earlier, religious expression is 
both ‘special’, and therefore likely to claim privileges for itself, and potentially, 
at least in some forms, a problem (e.g. to employers). As a result, there is a 
strong case for seeking to draw the boundary lines as narrowly as possible as to 
what actually represents religious expression without becoming overly-
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exclusionary. This is clearly a delicate balance to be achieved and requires some 
tests to be formulated and applied to each instance of putative religious 
expression (and this will be particularly important for those forms of expression 
which are most likely to be controversial or problematic). The most significant of 
these tests is the widest of all – legitimacy. Legitimacy can of course be defined 
in various ways, but how it is formulated here is in terms of conveying a sense of 
validity. Can a particular form of expression make a valid claim to be considered 
‘religious expression’? To make an assessment of validity, there is likely to be a 
requirement that there is some external standard for measurement. 
 
The next stage of this analysis is thus devoted to exploring the legitimacy (with 
reference to external standards) with which an employee can in fact stake a claim 
that his particular form of expression is indeed ‘religious’ in nature. 
‘Legitimate’ Religion 
 
A potential starting point is to consider the legitimacy of the particular religion 
itself which is being invoked as the basis of an act of expression. For example, 
the wearing of a headscarf-hijab
56
 is a potential act of religious expression which 
invokes Islam. The initial question in determining legitimacy might therefore be 
to examine first the question, is Islam, upon which this act of putative religious 
expression relies, a legitimate religion? Here legitimacy is most likely to be 
defined in terms of ‘recognised’ or ‘worthy of recognition’ (by society). Having 
determined on this basis that, yes, Islam is in fact a legitimate religion, it would 
then be possible to progress to consider the particular form of religious 
expression which is associated by the employee with Islam to judge whether this 
form is indeed a valid (or legitimate) expression of Islam. In essence, this 
approach involves a two-stage test.
 57
 Most commentators do not follow a two-
stage approach and go directly to the particular religious belief being expressed 
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as their initial reference point.
58
 This religious belief is then scrutinised in 
various ways to determine its legitimacy. This may indeed be the preferred 
approach in many legal jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it remains at least 
theoretically possible to seek an initial definition of religion as a first hurdle to be 
overcome prior to addressing the substantive issue of the particular way in which 
a consequent belief is being made manifest.  
 
To identify whether this first hurdle has been crossed, requires therefore a 
consideration of how to recognise a legitimate religion. The attempt to define the 
essence of ‘religion’ has preoccupied academics from a number of fields and 
constructs have appeared from within a number of disciplines such as theology, 
philosophy, sociology, socio-economics and psychology.
59
Conceptualising 
religion itself therefore would be a complex and controversial enterprise and one 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. Fortunately, it is unnecessary for the 
purposes of the law and therefore this chapter. The need is not to define religion 
with a view to explaining it as a phenomenon but rather to define it descriptively 
for the purposes of being able to recognise it when it is engaged. This is 
potentially a more manageable exercise, though not without its difficulties. 
 
For the purposes of seeking this kind of definition, it is submitted that there is, 
theoretically, an identifiable continuum. At one end, anything which a person 
sincerely believes and values, and claims this belief as a religion on whatever 
basis, could be regarded as such by society and, as a result, by the law.
60
 This 
would be the most open and all-embracing definition. At the other end of the 
continuum, religion could be extremely tightly defined such that only certain 
(probably ancient) religions are recognised as legitimate (and in their orthodox 
forms).
61
 Both of these approaches are problematic. The major problem with the 
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latter is its inflexibility. Inflexible fixed categories deny any protections to new 
(authentic) religions or, potentially, to new movements within religions. The 
major problem with the former is that it risks becoming so all inclusive that the 
term loses its significance. Clarke and Byrne highlight this with their modern 
American examples of devotion to baseball or playing the stock market.
62
 If 
these are regarded as ‘religious’ then not only is the term trivialised but there can 
be no meaningful protections when all can claim religious rights on each and 
every pretext. An allied problem with the former is the possibility which is 
opened up for protection to be claimed for highly individualised forms of 
‘spirituality’ (sometimes vaguely defined), again hugely widening the scope of 
protection.
63
 A third problem is the difficulty which arises in attempting to gauge 
levels of sincerity.
64
 Whilst this problem could arise in any event, it is 
particularly significant where sincerity is the only real test to be employed. 
Sincerity is an extremely important requirement and it will be considered in some 
detail later in this chapter. 
 
Returning to the notional continuum, between the two polar opposites outlined 
above, there are a variety of ways of defining religion for descriptive purposes 
which seek in some way to limit the reach of the term whilst remaining generally 
inclusive. Clarke and Byrne provide a useful classification of the possible 
approaches to providing what they describe as an ‘operational’ definition of 
religion.
65
 Firstly, they identify ‘experiential’ definitions which seek to identify 
some general type of experience which could be described as religious in nature, 
such as ‘a disposition which enables men to apprehend the infinite under 
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different names and disguises.’ 66  The experiential definition is perhaps 
worryingly close to the subjective approach already considered (as it relies to a 
large extent on individual perception) and, as such, is likely to be similarly 
flawed. Secondly, there is a substantive or content-based definition which 
considers the substance of the beliefs associated with a religion. Vickers 
considers that Tillich's famous definition of faith as ‘ultimate concern’ falls into 
this category,
67
 although other content-based definitions are more explicit in 
making reference to man's awareness of a deity.
68
 There is a third approach 
which looks at the function which ‘religion’ plays in people’s lives. Deep social 
or individual needs are identified and religion is the institutional medium by 
which these needs are met. Yinger amplifies this ‘functional’ definition: 
  
Religion then can be defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means of which 
a group of people struggle with these ultimate problems of human life. It expresses 
their refusal to capitulate to death, to give up in the face of frustration, to allow 
hostility to tear apart their human aspirations.
69
  
  
Another definition is based around Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘family 
resemblance’ which he famously applied in a discussion of ‘games’. 
Wittgenstein observed that it may not be possible to identify a feature or 
characteristic which is common to all games. Instead, he proposed that such 
games are connected instead by a series of observable similarities.
70
 A number of 
writers have sought to apply this notion in the search for a definition of 
religion.
71
 The starting point is usually to create a list of typical features of 
generally recognised religions against which the features of a putative religion 
can be compared. Audi appears to adopt such an approach in suggesting nine 
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features which might assist in determining whether or not a religion is present: 
(1) belief in supernatural beings; (2) a distinction between sacred and profane 
objects; (3) ritual acts focused on those objects; (4) a moral code believed to be 
sanctioned by the god(s); (5) religious feelings of awe; (6) direct communication 
with the god(s), such as prayer: (7) a world view concerning the role of the 
individual in the universe; (8) a comprehensive approach to life based on the 
worldview; and (9) a collective organisation bound up with the latter.
72
 
Greenawalt adopts a similar set of criteria, explicitly based on observable 
commonalities between those religions which ‘virtually everyone’ would accept 
are religions (without the need to explain why).
73
 Both Audi and Greenawalt 
stress that not all the features need to be present in order to establish that a 
legitimate religion is being described. This is of course crucial to the approach. It 
is how closely the features of a putative religion resemble at least some of these 
criteria that matters.  
 
Notwithstanding the claims of the family resemblance approach, one of the most 
controversial issues historically in the search for a definition of religion is 
whether or not in fact theistic beliefs must be present for a religion to be so 
classified. Durkheim influentially thought not, given his observation that 
Buddhism, Taoism and Jainism, whilst in other ways performing the function of 
a religion and generally acknowledged as such, are non-theistic in character.
74
 
Other writers argue that if reference to the divine is not a necessary requirement 
for a religion then the term becomes vague and it becomes difficult in 
consequence to draw any meaningful distinctions between a system of beliefs 
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and a religion.
75
 For advocates of a functionalist approach this is not a difficulty 
– if a non-theistic belief system performs the social or individual role of a 
religion then it is better to classify it as such. Only this way could religion be 
seen to be a universal phenomenon.
 76
 This in turn elevates the importance of 
religion because ‘[s]omething fundamental to human life in society is being 
tackled by the theory of religion and not merely an institution important in some 
localities and epochs.’77 It should be noted, however, that such a conclusion 
could only be possible from an entirely external perspective. Amongst those who 
accept the truth claims of a particular religion, many are likely to reject this 
purely functionalist premise as per se human-centred. Religion, for Christians, 
Jews and Muslims, for example, could be characterised rather as humankind’s 
obligation towards, or response to, the divine, and as such it is God-centred in the 
sense that God and not humankind is the initial reference point. 
 
Thus, in addition to the extremes of exclusivity and inclusivity of definition 
initially outlined, law makers and judges have a range of intermediate approaches 
to draw on when seeking to identify whether or not a legitimate religion is being 
invoked. They can draw on experiential, substantive, functionalist or family-
resemblance definitions, or some combination of these. The issue of whether or 
not a religion requires reference to a divine presence need only be of significance 
if, in a legal system, religion is privileged above some form of coherent 
philosophical framework for understanding life. Many legal jurisdictions may 
prefer to bracket the two together to create a joint classification of ‘religion and 
belief.’ 78  This, inter alia, would sidestep the debate over, for example, the 
precise status of Buddhism – whether it is a religion or a similar philosophical 
belief becomes unimportant if it is to receive the same legal privileges in either 
case.
79
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Legitimate religious expression 
 
If the two-stage test is adopted, and the legitimacy of a religion is accepted, the 
second stage of the test will then take effect. This will involve an assessment of 
the legitimacy of the particular form of expression seeking to invoke the 
legitimate religion. Alternatively, if the two stage test is rejected, this is the initial 
point of inquiry. The question, in either case, can be stated thus, is the form of 
religious expression to be invoked ‘legitimate’ or not? It should be recalled that, 
in practice, this question is only likely to arise in relation to potentially 
contentious forms of religious expression.  
 
Addressing this initial question involves encountering the same problem already 
considered when seeking to identify legitimate religion. Once again there is a 
continuum which, at one end, would allow individuals to express their religion in 
any way they wish, without any other form of legitimatisation; at the other end, 
would strictly recognise only certain forms of religious expression based on 
either an independent observation of how adherents of the major recognised 
religions choose to express their religious faith, or an interrogation of the sources 
of authority within each religion to determine what the religion requires (or 
desires) of its adherents. Between these two points, there may be some 
intermediary positions which seek, in different ways, to maintain a balance 
between the twin dangers of ‘under-inclusiveness’ and ‘over-inclusiveness’, with 
a recognition of the former as the worst evil.
80
 
 
Individual Interpretation 
 
The problem with regarding as legitimate unrestrained individual expression 
‘hooked on’ to a recognised religion is perhaps obvious. In a trenchant comment 
on the judgment in the Canadian case of Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem
81
 Ogilvy 
notes the application in a property dispute of what she regards as just this 
approach – the only requirement the court imposed before recognising the 
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legitimacy of the chosen ‘religious’ expression of a group of Orthodox Jews was 
sincerity of belief, or what she styles ‘a subjective sincerity in any self-concoted 
beliefs whatever’.82 This decision avoided what the court thought undesirable – 
that it should be involved in any way in seeking to determine whether or not 
religious doctrine could be invoked in any particular case. Indeed this may be the 
advantage of allowing individuals (as long as they are sincere) to be the sole 
arbiters of the justice of their own forms of religious expression. Unfortunately 
there is a considerable disadvantage, as observed in an Australian case: ‘[t]he 
mantle of immunity would soon be in tatters if it were wrapped around beliefs, 
practices and observances of any kind whenever a group of adherents chose to 
call them a religion’.83 In other words, the broader the view that is taken of what 
constitutes religious expression, the weaker the protection (or ‘immunity’) is 
likely, of necessity, to be. 
 
External Observation 
 
Another way of seeking to identify legitimate religious expression is through the 
study of adherents of recognised religions in order to identify types of religious 
expression which are common amongst adherents of those religions. This 
approach has been explicitly endorsed by Australian judges of the High Court: 
 
There is no single characteristic which can be laid down as constituting a formalized 
legal criterion [for the recognition of religious practices] … The most that can be 
done is to formulate the more important of the indicia or guidelines by reference to 
which that question falls to be answered. These indicia must, in the view we take, be 
derived from empirical observation of accepted religions.
84
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Some academic treatments of ‘religion in the workplace’ adopt a similar 
approach.
 85
   
 
Whereas this overall ‘external’ approach is useful, not least because it allows 
ready linkages to be made between religious and workplace practices, there are 
attendant disadvantages. Durkheim identifies the major problems with  
 
… observing the complex religions which appear in the course of history. Every one 
of these is made up of such a variety of elements that it is very difficult to 
distinguish what is secondary from what is principal, the essential from the 
accessory.
86
 
 
In other words there are two disadvantages to the observation-driven approach. 
Firstly, it fails to fully capture the complexity of different forms of religious 
expression and is therefore, at best, a rough and ready gauge, potentially 
unsuitable for application in complex cases in the court room or tribunal 
chamber. Secondly, it fails (or may fail) to distinguish between forms of 
expression which are primary to a religion and forms of expression which are 
secondary, or perhaps entirely unnecessary. Such information might be useful in 
an initial assessment of the cost to the religious employee of being prevented by 
an employer from engaging a particular form of religious expression in the 
workplace; being denied the right to wear a turban might, for the sake of 
argument, be more costly to a Sikh man than being denied the right to wear a 
headscarf might be to a Muslim woman – the observation approach would not 
assist in making that judgment. 
 
Religion-led Approach 
 
A very different approach would involve a consideration of legitimate religious 
expression based on the requirements of the particular tenets or belief systems of 
the respective religion invoked. The great advantage of this approach is that it 
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allows not only the identification of legitimate practices but permits more 
nuanced distinctions to be explored. For example, Ahdar and Leigh identify three 
types of ‘conduct’ or expression – those which are respectively permitted, 
required or prohibited by a given religion.
87
 Clearly absolute requirements or 
prohibitions are likely to be considered, from an external perspective, more 
fundamental to a religious adherent as opposed to that which simply permitted 
(in the sense of practices or conduct encouraged by a given religion, i.e. 
supererogation). Similarly, ECHR jurisprudence has identified a distinction 
between conduct ‘necessary’ to (i.e. explicitly mandated by) a religion and 
conduct which is ‘religiously-motivated’, with the former usually enjoying a 
degree of protection denied to the latter.
88
 It is submitted here that it is only 
possible to make these kinds of distinctions satisfactorily with the aid of some 
form of analysis of belief systems themselves.  
 
However, when such an analysis is applied, it would appear to yield some 
interesting results and indeed might call into question even the most seemingly 
well-established examples of religious expression. The debate on whether or not 
the wearing by Muslim women of a headscarf is mandated by Islam is well 
known – with a number of scholars denying that it is a tenet of the faith at all, but 
rather a voluntarily assumed practice.
89
 Roman Catholic Christians claiming a 
religious obligation to wear a crucifix will find this deeply contested within the 
Christian tradition – some protestants regard the display of a crucifix (a visual 
image of God the Son) as breaking the second of the ten commandments and thus 
a grave sin.
90 
Even the wearing of a turban by Sikh men has been contested as a 
religious obligation. This is on the basis that the actual requirement in Sikhism 
under the Khalsa (a ritual instituted by the last of the ten gurus of Sikhism) is for 
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hair to remain uncut not to be covered by a turban.
91
 The turban in fact started 
life as simply the most practical way to achieve this.
92
 
 
Thus it might appear that, under a religion-led approach to identifying legitimate 
forms of religious expression, there is danger of finding limited support for a 
number of forms of apparently religious expression in which a large number of 
followers of particular religions engage. It is submitted that this need not be the 
case. This problem only arises if the bases of religious belief are approached 
narrowly or selectively and a broader approach should provide a surer foundation 
for identifying legitimate forms of religious expression. Religious belief systems 
are in fact derived from a range of religious authorities. Audi is helpful in 
identifying such a range within the Judeo-Christian tradition, although also 
claims an application (in varying degrees) to other religious traditions. He 
identifies five sources: 
 
(1) scripture; (2) non-scriptural religious authority, especially that of the clergy, but 
including the authority of the relevant community, such as the religion’s theological 
community if there is one; (3) tradition, which may be quite authoritative, including 
as it does presumptions regarding one’s religions obligations and also habits that, 
whether or not they have a scriptural or theological endorsement, can have strong 
momentum in a community; (4) religious experience; and (5) natural theology … .
93
 
 
Some of these categories may be problematic – above all ‘religious experience’ 
which, unless ‘triangulated’ by another source of authority runs the risk of 
creating precisely the kind of individualised religious expression already 
considered. This form of authority aside, Audi’s inclusion of recognised 
‘secondary’ forms of authority (akin to the writings of the Church Fathers, for 
example),
 
and of well-established and widely shared (though not necessarily 
universal) religious tradition, is extremely helpful. Edge considers that English 
courts historically have shown a preference for drawing on well-established 
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textual authority (which he calls ‘the wisdom of the dead’), and, in more recent 
times, an increasing reliance on the contemporary practices of religious 
communities themselves.
94
 Allowing additional sources of authority such as 
these would legitimise the Islamic headscarf, as representing a well-established 
religious tradition. The turban would be legitimised on the same basis, given that 
over time it has developed a deep symbolic importance crucial to the way in 
which many Sikhs understand their religious identity.
95
 The wearing of a crucifix 
could perhaps also represent a well-established, if controversial, religious 
tradition, and might also derive authority from a secondary source; as Addison 
notes, the Seventh Ecumenical Council of 787 AD set out a Christian duty to 
venerate and display certain objects such as icons, statues and crosses.
96
 What the 
religion-led approach might also do is indicate the contexts in which forms of 
religious expression might be regarded as legitimate. It is one thing to wear a 
crucifix on good authority and another to feel obliged to do this in the workplace 
– the religion-led approach would yield information as to why and when certain 
forms of religious expression are required by religious adherents.  
 
Despite the merits of this approach, particularly in its broadest terms, there 
remain problems. Those who view religious practices as ‘frequently contested 
and subject to change’,97 are unlikely to support an approach (heavily weighted 
towards ancient sources and historical traditions) which would appear to be 
hostile to recognising the legitimacy of innovation in religious practice. 
Secondly, and perhaps most significantly, a religion-led approach may require 
courts to involve themselves in some way in determining the requirements of 
religious doctrine. For many commentators this represents an unacceptable 
intrusion by the courts into an area beyond its legitimate scope.
98
 Others, 
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however, appear to be more sanguine, pointing to the likely reliance on expert 
witnesses from within a particular religious tradition who would be (presumably) 
steeped in the knowledge and experience of the religious practices in question.
99
  
The importance of sincerity 
 
Thus far, in this chapter a range of possible approaches towards recognising 
‘legitimate’ religious beliefs and practices has been considered. Whatever the 
approach taken there is a hugely significant question which must also be 
addressed – is the individual sincere in the religious beliefs she holds? This 
question is clearly absolutely central if no other test of legitimacy is applied. 
However, it is also important in cases where religious beliefs and forms of 
expression are accepted as legitimate for doctrinal or historical reasons. It is one 
thing to invoke a belief, particularly if there is a perceived benefit in so doing; it 
is another to actually hold that belief with integrity. An investigation of sincerity 
should therefore greatly assist in separating ‘sham’ claims and claims based on 
genuine belief and practice. It is to this issue of sincerity - how to conceptualise 
and measure it - that this discussion will now turn.
100
 
 
A helpful definition of ‘sincerity’ from a court’s perspective is that provided in 
Amselem as ‘imply[ing] an honesty of belief and the court’s role is to ensure a 
presently asserted belief is in good faith, neither fictitious nor capricious and that 
it is not an artifice.’ 101  An individual’s ‘sincerity’ is generally framed as a 
question of fact for the court to determine.
102
 As the court is therefore required to 
engage in some form of legal inquiry, it seems not inappropriate to refer to this as 
a ‘test’.  
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A test of sincerity can be criticised on an operational level as at best somewhat 
elusive in spite of judicial efforts to define it more clearly.
103
 Indeed it may be so 
elusive that courts in the West have tended, as Ahdar and Leigh note, to accept 
all but the most patently fraudulent claims.
104
 This being the case, and given its 
key role in differentiating between worthy and unworthy claims, there is surely 
merit in subjecting the issue of individual sincerity to greater levels of scrutiny 
with a view to developing a more consistent and robust approach which might be 
useful to both courts and, in modified terms, to those such as employers who 
might sometimes be required to take a view on whether or not a professed 
religious faith is genuine.
 
  
Sadurski, whilst rather sanguine about the need to do so, explores this issue from 
a judicial perspective and identifies three elements for measuring the sincerity of 
a claim for religious exemption: 
i. the conformity of this claim with the written or empirically verifiable 
traditions and proscriptions of the religion or the cult;  
ii. congruence between the professed religious tenets and one’s actions; and 
iii. the willingness to undertake alternative duties and burdens, equally onerous 
but neutral from the point of view of that religion’s proscriptions, etc.105 
Unless applied at a very basic level indeed, the first element does look rather like 
a test of doctrine (in its loosest sense) which is surely, in reality, quite different 
from a sincerity test. The second and third elements are, however, more 
compelling. With regard to the third, certainly in the workplace, requiring that a 
religious employee makes some form of reciprocal ‘sacrifice’ in exchange for 
being excused from a particular task on religious grounds, might quickly reveal 
how far there is a genuinely held desire to abstain from that task. For example, a 
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Muslim factory worker might authenticate the genuineness of a request for time 
off for prayers on Friday afternoons by accepting a potentially unattractive 
Saturday evening shift as an alternative. However, not all occupations and not all 
religious beliefs lend themselves to such an easy trade off. The case of Ahmad v 
Inner London Education Authority,
106
 for example, illustrates the difficulty of 
finding an appropriate time trade off in a profession with fixed hours such as that 
of a school teacher. In this case, Ahmad, a Muslim, wished to absent himself 
from the classroom on Friday afternoons for prayer – the only trade off which 
could be contemplated was the financially disadvantageous one of a reduction in 
wages to reflect the reduction in hours worked – and this was not acceptable to 
him.  It is more problematic still to see how the principle of reciprocal sacrifice 
might work in cases where the right to wear a particular form of religious dress 
or adornment is the key claim.
107
 The immediate difficulty would involve 
quantifying the ‘loss’ to another party (such as an employer) and the second very 
practical difficulty would lie in quantifying an appropriate means by which 
‘compensation’ might be made for this loss. 
 
Sadurski’s second element, however, appears to be potentially more all-
embracing of the various ways in which individuals might manifest their 
religious beliefs. This element is very close, if applied systematically, to what 
might be termed ‘a consistency test’. In brief, this could be defined as a measure 
of how far the individual’s actions are in conformity with the religious belief or 
beliefs on which he is relying. This is potentially a very useful means of 
measuring sincerity as it relies on the congruence between belief and action,
108
 
and is worthy of fuller development.  
 
It would seem that something very like a consistency ‘test’ was considered by the 
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ECtHR in Kosteki v the Former Yugoslav Republic.
109
 Kosteki (on two separate 
occasions) took a day’s unauthorised absence at the expense of his employer, the 
Electric Company of Macedonia, during Muslim festivals. On both occasions he 
was fined by his employer as a disciplinary sanction. In a subsequent court case, 
the Bitola Municipal Court found that Kosteki had not provided evidence that he 
was a Muslim. His previous conduct weighed heavily with the court which noted 
that: he had never been absent from work during a Muslim holiday before a 
particular date; instead he had celebrated Christian holidays; his way of life 
suggested he was a Christian; and both this parents were Christians. The 
approach by the Court was challenged by Kosteki under Article 9. The ECtHR 
dismissed the case, and judged that a requirement to show evidence of allegiance 
to a particular faith was ‘not unreasonable or disproportionate’ and that it was 
within the scope of the margin of appreciation for member states to require this.  
 
It should perhaps be noted at this point that there may be occasions where an 
individual appears to have acted inconsistently but where this may not 
necessarily be indicative of insincerity. Inconsistency may sometimes result from 
fear or other pressures;
 110
 an unconscious double standard rooted in an 
individual interpretation (or, to others, mis-interpretation) of religious 
doctrine;
111
 or may be the natural effect of a very recent religious conversion or 
decision to take one’s religion more seriously. 112  Thus, the test should be 
approached with caution and contextual factors fully explored. With appropriate 
provisos, however, it is submitted that a consistency test is nevertheless an 
extremely useful aid to determining sincerity in religion and belief claims. 
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The Nature of the Workplace 
 
The term workplace has been utilised in this chapter (and will be elsewhere in 
this thesis) in broad terms in order to be inclusive of a variety of forums (in the 
private, public, quasi-public and voluntary sectors) where people work under 
various different contractual arrangements, such as: employees (full time, part-
time or fixed term), office-holders, self-employed contractors, casual workers 
and agency workers). There is a distinction which can be drawn, which is 
relevant to the analysis in this thesis, between public and private sector workers. 
It can be argued that public sector workers, perhaps particularly office-holders, 
because they carry out the functions of the Government (e.g. as judges, 
magistrates, registrars tax officials, etc.) could be said to ‘represent’ the state in 
ways that private sector workers clearly do not. If they represent the state then, 
under one argument, they should be more constrained in their religious 
expression, particularly if that form of religious expression might be perceived to 
have negative implications for particular communities, such as people of other 
religious faiths or gay and lesbian people, otherwise the impression may be given 
that the state is supportive of discriminatory conduct against particular social 
groups and the perceived neutrality of the services provided by Government 
would therefore be compromised.  Such arguments will be considered in more 
detail when applied to the office of Registrar of Marriages in Chapter 5.
113
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the workplace in the United Kingdom is governed by 
employment law, many aspects of which have a wide reach beyond the ‘pure’ 
employment relationship to govern all worker-employer relationships 
(discrimination law is the most significant example of this). Most workers will 
also be bound by organisational internal policies and procedures, although these 
are often most detailed for employees (and may sometimes form part of the 
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employment contract).  Some public office holders will be bound by additional 
regulations of various kinds, such as a professional oath of office (for example in 
the case of judges or legislators). Members of professions will also be regulated 
by professional bodies, some of which have had authority conveyed upon them, 
by statutory instrument, to issue codes of conduct and other binding regulations 
on their members, and with the power to police these – the clearest example of 
this is the General Medical Council in the United Kingdom. This means that 
some groups of employees will be bound by two sets of ‘regulations’ – those 
applying to them by virtue of their specific professions, and those applying to 
them more generally in their capacity as employees of particular organisations. 
Conclusion 
 
Two central concerns have occupied this chapter. The first has been to seek to 
map out the various ways in which an individual might express his religious 
convictions and to consider the consequent effects, if any, on the workplace, and 
in particular other actors therein. It has been suggested that certain forms of 
religious expression, those which are overtly religious in nature, have the 
strongest potential to pose a ‘problem’, whilst not discounting the possibility that 
expression which is less overt and even identity and belief itself may, in some 
instances, lead to conflicts of some kind – although instances are likely to be 
rare. With this in mind, the focus of the next chapter will be concerned primarily 
with outward forms of manifestation of religion and the potential legal interest in 
regulating any resultant conflicts within the workplace. 
 
In recognising the potential for conflict, the second part of this chapter was 
premised on the resulting desirability of seeking to limit any recognition of the 
right to expression of religious belief to situations where such belief can be 
considered ‘legitimate’. Whilst a measure of agreement can be found that only 
sincerely held-beliefs should be recognised (and it has been argued here that the 
consistency of individual conduct, with appropriate provisos, should be the key 
test to determine this), opinions differ on any further filters which should be 
applied. Those commentators supportive of religious rights are divided on this 
issue. Nevertheless, it is perhaps possible to identify two emergent positions. 
51 
Those who adopt a relativist approach to religion, for whom there is a blurring of 
boundaries between religion, belief and free expression (all of which are 
regarded as fluid), are most likely to be supportive of a form of ‘individual’ 
subjective understanding of legitimate religious expression. Those who adopt a 
more traditional approach to understanding religions as clear, bounded and (to 
some extent) complete systems governing the central questions of human life, 
may be attracted to the less individualised approaches, perhaps particularly the 
religion-led approach outlined here. For those with such a traditional 
interpretation of religion and its role, the individual-subjective approach is 
potentially dangerously reductionist. As Ogilvy warns, if  
 
religion is reduced to the private personal beliefs of one person, provided a court 
finds that person's sincerity credible … [then] in the face of an expanding state, a 
sceptical judiciary and an exceedingly hostile secularised society, in which all 
religious beliefs are treated as incredible … religious belief will be reduced to 
whimsy.
114
 
 
It is submitted that a religion-led approach to identifying legitimate forms of 
religious expression (such as that outlined earlier) is to be preferred and indeed 
will be the assumed method of characterisation of religious expression 
underlying the discussion in Chapter 3. This position can be justified as follows. 
Taking into account a range of recognised sources of religious beliefs, practices 
and traditions (such as those proposed by Audi) would help to prevent courts 
from taking an unduly narrow approach to identifying legitimate religious 
practices (which might follow, for example, from reliance on one source alone 
such as a sacred text). At the same time, limiting the range of reference points 
(albeit in a nuanced and generous way) would help to guard against an 
unattractive and ultimately unmanageable ‘free-for-all’ as individuals adopt the 
language of religion to refer to quite individualised ‘spiritual’ practices of 
various kinds. As has been seen, an indulgent over-inclusiveness risks widening 
any available legal protection unsustainably. More concerningly, as Ogilvy 
recognises, it risks trivialising religious expression in a way which might provide 
useful ammunition to those generally hostile to it. Why such hostility might arise 
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will be considered in the next chapter when the discussion will turn from the 
consideration of the nature and legitimacy per se of forms of religious expression 
to the value placed on religious expression. It is thus an appropriate point to turn 
from the discussion of the nature and legitimacy of religious expression to the 
position taken in response to incidence of religious expression in the workplace 
by the other actors referred to by Ogilvy, and in particular the state. What, if any, 
interest might it have in supporting or suppressing religious expression? This is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Restricting or Guaranteeing Religious 
Freedom in the Workplace: Legal Models  
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the possible legal and policy 
approaches which might be taken within a modern liberal state towards the 
restriction or guarantee of religious freedom of expression in the workplace, 
ranging from a deliberate strategy of suppression of religious freedom to the 
provision of an absolute guarantee. Each model, taken individually, would 
represent respectively a surprisingly homogenous approach towards state 
intervention in respect of religious freedom in the workplace. In reality it is likely 
that a given state may, over time, rely on aspects drawn from several of these 
models and so a complex patchwork of approaches, some of which may be, at 
points, mutually contradictory, is likely to emerge. Nevertheless, there is value 
for analytical purposes in examining and critiquing each model individually. 
 
In this chapter, six models of state approaches will first be presented and briefly 
described. Following this, each model will be considered individually in more 
detail to explore the respective underlying rationale and implications, and to offer 
a critique. 
 
The Six Models 
 
I Exclusion 
 
Under the first model, the law acts specifically to exclude religious expression 
from the workplace. Within this overall approach, characterised by a desire to 
suppress, there are degrees of exclusion. Entirely exclusionary approaches - such 
as the imposition of a religious test to exclude absolutely workers who identify 
themselves as holding religious beliefs from entry into the workplace – would 
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usually be characterised as illiberal and are therefore likely to lie outside the 
parameters of this study.  
 
In a liberal society, it is surely more likely as a general but not an absolute rule, 
that the focus would be less on workers’ actual (or suspected) beliefs and more 
on the ways in which those beliefs find expression in the workplace (as discussed 
in the previous chapter) - here there might be possible justifications for imposing 
restrictions, for example, on particular forms of dress, or the right to follow 
conscience, or on workers to trying to influence others from a religious 
perspective.  
 
II Support for a Preferred Historic Religion  
 
Under the second model, the law supports the expression of a preferred religion 
or religious denomination in the workplace. This religion may be the established 
religion, or historically the majority religion in a given State. For example, 
certain government offices or posts might be reserved for adherents of a 
particular religious faith. In Seventeenth Century England this was achieved 
through the Tests Acts of 1672 and 1678, which required that all public 
officeholders should take the oaths of allegiance to the Crown, and acknowledge 
royal supremacy over the Church, denounce transubstantiation and receive the 
sacrament of Holy Communion according to the rites of the Church of England. 
Thus, non-Anglicans were disbarred from all public office.
1
 In a modern liberal 
state, preference for an historic religion is unlikely to involve such blatant 
discrimination against others. However, if examples of mild preferential 
treatment for a preferred historic religion continue to exist, this may result from a 
lingering desire to preserve its cultural value (or contribution to the national 
‘heritage’). 
 
                                                 
1
 Until the passage of the Sacramental Test Act 1828 and the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829. 
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III Laissez-faire 
 
Under the third model, the state does not consider it has a sufficiently strong 
interest in supporting or restricting workplace religious expression. It allows 
employers to determine how much freedom to offer employees, and employees 
in turn can accept or reject those terms. This model is clearly applicable to 
private enterprises but its application to government workers is more 
problematic, given that the model gives discretion to employers to determine the 
level and forms of religious expression to be tolerated – the state as employer 
(rather than as legislator) would need to determine this for its own workers. 
 
IV ‘Islands of Exclusivity’ 
 
There is a tradition within Christianity of separation between ‘sacred’ work and 
‘secular’ work.2 It was based on an understanding of this binary division that the 
monastic movement developed in the fourth and fifth centuries, creating small 
communities of individuals, living working and worshipping together, having 
voluntarily accepted considerable restrictions on their liberty, including famously 
the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience.
3
  
 
A modern state, preferring a secularised workplace, may wish to draw inspiration 
from this to legislate to provide ‘safe havens’ (or ‘islands of exclusivity’4) where 
groups of people with particular strong religious convictions could work 
together, their right to associate in this way protected by law, although how far 
this might extend is likely to be more controversial. 
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56 
V Protection for Religion 
 
Under this model, there is legal recognition for a right of religious expression in 
the workplace and a degree of corresponding protection, either through negative 
or positive means. Negative means might involve the employment of a basic 
form of anti-discrimination law preventing direct discrimination and possibly 
indirect discrimination.
5
 Positive means might involve the creation of statutory 
rights which protect religious expression or the use of a more advanced form of 
anti-discrimination law preventing harassment and/or requiring the promotion of 
equality for religious employees in the workplace.
6
 A variant of this model 
involves the widening of ‘religion’ to include ‘belief’ and thus offer equivalent 
protections to non-theistic belief systems in the same way as to theistic religions. 
 
VI Protection for Minority Religions 
 
This model is a variant of the fifth model. Under this model however the focus is 
on protection for religious minorities and assumes that they are disadvantaged 
groups. Specifically protecting the religious traditions of these minority groups, 
in a variety of contexts, is considered desirable until such time as these groups 
are no longer perceived (by themselves or others) as suffering disadvantage. If 
and when such a point is reached, then any ‘special’ protections may be lifted. 
 
Summary 
 
Each of the six models presented here rests upon the adoption of a number of 
assumptions and values within a modern state, although each can be traced to a 
particular principle. For the first, the principle is to ascribe most value to 
secularism. For the second, the principle is to value a particular religion either for 
its own sake or for its role in the national heritage. For the third, the principle is 
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the primacy in the workplace of freedom of contract. For the fourth, the principle 
is to make special accommodations for those out of step with the social and 
economic ‘mainstream’. For the fifth, the principle is to ascribe (some form) of 
value to religious expression within the social and economic mainstream. For the 
sixth, a guarantee of freedom of religious expression is one means of correcting 
group disadvantage for members of minority groups. All of these principles 
require explanation and justification and are open to critique. This is the purpose 
of the rest of this chapter. The overall headings used when setting out the models 
will be employed a second time for ease. 
 
Exclusion 
 
As a general rule, it is religious expression rather than belief which is likely to be 
the target of any state interest in exclusion and this will be the primary area for 
discussion in this section. Nevertheless, the possibility was raised earlier that 
there is at least one example in a liberal society where exclusion of individuals 
from certain employment positions might be justified on the basis of belief rather 
than expression. This is on the grounds of national security where the religious 
belief in question is either considered subversive in its own right or a number of 
adherents of that religion are thought to be (or likely to be) engaged in activities 
which in some way are subversive of state interests. This possibility will be 
considered briefly now as a preface to the more substantive issue of religious 
expression.  
 
Religious Belief 
 
The notion that individuals might be excluded from employment due to belief is 
most likely to be justified as a result of the perceived threat to the state that they 
pose. Thus, it is likely that the roles in question will be few in number and in 
areas where there is potential to do grave damage to the interests of the state. 
Such roles are therefore likely to encompass a restricted number of public 
appointments (such as officers of the security services, officials in the foreign 
office, the police, and members of the armed forces) and an even smaller number 
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of private sector roles (such as employees of government defence contractors or 
private security services commissioned by the government). 
 
Prospective and current occupants of such roles might go through a ‘vetting 
procedure’ of some kind. The purpose of this vetting procedure will be to 
identify the potential threat (if any) that they pose. Such vetting in a modern 
liberal state will aim to ‘exclude the disloyal or those considered prone to 
disloyalty’ as opposed to ‘those who appear to lack the necessary impartial 
public stance.’7 Nevertheless, it may be a difficult distinction, in practice, to 
identify.  
 
It is unlikely that a vetting process would be aimed at the exclusion of employees 
with religious convictions per se. Nevertheless, this may be an indirect result of 
the process. Writing in 1994, Lustgarten and Leigh insightfully predicted that the 
list of those attitudes to be excluded with potential for subversion ‘could be 
extended in future (say) to views such as radical Muslim fundamentalism’.8 Thus 
the link is established between religiously-motivated ideas which could be 
characterised as political and which have the potential to subvert the state. The 
logical conclusion therefore is that individuals with particular religious beliefs 
might qualify for exclusion through a vetting process.  
 
Many people would consider that a strong case might exist for such exclusion 
where the national interest is threatened in some way, particularly if a terrorist 
threat is suspected. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth considering in more detail 
exactly the basis on which an ‘exclusionary’ decision might be made following 
vetting. Lustgarten and Leigh provide the following examples of factors 
considered in the British so-called ‘Enhanced Positive Vetting’ process of the 
early 1990s. Not only did the process involve inquiries into the personal history 
of the individual but also details of relatives, contacts with individuals in 
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‘suspect’ countries (then the communist and former communist nations of the 
east), and ‘all visits abroad since the age of 14.’9  
 
Within such a regime, it is not difficult to see that the clear possibility might exist 
that an individual, entirely innocent of holding subversive beliefs, might be 
excluded from certain employment roles by virtue of an unfortunate, even 
unintended, association with someone less innocent. In Home Office v Tariq,
10
 
for example, the Home Office successfully appealed a Court of Appeal judgment 
in favour of a Muslim immigration officer who had his security clearance 
withdrawn on the grounds of national security when the Home Office learned 
that his brother and cousin were being investigated for alleged Islamic terrorist 
offences. The Home Office justified its stance on the basis that his ‘close 
association with individuals suspected of involvement in plans to mount terrorist 
attacks’ made Tariq ‘vulnerable to attempts to exert undue influence on [him] to 
abuse his position.’11 In another example, a Muslim police officer who applied to 
join a protection unit for senior politicians was reportedly excluded from such 
employment because the imam at the Mosque which his family attended was 
suspected of links with a terrorist organisation.
12
 The possibility of an ‘unfair’ 
outcome from such a vetting procedure, at times indirectly restrictive of those 
with a particular religious identity, will be magnified in proportion to the extent 
to which ‘subjective assessments of character, attitude, and risk’ are intrinsic to 
the vetting procedure employed.
13
  
 
It should be noted from the argument presented thus far that outright exclusion of 
people with religious beliefs, however problematic in practice, can be justified in 
a liberal democracy only on the basis of genuine concerns for the security of the 
state or its citizens. There is, however, the further possibility, considered in 
Chapter 2, that public distaste, either real or imagined, for a particular religious 
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worldview to lead to the exclusion from certain workplace roles of adherents of 
that religion. Reconciling this within a liberal polity is likely, however, to be 
much more problematic. 
 
Religious Expression: Rationale & Implications 
 
The discussion will now turn, from the relatively rare overt examples of 
exclusion because of religious belief from certain employment roles, to the more 
contested area of exclusion on the basis of religious expression. 
 
The notion that the expression of religion or religious beliefs, verbally, through 
dress and grooming or through conscientious objection (as discussed in Chapter 
2), might be excluded from the workplace at first glance appears somewhat 
illiberal and therefore requires early justification. In order to seek such 
justification it is necessary to apply, indirectly, a significant debate about the role 
of religion in public life. The essential question on which the debate rests is how 
far is it permissible for a person ‘A’ to offer reasons for courses of action which 
will restrict the liberty of another person ‘B’ which are based on the religious 
beliefs of A (which B does not share)? The reason the question is pressing is the 
desire to avoid the strife which might be caused within a pluralistic, liberal 
society based on conflicting religious and non-religious beliefs. Before the issue 
is elaborated, a prima facie rationale is clearly required as to why this debate, 
whilst relevant at a political level, should be relevant within the workplace. The 
justification is two-fold. Firstly, theorists from Rawls onwards explicitly include 
government officials as amongst those encompassed by their theories.
14
  
Greenawalt, for example, develops an illustration based on a dilemma 
experienced by a hypothetical tax official.
15
 Secondly, other theorists, 
particularly those writing from a business ethics perspective, have developed an 
application of the issue to the workplace, which will be considered shortly. 
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The debate will be presented in summary form here.
16
 In broad terms there are 
two positions. Rawls is the most well-known exponent of the first theory (which 
will be referred to here as ‘the public reason requirement’)17 although it is held, 
with significant variations in terminology and application, by a number of liberal 
political philosophers such as Audi,
18
 Greenawalt,
19
 Lamore,
20
 Nagel
21
 and 
Habermas.
22
 The case for the public reason requirement will be summarised here 
and extended to the workplace.  
 
Rawls believes that it is necessary when engaging in debate on what he calls 
‘constitutional essentials’ to refrain from presenting arguments based on what he 
calls ‘comprehensive views’, a term embracing both religious and other 
worldviews and defined helpfully by Greenawalt as ‘overall perspectives that 
provide a (relatively) full account of moral responsibilities and fulfilling human 
lives.’23 Constitutional essentials include not only the fundamental principles on 
which a particular political democracy rests, but also ‘equal basic rights and 
liberties of citizenship … such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, 
liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the 
protections of the rule of law.’24 
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Rawls believes that on these issues (particularly if they involve the possibility of 
the coercion of others),
25
 legislators and public office holders, as well as citizens 
who wish to exhibit ‘civic virtue’, have a duty of civility to employ arguments 
which rest on foundations which are accepted as legitimate by all ‘reasonable’ 
citizens. These foundations are rooted in a so-called ‘overlapping consensus’ of 
opinion between holders of various different comprehensive views, with a 
consensus emerging from a disciplined effort to identify those ‘values that the 
others can reasonably be expected to endorse’26 within the area of overlap – 
public discussion based on anything else is ultra vires as it fails the test of 
‘public reason’. 
 
Rawls, later added a ‘proviso’ to his theory in which he accepted the legitimacy 
of ‘introducing at any time our comprehensive doctrine … provided that in due 
course we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our 
comprehensive doctrine is said to support.’27 Audi refers to his variant of the 
proviso as a ‘principle of secular rationale’ which imposes ‘a prima facie 
obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts 
human conduct, unless one has, or is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for 
this advocacy or support.’28 
 
In other words, a religious individual may introduce arguments based on 
religious beliefs but is required to justify them absolutely according to the 
demands of public reason. The duty of civility is therefore breached if an 
individual introduces religious arguments which cannot be justified by another 
(very different) route. Audi goes further by introducing another precondition, his 
‘principle of secular motivation’ which requires that not only must one offer 
adequate secular reasons but one must also be motivated by those reasons to the 
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extent that one would still advocate a particular course of action even if one’s 
additional religious reasons were removed.
29
  
 
Having set out the essence of the ‘public reason’ theory, it is now necessary to 
turn again to an application to workers. Firstly, as stated earlier, Rawls’ theory is 
explicitly applied to public officials (above all judges) who must be guided in 
their decision-making and public pronouncements by the dictates of public 
reason. Secondly, as regards public sector workers more generally it is possible 
to conclude, with Pava, that ‘[a]lthough he does not state it in these terms, 
[Rawls’] theory suggests the common-sense view that political liberalism is 
possible to the extent that public institutions are ruled by public reasons only.’30 
Thus, those in positions of authority of various kinds in the public sector are also 
bound by the requirements of public reason in the execution of their duties. 
Thirdly, it is possible to see an application of the public reason requirement to 
workers in the private sector also, although this requires a slightly greater 
stretching of the theory. As Pava notes, although Rawls does identify social 
institutions within which actors are exempt from the requirements of public 
reason, the business organisation is not amongst these, but neither is the business 
organisation specifically cited as a public institution where a public reason 
requirement might be inferred. 
 
A relevant argument has already been presented in support of the notion that the 
workplace is (to a certain extent) part of the public square, at least from the 
perspective of the religious employee.
31
 From a secular perspective, such a 
conclusion may also be reached. Pava, although he allows the business 
organisation only ‘quasi-public’ status, notes that two key variables in a theory of 
liberalism are membership and power and that these concepts can also be applied 
to the workplace: ‘[m]ore often than not one is a member, in a broad sense of a 
corporation whether he likes or not, and one is subject to corporate power, even 
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if it is against one’s will.’32 Just as leaving a given society to go to another one 
can be difficult and is certainly very costly, so too, argues Pava, can leaving a 
large corporation. To that extent it functions like a mini-society (with a ‘mini-
government’) where workers are members and therefore owe corporate 
allegiance.  
 
Thus, if Pava’s argument is accepted, then it is possible to extend the theory so 
that workers in the private sector (or at least private corporations exhibiting some 
or all of the features considered above) are also covered by the requirements of 
public reason in the exercise of any authority they may have over others, because 
such ‘corporate’ power can be coercive of others in the same way as power 
exercised at a political level. This conclusion is apparently shared by Greenawalt, 
in respect of chief executive officers of organisations, although, frustratingly, he 
does not elaborate.
33
 
 
Thus far it has been noted that, according to Rawls and others, public reasons 
must be offered in support of any actions which might lead to the coercion of 
others – for Audi, it is necessary to go further and have a personal commitment 
to these reasons as well – and that the theory can be applied to public office, the 
public sector and the private workplace. However, to demonstrate how it is 
possible to infer from this a case for legal suppression of religious expression in 
any or all of those three domains, it is necessary to take two further steps.  
 
The first step is to deal with an obvious objection to this inference which is that 
Rawls in particular is explicitly clear that his public reason requirement is 
intended to impose ‘a duty of civility’ and not a legal obligation. Rawls himself 
would clearly oppose the use of his theory to create a legal rather than a moral 
obligation to employ public reason in the manner suggested here. However, the 
difficulty of relying merely on moral suasion is apparent if it is assumed that the 
problem to which Rawls proposes a solution (that of discord based on conflicting 
religious and non-religious world views in a pluralistic society or organisation) is 
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so pressing as to require a greater imposition than mere reliance on the 
attractions of (what is held out to be) virtuous behaviour alone.
34
 If a state was 
persuaded to such a view it might indeed seek to impose public reason, in some 
form, through legal as well as moral means.
35
 Finding an overt legal mechanism 
to achieve this is likely to be very difficult, even impossible, without recourse to 
non-liberal means. This is not to say that the state might not be able to achieve 
this in more covert ways. The US Supreme Court has identified a concept in 
freedom of expression cases known as the ‘chilling effect’. At its most general, 
this concept refers to the recognition of ‘the potential deterrent effect [on 
freedom of expression] of a vague, or more commonly, an overbroad statute.’36 
By way of example, in Dombrowski v Pfister
37
 the US Supreme Court identified 
that federal laws (against subversion activities) had been used to harass members 
of a civil rights organisation (through means including search and seizure and 
arrest without intention to prosecute); the operation of the anti-subversion 
statutes had in fact created a ‘chilling effect’ on the first amendment right of 
members of the organisation to freedom of expression. It should be noted that the 
chilling effect does not presuppose malign intent on behalf of law makers but 
rather it results from the inevitable imperfections in the legal system (and indeed 
may be an unforeseen consequence).
38
 Nevertheless, it remains possible that a 
state (or some of the actors within a state) might actively seek to manufacture 
such a ‘chilling effect’, as a conscious and deliberate strategy, by framing or 
implementing law in such as way as to allow it to be used to suppress conduct 
incompatible with public reason. 
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The second difficulty is reconciling a state-imposed public reason requirement 
with the notion that this would lead to the suppression of religious expression per 
se. Public reason applies to the words or actions of those exercising power, or 
seeking to exercise power, over others. It would therefore most obviously affect 
at least some forms of verbal religious expression, particularly the justification of 
decision making on the basis of religious reasons or the imposition of religious 
practices or opinions on others (particularly subordinates) in the workplace. 
However there are some forms of verbal expression of religion where a public 
reason argument would be more difficult to mount; in such cases it would be 
rather more difficult (though not impossible) to convincingly demonstrate that an 
employee was seeking to ‘exercise power’ over or otherwise constrain others. 
Examples in this category might include a member of staff who wishes to invoke 
God’s blessing when talking to clients or colleagues;39 or a nurse who offers to 
‘pray’ for an elderly patient.40  
 
Moreover, public reason would not appear, at least at face value, to have 
anything to say about non-verbal religious expression such as dress, grooming or 
personal adornment (such as a member of staff at an airline wearing a small 
cross),
41
 nor about negative manifestation of religious convictions through 
conscientious objection (such as a Muslim check-out assistant refusing to handle 
alcohol)
42
 or for attendance at church services or religious festivals. This is in 
fact a likely conclusion for many as to the limits of the reach of a public reason 
requirement. However, there are strong arguments that the analysis need not be 
restricted to verbal expression: non-verbal religious expression is also considered 
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by some to be capable of exercising power over others.
43
 The most obvious 
example of this is the Islamic headscarf-hijab, or a more conservative variant of 
it such as the burqua, the wearing of which is sometimes perceived as capable of 
pressurising, even intimidating, other women of the same faith to conform to 
conservative Islamic values.
44
 As such (under a public reason analysis) it is as 
potentially capable as verbal forms of religious expression, such as proselytism, 
of creating disharmony and discord in the workplace (as elsewhere). 
 
Thus, the imposition of a public reason requirement could be a powerful stepping 
stone towards the suppression of many forms of religious expression, not merely 
verbal expression. Certainly, a number of secularists might seek to pursue, as a 
logical extension of the suppression of religious-based verbal expression in the 
workplace, the suppression of other forms of religious expression in pursuit of 
the (apparent) overall aim of harmony within a religiously plural society and 
organisation. 
 
Critique 
 
There are significant objections to this position. The extension of the public 
reason requirement from a matter of voluntary restraint based on civility to a 
matter of legal enforcement would amount to an illiberal restraint on liberty and 
is firmly ruled out by Rawls.
45
 Nevertheless, given the potential for reaching an 
illiberal position from the public reason approach (through overt or, perhaps 
more likely, covert means) it is necessary to consider a critique of the pillars on 
which the notion of a public reason requirement rests. Objections to the public 
reason requirement tend to cluster around three important points: firstly, the 
notion that there can be a ‘consensus’ around what is ‘reasonable’ is disputed; 
secondly, the potential incompatibility of the restraint imposed by public reason 
                                                 
43
 See A Renteln, ‘Visual Religious Symbols and the Law’ (2004) 47 American Behavioral 
Scientist 1590. The author argues that a Western viewpoint often underplays the powerful 
significance of religious symbolism particularly to members of minority faiths. 
44
 See discussion in Chapter 6. 
45
 Rawls, ‘Public Reason Revisited’, 769. 
68 
and the idea of liberal democracy is highlighted; and thirdly, the issue of personal 
integrity is raised.  
 
One of the most searing critiques of Rawls’ theory is an essay by Paul Campos.46 
He is particularly effective in illuminating the apparent lack of a clear 
explanation as to what ‘reasonable’ means. Given that the theory of public reason 
requires a consensus about what can and what cannot be reasonably assumed to 
be a shared value then this is a significant gap. Campos thus opens up the fact 
that what is ‘reasonable’ may not necessarily be reached through the ‘consensus’ 
of ‘reasonable people’ with the apparent ease that Rawls, and others, seem to 
assume. Even if it were possible to identify such a ‘reasonable consensus’ it 
would not follow that religiously-minded people would necessarily be persuaded 
by the consequent duty of civility (an obligation to fellow-humans) to adhere to 
it. Religious people feel they have a higher calling (an obligation to God) which, 
if it were to conflict with a liberal duty of civility, may well be the over-riding 
motivation. After all, ‘[c]itizens have to live with their God and their consciences 
as well as the requirements of citizenship, and must harmonize the various moral 
demands as best they can.’47 
 
Moreover, as Dworkin (in his later writings) observes, the objection may run 
deeper still. If people with religious convictions believe that non-believers are 
wilfully and stubbornly refusing to accept a revealed divine truth, then they may 
well ask the question, ‘Why should they abandon the profound ambitions of their 
faith simply to satisfy those who persist in their stubbornness?’48 To succumb 
would be less a duty of civility then an act of surrender to hostile pressure and is 
likely to be deeply unattractive.  
 
Secondly, as Wolterstorff points out, there is an inherent tension in the idea that 
people whose primary motivations are drawn from deep religious conviction, 
should be constrained epistemologically from drawing on those motivations in 
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public expression (particularly if the result of their argument would effectively 
be the same as that reached through a secular route, although Wolterstorff’s 
overall argument does not rest on this point). To impose such a restraint on the 
religious person would, in a sense, violate a core principle of liberal democracy 
(at least as an ‘idea’) which ‘implies the absence of any such restraint.’49 As 
Trigg points out, ‘[a] restriction on the idea of public reason, confining it to what 
is generally acceptable, prejudges democratic debate before it has even begun. 
We cannot be told what cannot be discussed.’50  
 
Eberle argues that each citizen should seek, diligently, to provide secular reasons 
when seeking to coerce others, but, if he or she cannot provide these, there is no 
impediment within a liberal society to placing reliance on a religious reason.
51
 
Habermas argues that religious citizens should try to consider their faith 
‘reflexively from the outside and to relate it to secular views’ (what he calls the 
‘institutional translation proviso’). 52  However, if they cannot find a secular 
‘translation’ for their views, he agrees with Eberle that they should be allowed to 
express themselves using religious language (at least in ‘the informal flows of 
public communication’).53  Indeed, if this were not permissible, a number of 
people who wish to make public statements drawn from their religious 
convictions but are unable to arrive, via a secular rationale, to the same statement 
would be disenfranchised as they would be unable to comply with the demands 
of public reason and so would lose their voice on an important issue.  
 
However, it should be noted that Habermas does not extend his concession into 
the ‘political public sphere and the formal proceedings within political bodies’, 
for which ‘translation’ into non-religious terms is first required before arguments 
can be advanced.
54
 For public officials then (and citizens who may wish to 
conform to the strict Rawlsian version of public reason), there must exist the 
                                                 
49
 Wolterstorff, ‘The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues’, 77. 
50
 R Trigg, Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatised? (OUP 2007), 207. 
51
 C Eberle, Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (CUP 2002).  
52
 Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, 10. 
53
 ibid.   
54
 ibid. 
70 
constant requirement to maintain a dichotomy between their ‘secular’ public and 
‘religious’ private selves, 55  - it is not hard to speculate on the possible 
psychological effects of trying to sustain long term such tension. 
 
Thirdly, the requirements of public reason (per Rawls’ version) have been 
criticised on the basis that, to accommodate views motivated by religious 
convictions (or those based on other comprehensive views), a degree of 
deception is required to the extent that an individual is required to put forward 
these views resting on principles drawn from the overlapping consensus. The 
individual is not necessarily likely to be particularly committed to (or even 
personally persuaded by) these principles. Not only is this disingenuous, forcing 
religiously motivated people to carry ‘hidden agendas’, but it actually distorts the 
views being articulated as, arguably, ‘[o]ne’s reasons for holding a position are 
integral to the position itself.’56  
 
In summary, there are sufficient objections to the notion of public reason to 
suggest that arguments drawn from these principles should not be used to seek to 
suppress religious expression in the workplace; to do so would actually represent 
a challenge to the very liberalism which the public reason requirement is said to 
support. However, there may be a qualification to this argument in respect of 
legislators and other public officials (both of whom are inter alia ‘workers’). 
Even those writers who are opposed in principle to a public reason requirement 
sometimes concede that it should apply in certain circumstances. For Chaplin, 
focussing on legislators, this occurs after deliberation has concluded (at which 
stage there should be no bar to religious argument) and at the point where 
decisions are taken and publicly justified.
57
 Wolterstorff, focussing on the 
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position of public officials, argues (indirectly) that it applies to the way they 
carry out their duties: 
 
Accordingly, when people are functioning in the role of executive or judge, the 
question of whether they personally approve the laws and provisions never 
arises; a person is never asked, when functioning in either of these roles, for his 
personal opinion on the matter. Thus also the question of offering reasons from 
his religion for or against the legislation or constitution never arises. The role of 
the executive is only to administer and enforce, of judge, to adjudicate. If 
anyone in the role has moral or religious scruples against doing so, then, 
depending on how serious the scruples, he or she must get out of the role.
58  
 
Under this view, the public official is merely charged with implementation not 
moral reflection on the fundamentals of the policies he or she is required to 
implement. There is therefore no space for the voicing of objections. This is not 
to say that Wolterstorff does not accept and welcome the influence (which may 
be openly expressed) of religious ‘comprehensive views’ in areas where there 
may be discretion given to the public official. There is a critical literature on this 
subject in respect of North American judges and all current writers are broadly 
agreed that judicial opinion must at times find a basis outside of the boundaries 
of the usual legal materials and arguments.
59
 Writers then differ as to what is 
acceptable as that basis and whether religious insights should be largely 
excluded.
60
 This is not of course the real issue here where the issue of conscience 
is (almost axiomatically) outside the range of personal discretion. Within this 
context, Wolterstorff’s conclusion does seem bleak, at least in so far as the words 
‘he or she must get out of the role’ are taken to mean permanent self-exclusion. 
An alternative approach might be temporary self-exclusion, through principled 
conscientious objection on religious grounds. 
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Support for a Preferred (Historic) Religion 
 
Rationale & Implications 
 
The notion that the expression of one particular religion should be supported, 
whilst others are not, rests on the view that religious homogeneity is in the best 
interests of social stability. Where a measure of tolerance for people of different 
religious beliefs is permitted, it is likely that this would not extend to influential 
positions and public offices in society. This has certainly been the active view, 
with varying degrees of rigour in application, for the best part of the history of 
Western civilisation since the fall of the Roman Empire.
61 
It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to provide an in-depth treatment of different theological approaches 
historically to the right to religious freedom,
 62
 
 
suffice to say that among all the 
major Christian groupings, with the exception of the anabaptists
63
 and some of 
the later non-conformists, there has existed an intolerant attitude towards people 
holding other religious beliefs based on assorted scriptural texts, with particular 
emphasis on the parable of the wheat and the tares
64
 and the great banquet.
65
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Biblical arguments are also supported by a profound conviction historically that 
the fabric of society would be undermined by religious pluralism.
66
  
 
Critique 
 
In modern liberal states the rationale supporting this position is no longer 
considered credible, given that ‘[a] distinctive, indeed for some the defining, 
feature of liberalism is its commitment to neutrality or impartiality between 
competing conceptions of what constitutes a good or worthwhile life.’67 Arriving 
at this point in the Christian West has involved a gradual development with 
significant change arriving only with the advent of the Enlightenment and the 
work of John Locke amongst others.
68
  
 
Nevertheless, all versions of liberalism in practice are imperfect.
69
 Many 
societies, given their respective historical contexts, may come to a liberal 
position on the basis of a gradual evolution from something more restrictive of 
freedom and this may leave a cultural or institutional legacy. This legacy need 
not be a matter of regret; there may be, for example, positive benefits for the 
health of Western society which still arise from the impact of its specifically 
Christian heritage.
70
 Some states may indeed retain an ‘established’ form of 
Christianity which enjoys some kind of preferential legal treatment over other 
religions, however trivial.
71
 In these circumstances, it is possible that, in 
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consequence of state actions, past or present, some or other form of preference, 
directly or indirectly, for particular religious beliefs may be institutionalised 
within certain workplaces, or within the wider socio-economic sphere. The 
structuring of work in Western states around the Christian calendar, with a rest 
day on a Sunday and a ‘shut-down’ period over Christmas, might be examples. 
Bradney, writing about the UK, surely describes these institutionalised 
arrangements accurately as ‘[v]estigal remnants of a largely Christian, Anglican 
past’.72 ‘Vestigal remnants’ are likely to be ‘religiously benign’ at best, and so 
widely accepted by people with little religious affiliation as to represent national 
traditions rather than religious ‘norms’ – as such they are historic features of 
society rather than modern evidence of the imposition of a particular religious 
approach. Such a view is open to challenge, however.
73
 
 
Laissez-faire 
 
Rationale & Implications 
 
Whilst the State may choose to operate state-run enterprises at arm’s length using 
artificially created market mechanisms, in reality a large part of the public sector 
is likely to operate as an administrative arm of the state. Thus, this model is 
likely to apply almost exclusively to the private sector. The model represents an 
outworking of a classical laissez-faire approach to managing the economy. 
Professor Richard Epstein is a helpful exponent of this view. 74 He argues that 
statutory interference in the labour market (and particularly regulation to outlaw 
discrimination) imposes indefensible costs on others and is thus an infringement 
of ‘ordinary liberties’. 75 
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Epstein argues that laws preventing discrimination should be swept away leaving 
the common law to provide what little regulation is needed in the labour market 
which is chiefly around the enforcement of private contractual terms. He argues 
that the ability of the individual worker to resign and seek work elsewhere is the 
most powerful protection against the employer. Epstein acknowledges that 
a laissez-faire approach will allow employers to decide with whom to associate. 
There is therefore a risk of discrimination against certain groups occurring. For 
Epstein however this is not a problem. A decision to discriminate against certain 
groups may be rational (as in the case of age discrimination to which he devotes 
a full chapter in both of his books). Where it is irrational, Epstein follows Becker 
in suggesting that the market will eventually drive the discriminator out of 
business. In Becker's view, discrimination is a ‘taste’ for which employers decide 
they are prepared to pay.
76
 This will impose additional costs as irrational 
discrimination will lead to a less productive workforce than would a ‘merit’-
based non-discriminatory approach. In the world of competition, the employer 
with a taste for discrimination, given the additional costs involved, will, 
eventually, be put out of business. That said, in organisations less constrained by 
market realities, Epstein for one is relaxed about allowing any kind of 
discrimination, including voluntary ‘reverse discrimination’, as a lesser evil than 
forced association. 
  
Although Epstein draws most of his examples from discrimination grounds other 
than religion, he does draw explicit attention to one positive effect of his theory 
for religious organisations (those ‘islands of exclusivity’). Under laissez-faire 
they are left alone to pursue employment practices as they see fit and presumably 
to take their chances with the market. 
  
Market pressures tend to encourage non-discrimination. But there will be others 
- perhaps fundamentalist employers who want all workers to take part in 
morning prayers. Why should we be so confident of our judgement that we feel 
entitled to shut them down? There is a powerful degree of intolerance behind the 
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wish to use force so freely. There is nothing glorious about using state power to 
prevent the continued existence and viability of fringe groups.
77
 
  
If the absence of any kind of anti-discrimination law broadly favours employer 
discretion, albeit tempered by the threat of resignation by the unhappy employee, 
there is one way in which the argument is construed to benefit employees. Posner 
contends that the existence of discrimination law can militate against the hiring 
of members of a protected group because of the difficulties involved in later 
dismissing them or because of other costs associated with employing them.
78
 
Thus, anti-discrimination law incentivises employers to find covert means of 
directly discriminating against members of protected groups. Interestingly this 
argument may be less universally relevant to discrimination on the grounds of 
religion as religious affiliation, like sexual orientation, may not be immediately 
obvious to an interviewer unlike say sex, race or age.
79
  
  
Critique 
 
There are a welter of objections to the thesis of Epstein and other neo-Classical 
economists, with probing questions about the reality of rational behaviour by 
both employers and consumers and the effect of imperfections in the market.
80
 
The strongest objection however, must be where Epstein's thesis is surely 
weakest and this is in its confidence in the employee's right to resign as a 
bulwark against the misuse of employer power. A number of commentators, 
writing in the industrial relations tradition, have provided strong arguments to 
illustrate that an imbalance of power exists between the individual employee and 
the employer and this imbalance is very much in favour of the employer.
81
 No 
less a figure than the father of classical economics, Adam Smith, appears to 
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concur: ‘it is not difficult ... to see which of the two parties must, upon all 
occasions, have the advantage in the dispute and force the other into compliance 
with his terms.’82 As Deakin points out (in reply to Epstein) ‘jobs are not always 
interchangeable, and searching for an alternative can be costly. Labour and skills 
cannot be stored, so that few employees can afford to be without employment for 
long.’83  
  
This criticism is strongly relevant to the subject at hand. Other theorists who 
would not travel far with Epstein nevertheless find this measure of agreement 
with him that a person's freedom of religious expression is protected by the fact 
that he is free to resign if his work and religion become incompatible and that 
this protection is sufficient.
84
  This is a controversial view, for essentially the 
same reasons advanced by Deakin, and has been subject to considered critique.
85
  
 
‘Islands of Exclusivity’ 
 
Rationale & Implications 
 
This model is based on the perceived desirability of permitting people with 
particular religious convictions to associate together to form workplace 
‘communities’ to the exclusion of those with different convictions or no 
convictions. This might be seen as an attractive means of satisfying those who 
might feel that their own freedom of religious expression could only be fully 
realised within the company of the like-minded and, at the same time, by 
removing such people from mainstream employment, finding a solution to the 
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‘problematic’ effects (if so perceived) of religious expression for other actors in 
the workplace. As a general principle, there are significant objections to this 
approach, particularly if it is seen as the only approach to accommodating 
religious expression. These will be considered shortly. Prior to this discussion, 
however, there are also some further issues to consider as to the circumstances in 
which these exclusive workplace communities might be permitted to exist and 
how this might be achieved. 
 
It is submitted that it is possible to sub-categorise the principle governing the 
operation of these religious communities in three main ways. First, such ‘islands 
of exclusivity’ might be occupied solely by groups of individuals engaging in 
specifically religious work, intimately connected with the forms and worship, or 
promotion, of a respective religion – modern monasteries, a Cathedral, a 
theological seminary, or an organisation whose sole function is to distribute 
sacred texts - might be appropriate examples. This would be the closest match to 
the mediaeval Christian notion of a functioning religious community – the main 
purpose of all activity is spiritual, albeit that practical work might be encouraged 
as a means of fostering spiritual disciplines or achieving other religious goals. 
 
Second, the occupants of such islands might also be engaged in work specifically 
inspired by their religious beliefs (and privately funded), such as a Hindu charity 
working towards poverty relief, or a pressure group whose purpose is to promote 
Christian values, or a private Islamic secondary school. Here the nature of the 
work is slightly different from the first model in the sense that it is religiously-
motivated work as opposed to religious work per se. 
 
Third, the islands might be populated by groups of workers with strong religious 
convictions who work together in organisational groups either to provide a 
‘secular’ service, such as a Christian medical practice, a Roman Catholic 
adoption agency (both of which might draw on state funds) or a Church of 
England state-funded secondary school, or to provide goods and services to 
others (not necessarily of the same religion) for a profit, such as a Christian 
motor dealer or a Jewish law practice. Here the work (in terms of a constituent 
bundle of tasks) is neither religious in character nor directly religiously-
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motivated; rather, it is the employees who are motivated by their religious 
convictions and believe that by choosing to infuse the way they approach their 
secular work with shared religious values, the work itself will be more successful 
and possibly more pleasing to God than it would be in the absence of those 
shared values. 
 
In practical terms, for such ‘islands’ to function, they would need to be endowed 
with protections against the reach of some aspects of anti-discrimination law on 
the grounds of religion or other grounds (such as sex and sexual orientation). 
This could be achieved in one of two ways. First, these organisations could be 
given specific exemptions in discrimination law for their employment policies on 
the basis that a particular religious belief is an ‘occupational requirement’ for 
each employment position. In practice this would provide some useful protection 
but it may be problematic in that it would require the employer to establish a 
specific justification in respect of each employment position. For example, a 
Catholic school might be able to mount a strong claim for an occupational 
requirement that its Religious Education teacher should be a practising Roman 
Catholic (otherwise the religious ethos of the school would be undermined), but 
it may find difficulty in justifying as an occupational requirement that its 
laboratory technician should also be a practising Roman Catholic, however 
desirable this might seem to be. As a second and alternative approach the State 
could provide an ‘associational group rights exemption’86 which would allow the 
religious employer, on whom this was bestowed, a general legal immunity from 
any discriminatory consequences of operating a religious test for employment or 
within employment. Under this regime, the example Roman Catholic school 
would be able to invoke an exemption to allow it to impose a religious test on 
applicants for all its posts, including both Religious Education teacher and 
laboratory technician. 
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Critique 
 
There are a number of potential objections to the ‘islands of exclusivity’ 
approach, both general and specific. In general terms, Esau notes the likely root 
of liberal objections to legal protections for religious groups who wish to remain 
exclusive: 
 
The normative claim of the religious group that some characteristic or behaviour 
of a person should lead to their exclusion from the group, directly clashes with 
the normative claim of liberal society that such characteristics or behaviour 
should be treated as irrelevant and that such persons should be embraced rather 
than excluded.
87
 
 
Esau’s point is that the liberal state tends towards inclusivity88 and so has an 
innate discomfort with the idea of granting rights which embody the opposite 
principle. With this in mind, it might be assumed that a liberal state, whilst 
grudgingly recognising that there may be occasions where ‘islands of 
exclusivity’ may be justified, might seek to take a narrow rather than a broad 
construction of entitlement to inhabit such islands. Thus, an ‘occupational 
requirement’ as opposed to a general exemption approach is likely to be 
preferred, and, in terms of the taxonomy of religious groups presented earlier, the 
first category is likely to be the least objectionable to liberal sensibilities. Here, 
workers are all fully involved in explicitly religious activity and non-religious 
workers are unlikely to be able to fulfil the actual duties. The third category, on 
the other hand, is likely to be most objectionable, given that, as observed earlier, 
the respective bundles of tasks which form the actual work roles will be 
primarily non-religious in character. By that logic, secular work should not be 
withheld from potential workers on the basis of their religious beliefs (or sexual 
preferences) and an occupational requirement defence might be hard to mount.  
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Esau counters this view by suggesting that it assumes an ‘instrumental view of 
employment [where] a person is given a defined task to do and the duty of the 
employee is to do that task and no more.’89 For Esau, an ‘organic’ view of 
employment is more characteristic of religious organisations; under this model, 
‘the employee is expected to participate in the mission of the organisation as a 
whole, and is expected to join the whole community, the whole body, in a way 
that transcends any narrowly defined job description.’ 90  Esau’s point is a 
powerful one as it provides a stronger justification for a broad approach to 
island-dwelling. His organic approach to employment, as representing 
commitment beyond merely the wage-effort bargain, finds considerable support 
amongst those modern management theorists with a concern for the so-called 
‘psychological contract’ which is said to apply in a range of employment 
contexts, not simply religious ones.
91
 The psychological contract is a metaphor 
for the various expectations of employer and employee about their mutual 
commitment, which overlay the instrumental requirements of the strictly legal 
contract, and are of greater overall significance for both parties.
92
 
 
There are two further objections to the ‘islands of exclusivity’ approach from a 
very different perspective. The model as described here could either serve as the 
only platform for workers to express their religious beliefs in the workplace 
(where there is no protection or even state hostility to protection in mainstream 
employment), or as one part of a broader approach to offering protections to 
religious workers. If it were the former, then religious workers would suffer both 
marginalisation into their own work ‘ghettos’ and total exclusion from a range of 
occupations (including the entire range of public sector job roles). Moreover, 
those religious workers who perceive the secular workplace as a ‘mission field’93 
would object, on religious grounds, to being denied access to it.  
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The second objection is that the ‘islands of exclusivity’ approach is that special 
protection by the State might in some way compromise the integrity of the 
religious workers themselves and their organisations: 
 
… exemptions may lull religious organisations into an idolatrous relationship 
with the government because religion has been bought off with beneficial 
exemptions to “adverse” policy so as to dull the prophetic role that religious 
organizations arguably ought to play in the public square.
94
 
 
In summary, the ‘islands of exclusivity’ approach is controversial. It may well 
convey benefits, but only (to avoid the creation of religious ghettos) if pursued 
alongside other approaches within mainstream employment. 
 
Protection for Religion 
 
Rationale  
 
The notion that religious expression in the workplace is worthy of protection is 
entirely dependent on the value ascribed within a particular society to that right, 
therefore the various arguments in support of a right of religious expression in 
the workplace require elucidation here in order to provide a rationale. The nature 
and extent of these protections is a consequent ‘implication’ which will be 
considered separately, before a critique is considered. Prior to this, it is perhaps 
helpful to emphasise that the protection envisaged in this section is for the 
manifestation and expression of religious beliefs and identity. The protection 
attaches to the individual rather than the beliefs that he is seeking to articulate or 
act on. Thus, the kind of protection under discussion is not for ‘religious feeling’ 
(i.e. that an individual’s beliefs should be immune from criticism or even 
mockery)
95
 but for religious expression.
96
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The idea that any human characteristic or activity should be valued by others 
must have an underlying basis. There is however a critical question as to whether 
it is possible to identify this ultimate rationale. For people with religious 
convictions, there is no difficulty. The Judeo-Christian view of human worth, for 
example, is based on the notion that men and women are made in the image of 
God
97
 (often referred to as the imago dei).
98
 As a consequence, they are also 
essentially equal in their humanity.
99
 In Islam, as another example, there 
similarly exists an elevated concept of human worth due to the belief that there 
rests a divine spark (sometimes known as the taqwa or hidaya) within each 
human which supplies the ultimate source of moral guidance (or conscience).
100
 
 
Others search for an underlying foundation without reference to a divine Creator 
but rather on the basis that human beings are afforded a high level of importance 
by virtue of their humanity itself. For some, this can find adequate foundation on 
the Kantian notion that human beings are special on the basis of their capacity for 
rational thought and as such should be treated individually as an ‘end’ rather than 
a ‘means’.101 Others choose not to probe too deeply for fear that this would 
reveal the lack of an ultimately satisfying rationale.
102
 Others are more sanguine; 
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for them, the attempt to find the ultimate foundation is either futile or 
unnecessary and so they do not attempt it.
103
  
 
Essentially, whether or not an ultimate rationale is established, human worth 
translates into three concepts on which rights theories are usually based: equality, 
dignity and autonomy. These three concepts are to a large extent interlocked
104
 
and the boundaries between them may not always be apparent. ‘Equality’ is the 
oldest concept, with its foundation in the Aristotelian ideal of treating likes alike 
and which has subsequently broadened to encompass also the notions of equal 
opportunity and substantive equality.
105
 ‘Dignity’ as a concept has developed 
subsequently and some theorists make a direct a fortiori link from equality. 
Dworkin, for example, writes that there is ‘a natural right of all men and women 
to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess … simply as human 
beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice.’106 
 
It is of course possible to reverse the direction of travel and see dignity as the 
foundational concept. One consequence of human dignity would be of course the 
need for equality of treatment, and indeed dignity may have a softening effect on 
the manifestation of equality (compared to the conception of equality which 
might result from rationality, the alternative foundation).
107
 For example, the 
introduction of dignity into the equality equation might require a ‘levelling up’ in 
situations of inequality rather than a ‘levelling down’ which might equally result 
from equality as rationality.
108
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‘Dignity’ however, is a complex concept. Although it may mark a recognition of 
the need to ‘protect the special status and integrity of the species’, 109  the 
substantial content of ‘dignity’ beyond this recognition may be hard to precisely 
capture.
110
 One helpful approach is provided by Feldman who presents human 
dignity as a multi-layered concept with an application at a ‘species’ level; at a 
group level; and at an individual level.
111
 When considered at an individual level, 
Feldman draws a dichotomy between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ dignity. 
Objective dignity derives from characteristics which are unrelated to personal 
effort or endeavour – they are in a sense the immutable characteristics of 
humanity (although Feldman does not use this terminology). Drawing on 
Feldman’s overall analysis, religious expression can find a basis for protection at 
both a group and at an individual level. At a group level, such a conception of 
dignity would allow religious groups ‘to assert a right to respect for their 
existence and at least some of their traditions which is at least equal to that of 
other groups’.112 At an individual level, dignity requires that people ‘be treated in 
particular ways which advance or do not unduly interfere with the acquisition or 
maintenance of whatever respect, self-respect, characteristics or bearing or 
behaviour … [including] physical or moral integrity.’113 The notion that ‘moral 
integrity’ is protected by ‘dignity’ provides a powerful platform for respecting 
the individual’s right to religious expression in many fora, including, potentially, 
the workplace.  
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The notion of autonomy in liberal political thought recognises the right of 
individuals to make choices and to develop and pursue their own version of the 
good life.
114
  Clearly there is a large area of overlap with the notion of dignity, 
but the emphasis here is on valuing and protecting the decisions and choices 
made by individuals. To be worthy of protection, such decisions and choices 
need concern matters of fundamental importance to an individual’s view of the 
world and version of the good
115
 (lest such a large range of human ‘choices’ be 
protected that the truly special and distinctive things are ‘swamped’ by the 
general, or indeed the ‘process’ of choice itself)116 – expressions of religious 
faith would, however, undoubtedly qualify. 
 
It should perhaps be noted at this point that it is possible to advance the case for 
protecting religious expression based on principles unrelated to equality, dignity 
or autonomy. Vickers for example, argues that protection may also be extended 
in order to promote ‘social [and presumably organisational] cohesion’, ‘conflict 
resolution and social inclusion’ and in response to the ‘aesthetic’ value of 
religious expression.
117
 Adhar and Leigh note that a case could be mounted for 
protecting religious expression on the basis that religious people are likely to 
display personally, and perhaps help to advance generally, ‘civic virtue’ (which 
could also be translated into organisational virtue).
118
 It is accepted that these 
might provide useful secondary arguments in favour of supporting religious 
expression in the workplace. The argument based on the value of social cohesion 
might in particular be a powerful one in certain social contexts, where religious 
identity is a particular and enduring source of antagonism, such as Northern 
Ireland. However, it is hard to see how this and other arguments can compete at a 
principled level with arguments based on the powerful concepts discussed earlier 
and which form the focus for the discussion below. 
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Implications 
 
If religious expression is given high status for its role in promoting the dignity, 
equality and autonomy of individuals, then there is a compelling case for the 
right to religious expression to be protected in a variety of fora and this is very 
likely to include the workplace. 
 
As noted earlier, such protection could take two forms – either creating positive 
‘rights’ for religious expression, or creating ‘negative’ protections against 
discrimination. A combination of these two approaches is possible. Within either 
approach it is likely that there will be some mechanism required to deal with any 
clashes with other claimants to rights in the workplace. One such clash may be 
between sexual orientation rights and religious rights.
119
 Employers may also 
have contractual rights which may conflict with religious expression.
120
 A 
mechanism for addressing these issues might create a clear hierarchy of rights, 
where one right is clearly identified as subordinate to another; or it might involve 
the emergence of a judicial formula or approach involving the balancing of one 
set of rights against another to determine which has the strongest claim in any 
given circumstances.  
 
Critique 
 
A number of critics question the importance of religious expression on the basis 
that religious identity is a mutable characteristic. People can opt to change 
religion and in this sense it is a matter of personal choice (autonomy) and levels 
of commitment can be ‘flexed’ accordingly. This reduces its status as an 
inalienable right deserving of a full measure of dignity which most properly 
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belongs to immutable characteristics, such as race and sex.
121
 Under this analysis, 
religious expression may be accorded some value but it is subordinate to a range 
of other rights which are deserving of ‘objective’ dignity.  
 
The counter argument is in four parts. Firstly, it is possible to deconstruct the 
concept of immutability. For example, whereas ‘race’ might appear an obvious 
contender for the status of an immutable characteristic, it has been argued that 
racial characteristics owe more to social context than physiology and so cannot 
really be described as immutable.
122
 Unfortunately, as the same reasoning cannot 
realistically be applied to sex,
123
 age and disability, this argument may serve 
more to cast doubt on the place of race in a potential hierarchy of rights than to 
fully undermine the concept of immutability itself.  
 
Secondly, the apparent mutability of religious belief may be questioned on 
observational grounds, given that a very large proportion of people with religious 
affiliations do not in fact change those affiliations over their lifetime.
124
 
However, the fact that there plainly are conversions from one religion to another 
(however exceptional) does somewhat undermine this argument. Moreover, some 
argue that individuals do exercise choice in the degree of dedication with which 
they pursue their religious convictions and this in turn may change over time.
125
  
 
Thirdly, the notion that religious identity is mutable can also be challenged by 
those who believe these ‘choices’ are predetermined and thus choice in any 
meaningful sense is excluded. There are those who argue this case from a 
religious perspective on the basis that they have been compelled to faith by God 
and not by their own free will.
126
 This is for example the position held by 
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Christians in the Calvinist tradition. Some argue this case using secular reasoning 
from a biological-environmental perspective.
127
 Others point to the importance of 
socialisation and culture in forming religious beliefs.
128
 
 
The fourth and surely strongest counter-argument is to question the importance 
of mutability per se. As discussed earlier, autonomy is considered to be a 
significant value, informing an individual’s identity and self-respect, and this is 
given effect through choice over the fundamentals of life.
129
 From the religious 
adherent’s point of view this ultimate choice is about something more significant 
still, beyond the normative values of self-respect and identity, as it involves a 
decision relating to both an objective reality of universal significance
130
 (God 
and his claims on humankind), and a personal and urgent concern for ‘the state of 
one’s soul’.131 In a sense there is less of a choice than an acceptance of an 
individual’s obligation or duty towards God under conviction of conscience.132 
Many secular liberals have great difficulty in acknowledging that religious 
beliefs have this level of ‘transcendent importance’133 and prefer to value them as 
equivalent to ‘other and deep genuine commitments’.134 Although this may be 
held to reflect a limited willingness to imaginatively enter into the worldview of 
someone with deep religious convictions, for the purposes of this particular 
argument both the religious adherent and the secular liberal may be able to arrive 
at a similar conclusion (albeit perhaps the one more enthusiastically than the 
other). That is that there is no obvious reason why the result of a fundamental 
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‘choice’ should be regarded as less worthy of protection than an immutable 
characteristic. If this point is accepted then the very question of the significance 
of mutability fades from the stage. 
 
The final objection to be considered here is that religious expression undermines 
other rights cherished in a liberal state, particularly those related to sex and 
sexual orientation. Some feminist scholars, for example, deplore forced marriage, 
polygamy and the veiling of women which are often associated with the cultural 
subordination of women based on religious beliefs.
135
 Equally, many liberals are 
critical of the religious condemnation of homosexual acts as sinful.
136
 If religious 
employees are seen to be insufficiently tolerant of other ‘rights’ then this in turn 
serves to undermine the claim of religion itself as a right to be respected.
137
 
 
In recent years the bar of tolerance has been raised by a number of liberal 
scholars who argue that it is no longer sufficient merely to ‘bear with’ others and 
their practices, per the historic understanding of the meaning or tolerance (i.e., to 
make a ‘deliberate choice not to interfere with the conduct of which one 
disapproves’). 138  More is required. This is based on the assumption that 
toleration is extended by the ‘majority’ to ‘minority groups’ the members of 
which feel, by reason of their minority status per se, unable to fully express their 
respective identities, and in this sense are ‘invisible’, e.g. gay and lesbian 
people.
139
 To tolerate members of minority groups and their practices merely in a 
non-interfering way will do nothing to demonstrate ‘public respect’ and 
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encourage the building up of ‘adequate self-esteem’. 140  Thus, to be fully 
‘tolerant’ now requires more - that members of minorities should be ‘affirmed’ or 
‘embraced’ for their personal characteristics and in terms of their lifestyle 
choices so they can achieve the ‘full citizenship’ which would otherwise be 
denied them.
141
 For some religious people, able to conform to the older definition 
of tolerance, the new, proactive requirements of tolerance may be far more 
problematic in certain cases. Taking the example of rights connected to sexual 
orientation, a Roman Catholic Christian is likely to be perfectly able to, 
courteously and respectfully, ‘bear with’ a gay colleague; however, she is 
unlikely to be able to positively ‘affirm’ the worth of that sexual lifestyle as to do 
so would, in her eyes, amount to encouraging an individual to remain under 
God’s displeasure, in a state of sin, and thus, spiritually, to do grave harm to her 
gay colleague. 
 
In a workplace context, there may be pressure to restrict religious expression 
should it either conflict with other aspects of equality or be seen in some way to 
be less than affirming of the perceived rights or choices of co-workers. In such 
cases, religious expression may indeed be regarded as by some as ‘harmful’ to 
the dignity of others and thus worthy of censure and possibly prohibition.
142
 
Critics of this perspective draw attention to the fact that, in effect, it creates a 
situation where certain other rights are routinely allowed to ‘trump’ religious 
rights.
143
 For a state to explicitly sanction such practices would also mean that in 
a sense it ‘takes sides’ against religious rights and many liberals, not to mention 
religious employees, would find this unsatisfactory as a general principle.
144
  
 
There is a deeper problem here. In a society which cherishes a number of 
fundamental rights, there is likely to be inherent competition and conflict at some 
stage. As Galston notes, ‘in the very act of sustaining diversity, liberal unity 
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circumscribes diversity. It could not be otherwise. No form of social life can be 
perfectly or equally hospitable to every human orientation.’145 This is likely to be 
as true of the workplace, where ‘diversity’ as a value may itself be promoted, as 
it is of other public fora of human activity. How to reconcile differences is ‘not a 
simple question’,146 and at some stage one right will be preferred over another in 
any given instance. To make an absolute decision that it should be the religious 
right that gives way is, for some, peremptory and unjustified.
147
 An alternative is 
to treat each clash individually and seek to develop some principles which 
‘directly address and fully analyze … competing interests’ in each case in order 
to determine finally which right must give way.
148
  
 
A variant of the model: Protection for Religion and Belief 
 
As noted in Chapter 2 there may be pressing practical reasons for extending the 
definition of that which is to be protected in the workplace from ‘religion’ to 
‘religion and similar philosophical beliefs’. This extension helps to overcome the 
problem, for example, of how to classify non-theistic belief systems such as 
Buddhism, which may fall outside many definitions of religion but which many 
people would regard as worthy of protection on the basis that they function as 
religions in the life of some people and (often) their communities. 
 
There are, however, reasons of principle which may be invoked to support 
protection for beliefs which may not necessarily be as closely aligned, from a 
functional perspective, to religion. Many of these reasons may be derived from 
the arguments presented in this section concerning the importance of recognising 
the significance of choice and self-expression in support of the important liberal 
value of individual autonomy. This may be bolstered by an empirical recognition 
that increasing numbers of people are rejecting mainstream religions and pursing 
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highly individualised forms of spirituality. Many would contend that people 
deserve protection for these beliefs too. A difficulty which is then encountered is 
how to conceptualise what it meant by ‘belief’. As Vickers notes, there are two 
possibilities, either the meaning of ‘belief’ is construed narrowly to refer to an 
overall system of belief or philosophical outlook analogous to a religion; or it 
might be expanded to refer to a single issue (such as a belief in man-made 
climate change or pacifism). Vickers favours protecting the former rather than 
the latter, lest the net of protection be cast too wide.
149
 Indeed this is the major 
problem with widening the scope of protection to include belief - the inevitable 
consequence of protecting more people is that the nature of that protection is 
likely to become weaker:  
 
The word [belief], however, introduces a further vagueness into the definition 
which courts have to wrestle with. The problem is that the more the category 
covers, the more limitations will be found legally necessary. An absolute right to 
freedom of a wide range of belief will have to be balanced by further restrictions 
in law on the “manifestation” of those beliefs. The more outlandish the beliefs 
tolerated, the more a society will have to be careful about how they are 
expressed.
150
 
  
Furthermore, the very act of widening the definition to encompass belief 
weakens any argument that religion is ‘special’ – inevitably, when equated with 
‘belief’ it becomes a subset of the latter and loses any sui generis claims.151 As 
Sadurski notes: ‘[t]here is no basis, in an ideology of a liberal and secular state, 
to draw the line between the religiously-motivated and other deep moral 
beliefs.’152 In other words, religious beliefs will be viewed in exactly the same 
way as deep moral beliefs.
153
 This is in keeping with liberal ideals (of neutrality) 
and will thus be the inevitable result of equating religion and belief in terms of 
the distribution of protection.  
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Yet, in addition to the liberal arguments presented in this section for the value of 
religion to individuals, there is in addition a powerful argument that religion is 
both unique and necessary to humanity and, by extension, worthy of the kind of 
special protection which other beliefs may not be. Trigg identifies the basis of 
this in terms of:  
 
A readiness to detect agency, even of a supernatural kind; a willingness to see 
purpose and goaldirectedness in the material world; a readiness to attribute 
mental capacities to other people which may survive death; and an acceptance 
from an early age that intentional agents can have ‘super-powers’ such as the 
ability to know everything – these are not just the building blocks of religion, 
they are basic characteristics that are built into the very fact of being human.
154
 
 
Protection for Minority Religions 
 
Rationale & Implications 
 
The rationale for providing specific protections for minority religions, as 
opposed to religion in general, is premised on the notion that religion is one 
means by which groups in society which depart from the ‘norm’ identify 
themselves.
155
 The major determinant of group membership is ethnicity and, 
ethnicity can be strongly linked to religion.
156
 Members of such ‘ethnic-and-
religious’ minority groups are disadvantaged in the West due to institutional 
factors, such as the structuring of the working calendar around a Christian norm 
and the conventional expectations of the majority culture about dress, food and 
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drink.
157
 Special protection should therefore be offered to guarantee minority 
religious expression in order to counter the inherent disadvantage of operating 
within a majority culture with its institutional legacy (in the West) of Christian 
practices in many workplaces. Such protection might permit practices (such as 
allowing Sikhs to carry a kirpan, a small dagger) which would not be permitted 
to non-members of minority religious groups.
158
 As such this approach might be 
characterised as a mild form of ‘affirmative action’ or ‘positive discrimination’ 
entailing a degree of preferential treatment.
159
  
 
Indeed this may be an element of a more radical strategy of positive 
discrimination which would aim to increase the workplace participation (at 
various levels) of members of ethnic and religious minority groups in pursuit of 
‘substantive equality’. 160  Substantive equality takes the final outcome for 
members of different groups (a relevant example here might be the relative 
proportions of members of different ethnic groups in a management cadre) as its 
starting point, as opposed to equality of opportunity which emphasises a level 
playing field for all individuals at the point of entry (recruitment or promotion). 
The substantive equality approach, at an organisational level, is essentially a 
‘redistributive’ strategy which seeks to directly intervene in decision making on 
personnel matters to the benefit of members of disadvantaged groups.
161
 
 
A society pursuing such a strategy might either permit or impose a ‘quota’ 
system (or otherwise set targets) requiring organisations to recruit a certain 
percentage of employees, managers, directors, etc, from minority religious 
groups. Clearly, in reserving posts for members of religious minorities, it would 
be a necessary corollary that forms of religious expression be protected so that 
members of religious minorities would be willing to take up the available 
positions. 
                                                 
157
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In summary, under this analysis, the focus of protecting religion and religious 
expression is on removing disadvantage experienced because of membership of a 
minority religious group. Once disadvantage is alleviated, the justification for 
protection for minority religion disappears and should be removed.
162
 Thus, 
under this model, there also exists an expectation that, in parallel with legal 
protection for minority religions at an individual level, legal and policy efforts 
are also made as a matter of urgency to tackle sources of disadvantage at an 
institutional level. For some commentators, such as McColgan, this also involves 
removing any lingering workplace features of the historical majority religion 
(such as the institutional legacy of Christianity considered earlier).
163
  
 
Critique 
 
Where this model is most vulnerable to critique is that it is not based on any 
overall acceptance that religion is important and deserving per se. Instead, the 
governing principle is that religion is a proxy for race or ethnicity. Inevitably this 
leads to a view of religious expression as one form of ‘cultural expression’ and 
the terms of the debate change.
164
 It would of course be naïve to deny or 
underplay the links between religion and culture, but if the language of culture 
only is adopted, religion becomes a secondary characteristic of something 
apparently more important – collective identity. Religious practices are assumed 
by people as expressions of identity with a particular culture and not as ends in 
themselves. In a related point, as Jones notes, ‘a person’s culture may be invoked 
as a causal explanation of his beliefs but it cannot be offered by the believer 
himself as a reason for believing what he does.’ 165  This model makes no 
assumption that there is any kind of serious thought about the truth or merit of a 
religion’s claims on behalf of its adherents – religion becomes instead ‘a mere 
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quirk of culture’166 and is worthy only for its role in shoring up that culture or 
even for sentimental reasons connected to the value of heritage. This of course 
serves to strongly undermine any special sui generis claims for religion which 
might otherwise be advanced. This point is clearly recognised by a proponent of 
this model, McColgan, who, in support of her own argument, is keen to underline 
it: 
 
The identification of [ ] practices as ‘religious’ as distinct from ‘cultural’ is 
strongly contested, and privileging those accepted as ‘religious’ from merely 
‘cultural’ increases the incentive to categorise them as ‘religious’ and thereby 
helps to perpetuate them.
167
 
 
A second line of critique stems from the fact that this model encourages the 
dismantling of the legacy of Christianity in the workplace (and elsewhere) in 
pursuit of the reduction of disadvantage. There are objections to this at a practical 
as well as at a theoretical level. Galeotti, whilst keen to promote the questioning 
of ‘traditions and conventions’, acknowledges the ‘difficulty for society as a 
whole of finding a new network of conventions that suits everyone from every 
group’.168 Taking the example of the ‘Christian’ tradition of structuring of the 
working week to allow Sunday as a holiday; an attempt to change this, whilst for 
Galeotti, potentially desirable at one level, ‘would create enormous practical 
problems in all sectors of social life, from business to school …’ and is thus 
impractical as a solution.
169
 Indeed as Jones observes, it appears hard to escape 
the conclusion that seeking to remodel institutionalised features of life such as 
the working week to make them ‘religiously netural’ would in actual fact risk 
creating a situation which was ‘equally inconvenient for all religions’ thus 
‘making some people worse off whilst making no one better off’.170  
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As Parekh notes, removing the cultural legacy of Christianity in the United 
Kingdom  might also create potentially a new source of disadvantage to religious 
and ethnic minority groups in terms of incurring the resentment of members of 
the majority population and any ensuing effects of this. 171 For Parekh, however, 
it is not even a case that the cure is worse that the cause. He also argues 
positively that the central proposition is wrong: the continued existence of the 
Christian legacy need not in itself result in disadvantage to minority groups: 
 
Besides, once the religious beliefs of all citizens are equally respected, no 
apparent injustice is done to minorities if the religion of the overwhelming 
majority is given some precedence over theirs, especially when it is a long-
established part of the structure of the state and doing so has no adverse effects 
on their rights and interests.
172
 
 
A third and potentially most significant criticism is that this model is potentially 
implicitly hostile to the expression of a major religion, Christianity, which, as 
‘mainstream’, is seen as a major contributor to the ‘disadvantage’ that requires 
removal. Thus, Christians would not be ‘protected’ in law whilst members of 
other religions would be – creating a major inequality. Arguably this might not 
matter if, as is assumed under this model, Christian self-expression is mainstream 
and is not subject to serious challenge.
173
 The problem is that although perhaps 
even a majority of the Western population self-identify in some vague way as 
Christian,
174
 they do so, as Bradney observes, without necessarily knowing what 
to be Christian actually means;
175
 moreover ‘[f]or such people their religion 
neither tells them what they should do nor does it prevent them from pursuing 
anything that they see to be in their interest. It is neither a guide nor a limitation 
to their behaviour on a day-to-day basis.’176 
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Others, whilst taking their Christianity slightly more seriously, perhaps through 
Church attendance, may fall within a different grouping – those who exhibit 
‘religiosity’ as opposed to a genuine commitment to the doctrines of the 
Christian faith.
177
 Neither of these groups is likely to challenge the dominance of 
secular thinking and mores which are surely the more defining characteristic of 
Western European states. Thus, it might be suggested that this model rests on a 
false premise – Christianity (in any meaningful sense) as representative of the 
‘mainstream’ in Western society. It may be suggested rather that this honour falls 
to secularism. If this is the case, then it follows that practising Christians are a 
minority group and are just as likely to face hostility as any other religious 
grouping.
178
 Thus, Christians need as much legal protection as people of other 
religious faiths and, under this model, they fail to receive it.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Six overarching models of legal approaches towards religious expression by 
employees in the workplace have been presented, and the implications discussed 
and critiqued. As stated at the outset it is unlikely that a liberal society would 
adopt any one of these models as a single strategy. The models all rest on 
particular assumptions, economic and socio-political in nature, which are likely 
to be a subject of debate within a liberal society. Approaches may alter over time 
depending on the point at which the debate rests and, as a result, legal responses 
to religious expression may be, at times, ad hoc and even inconsistent. 
 
The models presented here will be utilised again in the next chapter to consider 
how far law in England and Wales, at a legislative level, can be seen to embody 
aspects thereof. What is of value in the concluding part of this chapter is to 
identify any cross-cutting themes and key questions which might have a strong 
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influence on overall state approaches at different times, depending upon the 
nature of the political and social context and other factors. 
 
One of the key questions is how religion is perceived in terms of its effect on 
society. One underlying view would be to see religion essentially as divisive and 
a barrier to ‘socially progressive’ ideas, such as gay rights and equality for 
women. Another view would be to see religion in much more positive terms for 
its positive moral and other individual and social effects. If the initial perception 
is negative, a degree of hostility, implicit or explicit, is likely to characterise 
attitudes towards religious expression in whatever forum. A second important 
question (which to some extent follows from the first) is how far religious 
convictions, where not shared by others, should be kept private – the expression 
of religious convictions excluded from the public square (including the 
workplace) either by voluntary restraint or through some form of imposition 
(whether directly by law or indirectly through a ‘chilling effect’).   
 
If the answers to these initial questions are positive from a religious employee’s 
perspective, then a third and vital question arises. If society perceives some value 
in religious expression then how great is this value? This hinges to a large extent 
on whether religion is seen as either one of many important choices which give 
expression to an individual’s personal autonomy, or as an expression of culture 
and identification with members of an ethnic grouping; or whether it is seen as a 
response to an obligation to the divine – where ‘choice’ as normally understood 
is not a factor. If it is the latter, then religious expression is likely to be seen as 
worthy of a greater level of protection certainly than the first and possibly than 
the second category. This leads on to a further question, which is how to treat 
religious expression in the face of competing rights in the workplace (such as 
employers’ rights, or rights connected to sex or sexual orientation) – what should 
its place be in any hierarchy of rights? At what point is it appropriate to 
subdivide religious expression into different forms, some being more ‘offensive’ 
than others? Those who see religion as obligation as opposed to choice are likely 
to have a much stronger case to argue for a high place for religious expression in 
its various forms in the hierarchy. Those who see religion as a manifestation of 
culture only risk trivialising religion by seeking to subordinate to another 
101 
category (race) which may be thought to have a higher standing in the hierarchy 
of rights – this also has the effect of forcing the disaggregation of the term 
‘religion’ in practice as different religious groups will be afforded different 
protections according to how far they can show an obvious link between the way 
they manifest their religion and to ‘ethnic’ culture.  
 
There is, finally, a significant question as to whether or not the state has a 
legitimate role at all in seeking to intervene in the employment relationship to 
protect or proscribe forms of religious expression. Some would argue that such 
matters should be resolved through the normal process of negotiation between 
employer and employee. Those employees unhappy with the arrangement 
reached could work instead for other organisations (perhaps organisations with a 
religiously exclusive employment policy) which are more accommodating. 
Others would argue that religious expression is sufficiently important to require 
protection even in the workplace, particularly in a context where other 
characteristics or choices are similarly protected and where the bargaining power 
of employers far outweighs that of employees.  
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Chapter 4: The Legislative and Policy Landscape in 
England and Wales 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the legal authorities which are relevant 
to freedom of religious expression in the United Kingdom workplace, both 
European and domestic; the two most significant areas of law concerned are 
human rights law and employment law. The law and, in very broad terms, the 
way in which it has been interpreted (including at a policy level), will be 
examined with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and domestic law in England and Wales, most of it 
employment law (which in turn is largely derived from European Union 
directives). 
 
As each area of legal jurisdiction is examined, its congruence with the models set 
out in Chapter 3 will be considered. 
 
Approaches under the European Convention 
 
General 
 
There are two overarching areas of European legal authority which are 
fundamental. The first, under the authority of the Council of Europe, is the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The second, under the 
authority of the European Union, entails those clauses of the EC General 
Framework Directive
1
 which deal with religion and belief, as mediated into 
domestic law originally through the Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) 
Regulations, and since 2011 (when it came into force), the Equality Act 2010. 
The first will be the concern of this section. 
 
                                                 
1
 2000/78/EC. 
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There are two articles of particular relevance to religious freedom of (adult) 
individuals in the Convention – Articles 9 and 14 respectively – although other 
articles could also be construed as offering protections for religious freedom, 
particularly Article 10 which guarantees freedom of expression.
2
 Article 9 states 
that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice or observance. 
 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 10 reads: 
 
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises. 
 
2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
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Article 14 reads: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any grounds such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
minority, property, birth, or social status. 
 
Of these articles, the meaning and implications of Article 9 is of most concern 
here. Article 14, however, offers, at face value, significant protection for, inter 
alia, adherents of religious faiths, setting out clearly the principle of non-
discrimination against them in the enjoyment of their convention rights (although 
it is only exercisable ‘within the ambit’ of other convention rights3). Thus far, 
Article 14 has not featured prominently in applications concerning restrictions on 
religious expression. The application in Ladele v UK
4
 is a recent exception, and 
the reasoning of the ECtHR will be interesting on this point, once judgment is 
given. 
 
In terms of the models presented in Chapter 3, it is clear that Article 9(1) of the 
Convention creates putative rights protective of religion and religious expression. 
These positive rights explicitly extend beyond the right to hold a religious belief 
in private and encompass the right to ‘manifest’ religion in various ways 
(including in ‘practice’) and to do this in ‘public’. In its interpretation of the 
ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) takes a high view (in 
theory at least) of the importance of Article 9 rights, basing these rights on the 
importance of religious expression as a function of individual autonomy and 
dignity. As it famously said in Kokkinakis v Greece: 
 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in 
its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the 
identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for 
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atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a 
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends upon it.
5
 
 
Although a very positive statement of the importance of religious belief and 
expression, overall and in context, it is clear that the Convention does not in fact 
place particular and unique value on religion itself. This is apparent in two 
fundamental ways. The first is with reference to the juxtaposition of ‘religion’ 
and ‘belief’ in the overall definition under Article 9. The two are seen as 
inextricably linked. As Evans puts it: 
 
It is both unhelpful and unnecessary to seek to distinguish those patterns of thought 
and conscience which are religious in nature from patterns of belief which are not 
since all those systems of thought and conscience which fall within the scope of the 
article are to be equated with ‘beliefs’, the manifestation of which is to be 
protected.
6
 
 
Intentionally or not, Evans’ analysis of Article 9 reduces religion to a function of 
‘belief’ which is arguably more representative of ECHR jurisprudence – there is 
no sense in which religion itself carries sui generis claims to special protection, 
despite the warm words in Kokkinakis. The second arises from the scope of 
Article 10. Although Article 10 arguably increases or at least reinforces 
protection for religious expression, it also provides a separate avenue to protect 
many forms of putative individual expression; indeed ‘an all-embracing 
provision providing for the transmission of ideas, views and opinions through a 
potentially limitless array of mediums.’ 7  As the ECHR does not distinguish 
between the rights it conveys in terms of a hierarchy of importance, Article 10 
potentially serves, inter alia, to widen and thereby potentially reduce protection 
for religion (and analogous beliefs) by creating a further category which provides 
equivalent protection for forms of individual expression which fall short of 
admission into the Article 9 category.  
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This point can be clearly illustrated with reference to Arrowsmith v UK.
8
 Pat 
Arrowsmith was convicted under the Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934 for 
distributing pacifist literature (encouraging soldiers, inter alia, to desert the 
army) outside army bases. Arrowsmith applied to the European Commission on 
Human Rights (ECommHR) arguing that her conviction violated Articles 5, 9, 10 
and 14. Her Article 9 claim was on the basis that she was manifesting ‘belief’. 
This claim was rejected by the ECommHR, as it did not meet the standard to be 
considered a practice or manifestation.
9
 However, her Article 10(1) claim 
(although ultimately unsuccessful on the grounds of the restrictions in Article 
10(2)) encountered no such difficulties. Her actions were accepted at face value 
as a legitimate form of expression, potentially worthy of protection, thus 
providing an equivalent avenue of redress for beliefs which fail to adequately 
demonstrate that they constitute a legitimate ‘religion or belief’.   
 
Another problem is how ‘manifestation’ of religion has been interpreted under 
Article 9. In its well-known ruling in Arrowsmith, the ECommHR adopted a 
restrictive interpretation, arguing that ‘Article 9(1) does not cover each act which 
is motivated or influenced by a religion or belief.’10  Whilst the Commission 
accepted pacifism as a belief, it went on to reject the Article 9 application on the 
basis that the act of distributing pamphlets was motivated by Arrowsmith’s 
pacifism but not in fact a manifestation of that pacifism. Thus, the Commission 
set out a ‘manifestation/motivation requirement’11 which focuses on the nature of 
the manifestation itself, and whether it is truly and fully related to the religion or 
belief espoused, rather than the motivation of the individual which underpins it.
12
 
Looked at from the perspective of the claimant, this means that an individual 
must show that the particular practice, for which he wishes to obtain protection 
as a ‘manifestation’ of religion or belief, is necessary to, or mandated by, the 
                                                 
8
 (1978) 3 EHRR 218. 
9
 See discussion below. 
10
 Arrowsmith [15]. 
11
 M Hill, R Sandberg and N Doe, Religion and Law in the United Kingdom (Wolters-Kluwer 
2011), 51. 
12
 See P Cumper, ‘The Public Manifestation of Religion’ in R O’Adair and A Lewis (eds), Law 
and Religion (OUP 2001), 320. 
107 
religion or belief system he espouses.
13
 This is often referred to as a ‘necessity 
test’.14  Such a test was applied in the UK court in the high-profile case of 
Playfoot v Governing Body of Millais School
15
 to reject an Article 9 claim by a 
schoolgirl forbidden to wear a silver ring which was said to symbolise her 
Christian commitment to sexual abstinence before marriage but which the court 
found not to be necessary to that belief.  
 
Although the test appears to be well established, it should be noted that there 
have been a few recent departures from it. For instance, in its decision in 
Jakowbski v Poland,
16
 the ECtHR found that the refusal of a Buddhist prisoner’s 
request for vegetarian food engaged Article 9 (even though vegetarianism is not a 
requirement of the Buddhist religion). In Bayatyan v Armenia,
17
 the same court 
accepted that when opposition to military service is motivated (rather than 
required) by sincerely held religious beliefs then it falls within the protection of 
Article 9. In R (Imran Bashir) v The Independent Adjudicator and Anor,
18
 the 
High Court of England and Wales accepted that a prisoner’s decision to fast prior 
to a court appearance was motivated by his religious beliefs and as a result 
consideration should have been given to his Article 9 rights. This was in spite of 
the fact that his decision to fast was a personal one rather than a requirement of 
his Islamic faith. It is perhaps too early to seek to draw general inferences from 
some isolated examples (which may be context-specific), suffice to note that they 
may point to the possibility of a more flexible approach by the courts towards the 
question of ‘necessity’ in the future. 
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Application to Workplace 
 
The Convention itself is binding upon the United Kingdom
19
 and any breaches at 
a national level can be appealed directly to the European Court of Human Rights. 
In addition, the Convention has been applied in domestic law in the form of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. This Act provides an avenue of redress for individuals 
where public authorities have breached their convention rights.
20
 Within the 
context of the workplace, this means that public sector workers can, in theory, 
make a claim directly against their employer, as can anyone working for a 
privately-owned enterprise which performs a public function (e.g. a former 
public utility company).
21
 On the face of it, this might imply that public sector 
workers have potentially more ‘rights’ than those in the private sector. 22 
However, the HRA expressly states that employment tribunals and courts are 
themselves public bodies,
23
 to which the ECHR therefore applies. The Act also 
states that ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights.’24 Thus, Convention rights must also be taken into account by 
the courts as part of the interpretation of statute, including employment statutes – 
to what extent there is an implied obligation to interpret common law in this way 
is less certain.
25
 
 
Thus, Convention rights extend to apply to public bodies and, to a certain degree, 
private employers. However, in practice, the extent to which this provides 
additional rights for workers is debatable. This is because Convention rights have 
traditionally been construed to apply to individuals but not necessarily in all 
contexts – the employment sphere being one of those contexts where applications 
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have often been ruled to be inadmissible.
26
 This approach has been referred to by 
some commentators as ‘the specific situation rule’ as it serves to limit the 
exercise of Article 9 rights in ‘specific situations’,27 perhaps the most important 
of which would appear to be the workplace, although it has also been applied in 
the context of education.
28
 Four examples concerned with putative Article 9 
claims in the workplace will help to illustrate the rationale(s) employed by the 
European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR) to defend this position. 
 
In Ahmad v UK,
29
 a Muslim school teacher claimed constructive unfair dismissal 
against his former employer, the Inner London Education Authority, when it 
refused to allow him a 45-minute absence from his school on Fridays to attend a 
Mosque without reducing his paid working week from five to four and a half 
days. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim
30
 and, in response to Ahmad’s 
subsequent case against the UK government, the ECommHR, in refusing to 
admit his claim, concluded that refusal to provide time off did not amount to an 
interference with his Article 9(1) right. Ahmad had accepted the contract ‘of his 
own free will’, thereby voluntarily surrendering the claims on his time of 
religious duties, and what remained of his Article 9 rights were guaranteed by the 
fact that he was free to resign. 
 
The argument that the ‘right to resign’ is the ultimate guarantee of religious 
freedom was subsequently consolidated as a position by the ECommHR. In 
Konttinen v Finland,
31
 for example, a Seventh Day Adventist had been dismissed 
for leaving before sundown on a number of Fridays in accordance with his 
religious convictions. The Commission again denied any interference with 
Article 9(1) rights and determined that the complainant had been dismissed for 
                                                 
26
 Originally, by the European Commission on Human Rights, which determined admissibility; 
see Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, 8. 
27
 Kalac v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 552 [27]. See also discussion in Hill, Sandberg and Doe, 
Religion and Law in the United Kingdom, 53. 
28
 For example, in the context of a university student, see Karaduman v Turkey (1993) 74 DR 93. 
29
 (1982) 4 EHRR 126. 
30
 Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority [1978] ICR 36. 
31
 Appl No. 24949/94 (3 December 1996). 
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refusal to carry out his contractual obligations vis-à-vis working hours, not for 
manifesting his religious beliefs. In respect of the latter, there was no protection 
anyway because Konttinen retained the ‘ultimate guarantee’ of his freedom of 
religion – that is he could leave his employment if he considered that there was 
any conflict with his religious beliefs. 
 
In Stedman v UK,
32
 this principle was applied in different circumstances, when 
the complainant was dismissed for refusing to sign a new contract with her 
employer which included Sunday working. The Commission found that she had 
been dismissed for a failure to agree to adopt a particular work pattern rather than 
for her religious beliefs. In this case the Commission was unable to argue that the 
employee had voluntarily forgone any rights upon entering the employment 
relationship as it was for refusing to surrender such rights (upon variation of her 
contract) that she was dismissed. Thus it relied entirely on the argument that the 
ability to leave employment was sufficient to guarantee her religious freedom. 
 
In Pichon and Sajous v France,
33
 a claim by two French pharmacists, who had 
been penalised for refusing to prescribe contraceptive pills, that their Article 9 
rights had been violated was ruled inadmissible by the ECtHR. The court noted, 
inter alia, that the applicants were free to manifest their beliefs outside of the 
work sphere. 
 
In a case before the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Copsey v Devon 
Clays Ltd,
34
 in which an employer had sought to vary an employee’s working 
hours to require Sunday working despite his long-standing objection, Lord 
Justice Mummery, in rejecting an Article 9 application, endorsed the specific 
situation rule, thus setting a clear precedent for future domestic cases:  
 
There is, however, a clear line of decisions by the Commission to the effect that 
Article 9 is not engaged where an employee asserts Article 9 rights against his 
                                                 
32
 (1997) 23 EHRR CD (Commission). 
33
 Appl No. 49853/99 (2 October 2001). 
34
 [2005] EWCA Civ 932. 
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employer in relation to his hours working. The reason given is that if the 
employer's working practices and the employee's religious convictions are 
incompatible, the employee is free to resign in order to manifest his religious 
beliefs.
35
 
 
In Begum v Denbigh High School,
36
 a case involving a schoolgirl forbidden to 
wear the jilbab at the secondary school she attended, the specific situation rule 
was also endorsed in an educational context because ‘there was nothing to stop 
her [the claimant] from going to a school where her religion did not require a 
jilbab or where she was allowed to wear one’. 37  The rule was stated more 
generally that ‘Article 9 does not require that one should be allowed to manifest 
one’s religion at any time and place of one’s choosing.’38 Lord Bingham noted 
that that ‘there remains a coherent and remarkably consistent body of authority 
which our domestic courts must take into account and which shows that 
interference is not easily established.’39 This reasoning was swiftly followed by 
Lord Justice Silber in X v Headteacher of Y School
40
 and has become a 
problematic precedent in education as well as employment cases.
41
 
 
In a partially-dissenting opinion in Copsey, Rix LJ took a more sceptical view of 
the European precedents, arguing that the circumstances of Ahmad and Kottinen 
did not in fact apply to those of Copsey. This was because in these two cases it 
was the employee and not the employer who was seeking to change the terms of 
the contract. The facts of Stedman alone were materially similar because the 
employer had attempted to vary the terms of employment. However, in this case, 
                                                 
35
 [31]. 
36
 ibid. [2006] UKHL 15. 
37
 ibid. [50], Lord Hoffman. Hill and Sandberg point out that it is difficult to see how the rule 
could apply in full as a school pupil has not voluntarily chosen to accept a role which might limit 
his Article 9 rights; see M Hill and R Sandberg, ‘Is nothing sacred? Clashing symbols in a secular 
world’ (2007) Public Law 488. 
38
 [50] (Lord Hoffman). 
39
 [23]. Two of the five law lords were more equivocal about the specific situation rule and 
preferred to dispose of the appeal on the basis of Article 9(2). 
40
 [2007] EWHC 298. 
41
 See Hill and Sandberg, ‘Is nothing sacred?’ 
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Rix argued that the Commission had acted ‘without attempt at explanation.’42 
Thus, the court was under no obligation to apply the decision in Stedman, nor 
any of the other decisions, as this line of apparent authority failed to meet the test 
of ‘clear and constant jurisprudence’.43   
 
It is not difficult to find evidence to support Lord Justice Rix’s critique. 
Although, as has been seen, the voluntary surrender of rights and the right to 
resign arguments have been employed to deny opportunities to exercise Article 9 
rights in the workplace, such exclusion is not derived from a plain reading of the 
ECHR itself; moreover, the ECtHR has not been consistent in applying these 
exclusionary principles to other convention rights. Although there have been 
some instances in largely older case law of other convention rights being 
declared non-admissable in employment,
44
 there are numerous examples to the 
contrary. In Halford v UK,
45
 for instance, the Court determined that a senior 
police officer’s right to privacy was infringed when her telephone calls from 
work were intercepted without her permission. Similarly, in Niemietz v Germany, 
the Court determined that the right to privacy was violated by the search of an 
employee’s workplace office. In Smith and Grady v UK,46 the court found that 
the discharge of two men from the Royal Navy because of their homosexuality 
breached their right to a private life. Similarly, in Sidabras v Lithuania,
47
 the 
‘exclusionary approach’ was rejected in circumstances where a former KGB 
officer was dismissed from a public appointment under legislation restricting the 
employment of former KGB officers. The ECtHR did not accept the argument 
that Convention rights did not extend to guaranteeing a right to remain in a 
particular employment; instead, it judged this dismissal a violation of the right to 
a private life as more than simply work life is affected by the denial of 
employment opportunities (and earning potential). In Sorensen and Rasmussen v 
                                                 
42
 Copsey [65]. 
43
 ibid. [66]. 
44
 For example, Kosiek v Germany (1986) 9 EHRR; Glasenapp v Germany (1987) 9 EHRR 25; 
and Bozhilov v Bulgaria Appl No. 41978/98 (22 November 2001). 
45
 Appl No. 20605/92 (25 June 1997). 
46
 (1999) 29 EHRR 493. 
47
 Appl Nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00 (27 July 2004). 
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Denmark
48
 the ECtHR explicitly rejected an argument that employees, who were 
forced to join a trade union against their wishes in order to secure employment, 
were free to take up alternative employment and so there could be no 
infringement of their Article 11 rights. In so doing, it commented on the labour 
market realities which constrain employees’ freedom of action when applying for 
jobs. 
 
The reasoning in these rulings under Articles 8 and 11 run directly counter to the 
equivalent Article 9 jurisprudence in failing to impose a ‘specific situation rule’ 
to filter out the claim. Some commentators have argued that this is particularly 
unfortunate because it implies that there is a hierarchy of rights where some 
rights are applicable in all circumstances (such as those protected under Article 
8) and rights connected to the manifestation of religion and belief are exercisable 
only in restricted circumstances. As Leigh notes, one explanation for this 
approach is offered by those who argue that religion and belief are matters of 
choice, and this justifies the decision to impose restrictions.
49
 This argument was 
considered in Chapter 3 and some objections raised. 
 
It should however be noted that there has also been a degree of inconsistency in 
applying the specific situation rule to Article 9 itself. In an educational context, 
the ECtHR did not invoke the specific situation rule as a filter in either Leyla 
Sahin v Turkey,
50
 nor in Dahlab v Switzerland
51
 (although in neither case was it 
asked to do so). These judgments will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. In 
applications concerning other employment situations there have also been 
departures from the rule. For example, in Pitkevich v Russia,
52
 the ECtHR found 
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 Appl Nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99 (11 January 2006). See also Young, James and Webster v 
UK [1981] IRLR 408, where a closed shop arrangement was considered to interfere with an 
individual’s Article 11 rights; and Sibson v UK (1994) 17 EHRR 462, where a closed shop was 
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 I Leigh, ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy and Other Human Rights under the European 
Convention’ (2012) 1 OJLR 109, 123. 
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 (2004) Appl No. 44774/98 (29 June 2004). 
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 (2001) Appl No. 42393/98 (15 Feb 2001). 
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that Article 9 was prima facie engaged in respect of a judge dismissed for 
expressing her religion (by praying audibly in the court room and promising 
favourable outcomes to parties willing to join her church). Although she lost her 
claim when the court considered the application of Article 9(2), it is nevertheless 
significant that the specific situation filter was not initially employed to exclude 
the claim. Similarly, in Siebenhaar v Germany
53
 where an applicant had been 
dismissed from employment as a day care worker by a Church having been 
found to be a member of an religious group with views incompatible to those of 
her employer, the ECtHR did not apply the specific situation rule, but instead 
focussed its enquiries on whether or not the national courts had sufficiently 
balanced the interests concerned. This case followed two earlier ECtHR cases 
involving Church employees who had been dismissed – however the grounds of 
dismissal in these earlier cases related to the incompatibility of individuals’ 
respective private lives and so the cases were argued under Article 8 where, of 
course, the specific situation rule was not applied.
54
 Arguably the ECtHR was 
forced to confront its own inconsistency when faced with an Article 9 claim in 
such similar circumstances, hence the decision to overlook the specific situation 
rule.
 
 
   
Of course Pitkevich was determined some time ago, and Siebenhaar relates to a 
religious employer and may indeed be an unusual decision out of the main 
stream of ECtHR jurisprudence.
55
 Therefore, at present, it may be assumed that 
the specific situation rule is still likely to apply in employment cases. However, it 
should be noted that, at the time of writing this thesis, four high-profile 
applications are pending a hearing at the ECtHR.
56
 These all relate to the 
applicability of Article 9 in the UK (secular) workplace and the submissions 
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 [2011] Appl No. 18136/02 (3 February 2011). 
54
 Obst v Germany, Appl No. 425/03 (23 September 2010); Schuth v Germany, Appl No. 1620/03 
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55
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include a considered challenge to the specific situation rule, albeit that the UK 
government’s submissions continue to rely on this doctrine.57  
 
Nevertheless, even if, as a result either of the outcome of these cases or of a more 
gradual evolution, Article 9 applications in workplace cases begin to be accepted 
prima facie, there is another potential impediment to the full flourishing of 
protection for religious expression. This is evident from Article 9(2) which sets 
out the limitations on the freedom to ‘manifest’ religion or belief which a 
convention signatory state may impose. No such limitations are placed on the 
freedom to hold a religion or belief itself.
58
 Of the range of rationales for 
limitations on the manifestation of religion (listed in Article 9(2)), ‘the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others’ must surely be potentially the most wide-
ranging in scope, particularly in a workplace context. As with other freedoms, 
the ECtHR allows signatory states a ‘margin of appreciation’, albeit under 
European oversight,
59
 to determine for themselves the circumstances in which 
Article 9(2) may be invoked (and enshrined in national law).
60
 In exercising its 
margin of appreciation, a member state is nevertheless expected to show 
evidence that its courts have considered the extent to which any restrictions on 
ECHR rights are ‘proportionate’ and in the process that they have sought to 
balance the interests involved. As Baker puts it succinctly: 
 
The basic European principle of proportionality requires that invasions of a right 
impose no greater restrictions on the right (or on the ‘rights interests’) than can 
be balanced out by the need of the state to invade the right; the state’s ‘need’ 
refers both to the importance of the objective and to the need for the particular 
means employed to achieve it.
61
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Depending upon the outcome of the four workplace Article 9 applications before 
the ECtHR, there may be increased focus on the application of proportionality to 
restrictions on the manifestation of religion and belief in the workplace. Thus far, 
due to the application of the specific situation rule, few applications have reached 
that stage. 
 
England and Wales (Before 2003) 
 
The purpose of this section is to present a brief survey of domestic legislation 
and its context which directly or indirectly addresses religious expression in the 
workplace (or some aspect of it) prior to the major legislative innovation in 2003. 
 
Vestigial Remains of Historic Legislation 
 
Public Appointments 
 
Some of the legislation which has applied historically was surveyed earlier in 
Chapter 3 in considering the approach of providing exclusive protection for 
Christianity as the national religion. Historically and directly this took the form 
of legal measures which had the effect of excluding Roman Catholics and 
Dissenters from public office and the professions. Most of these ‘disabilities’ 
were removed in 1829,
62
 although a few remained. For example, until as late as 
1974, the position of Lord Chancellor could not be occupied by a Roman 
Catholic on the basis that he was ‘keeper of the Queen’s conscience’ and had a 
ceremonial role in appointing bishops.
63
 It is for a similar reason, i.e. the office-
holder’s role in appointing Church of England bishops, that the convention exists 
that neither a Roman Catholic nor a Jew should not occupy the office of Prime 
                                                 
62
 Under the terms of the Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829. 
63
 The Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Functions ) Act 1974 
permits the office to be held by a Roman Catholic, albeit that some of the ceremonial functions 
must then pass to another office-holder; see Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal 
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117 
Minister. Cumper and Edge point out that although there is no absolute legal bar 
to a Roman Catholic taking up the appointment, in practice there are significant 
legal constraints; not least amongst these, a Roman Catholic (or Jewish) Prime 
Minister may not advise on clerical appointments on pain of criminal prosecution 
and loss of office,
 64
 but no provision is made for this power to be delegated to 
another officeholder.
65
 The continued influence of this convention can be seen in 
the decision by the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to delay his public 
conversion to the Roman Catholic Church until after his tenure in that office had 
come to an end.
66
 Nevertheless, the significance of this convention should not be 
over-stated. The convention merely refers to allegiance to the Church of 
England. It does not require the incumbent Prime Minister to act in conformity 
with Anglican teachings, either in private or public.
67
 
 
There is, however, one remaining office, excepting those specific to the Church 
of England, for which there remains a legal requirement that the incumbent is a 
Protestant Christian - this is the office of Monarch.
68
 The Monarch must attest to 
this by means of a coronation oath
69
 and must join the Church of England to 
perform the functions of Supreme Governor.
70
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Working Patterns 
 
With the exception of the unique public office of monarch, which to a limited 
extent reflects the a Model II imperative (‘religion as heritage’), the only other 
institutional arrangements which serve to support Christianity uniquely in the 
workplace are those identified in Chapter 2 concerning the structuring of the 
working calendar. In terms of their entrenchment in legislation, there are now 
few examples.  
 
Dealing first with the working year, it is notable that four of the eight officially 
recognised public holidays in England and Wales are timed to coincide with the 
two major Christian festivals of Christmas and Easter. Significantly, a fifth 
public holiday, the Christian festival of Whitsun, a holiday which used to fall on 
a date between 11 May and 14 June, was secularised in 1971 as the second May 
public holiday (observed on the last Monday of that month) and has so lost its 
Christian associations.
71
 Although these holidays are officially recognised, the 
Working Time Regulations 2008
72
 do not entitle employees to these specific 
days as holiday.
73
 The tradition is quite entrenched, however, such that the Trade 
Union Congress estimates that only one-third of all workers works on at least one 
public holiday in the year.
74
  
 
In terms of the working week, there is an established convention that Sunday is 
the day when most workers expect to take a holiday. This convention is firmly 
rooted in notions of the Christian ‘Sabbath’ as falling on a Sunday; the Sabbath 
being a day which, by divine command, is kept separate from work as a day of 
rest.
75
 As late as 1950 this principle continued to form the basis of actual law-
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making in England and Wales. Part IV of the Shops Act of that year regulates 
Sunday trading, with restricted exceptions, starting from the principle that ‘Every 
shop shall, save as otherwise provided by this Part of this Act, be closed for the 
serving of customers on Sunday’. 76  It is clear that the rationale behind this 
general prohibition of Sunday trading was at least in part religious, from the fact 
that some of the exceptions were specifically and uniquely available to ‘person[s] 
of the Jewish religion’77 who would not be celebrating the Sabbath on a Sunday 
but rather the day before.
 
It is also of note that this Act did not repeal, but rather 
modified, more explicitly ‘Christian’ restrictive legislation in the forms of, for 
example, the Sunday Fairs Act 1448 and the Sunday Observance Act 1677.
78
 
This position changed with the passage of the Sunday Trading Act 1994 which 
relaxed, to a considerable extent, Sunday trading restrictions. Indeed, any 
meaningful restrictions apply only to ‘large shops’ (those where the floor space 
exceeds 280 square metres
79
) and again with some exceptions.
80
 Those falling 
within the restrictions may only open for a maximum of six consecutive hours on 
a Sunday, between 10am and 6pm; and they may not open on Easter Sunday or 
on Christmas Day when it falls on a Sunday.
81
  
 
Where workers themselves are concerned, there are some exemptions in the retail 
and betting trades (such that employers cannot force employees to work on 
Sundays
82
), but the general principle from the perspective of the state is that of 
laissez-faire, such that workers are expected to work as their contracts require. 
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Sunday is not even mentioned in the Working Time Regulations 2008, although 
there is (consciously or perhaps unconsciously) a recognition of a Christian 
pattern of weekly rest by the requirement that, with very limited exceptions, 
workers must be given a minimum rest period of an uninterrupted 24 hours in 
every seven-day cycle.
83
  
 
It should be noted that Knights sees the existence of the protections from Sunday 
working for shop workers as an example of a favouring the established religion 
and, for that reason, should be ‘subject to challenge’.84 Assuming her analysis is 
to be accepted (although no actual reference is made in the legislation to religion 
and thus all can benefit from the option of refusing to work on Sunday, 
irrespective of religious convictions), Knights arguably underplays the context in 
which the exemptions came into force – they are of course concessions in the 
face of a loss of much greater freedoms (since 1994) to observe Sundays as a day 
for worship and rest for the Christians, rather than positive rights created 
specifically to favour the established religion. 
 
This example notwithstanding, it is submitted that there is little at a statutory 
level which amounts to evidence of exclusive ongoing support in ‘a workplace 
context’ for the historical religion of England and Wales. In fact there remain 
two examples. In terms of public office, the role of the monarch continues to 
require a religious test of commitment to Anglican Protestant Christianity, and 
this is largely for reasons connected to the constitutional position of the Church 
of England and the role of the monarch as Supreme Governor. In terms of the 
working calendar, there now remains only Easter Sunday where large shops must 
be closed; otherwise, there are few restrictions on Sunday trading. However, 
although there is little in the way of statutory restriction, the convention of 
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treating Sunday as a weekly day of rest remains strong in such that on that day 
‘many social activities (such as education and government) are suspended.’85  
 
Race Discrimination Protections 
 
It will be argued that anti-discrimination law provides the most obvious vehicle 
for the protection of religious expression in the workplace. Although specific 
protection for religion and belief has only been available since 2003, there is 
some older anti-discrimination law in the form of the Race Relations Act 1976, 
which has been interpreted to offer protection to workers who are members of 
certain religious groups on the basis that these also represent defined ‘racial 
groups.’ 86  The Race Relations Act, in its amended version, outlaws 
discrimination on ‘racial grounds’ or against ‘racial groups’ where the latter term 
‘means a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or 
ethnic or national origins’.87  
 
This principle that this definition might encompass groups more usually 
identified as religious was first established at the Employment Appeals Tribunal 
(EAT), with reference to a Jewish man. Although without employing any 
significant legal reasoning, except that it reflected a common understanding 
between the parties, the EAT determined that he could be considered to be a 
member of an ethnic or racial group for the purposes of the Race Relations Act.
88
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The same principle was recognised in respect of Sikhs, and with much more 
sophistication, in the House of Lords judgment in Mandla v Dowell Lee.
89
 This 
case was brought under the wide reach of the Race Relations Act by the father of 
an orthodox Sikh who was a prospective pupil at a private school. The 
headmaster, who in the cause of racial harmony, wanted to minimise religious 
and social distinctions in the school, refused to admit the boy unless he removed 
his turban and cut his hair. Mandla and his father held that this represented 
indirect discrimination which could not be justified, as the rationale rested on the 
headmaster’s subjective opinion, and was therefore unlawful. The case rested on 
whether or not the Sikh identity was purely a function of religion or also a 
function of ethnic origin. The House of Lords determined that unlawful indirect 
discrimination had occurred under the Race Relations Act. In determining that 
Sikhs are in fact members of an ethnic group, the following ‘content-based’ 
rationale was offered: 
 
The conditions which appear to me to be essential are these: (1) a long shared 
history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and 
the memory of which it keeps alive (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including 
family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily associated with 
religious observance. In addition to those two essential characteristics the following 
characteristics are, in my opinion, relevant: (3) either a common geographical 
origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors (4) a common 
language, not necessarily peculiar to the group (5) a common literature peculiar to 
the group (6) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from 
the general community surrounding it (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or 
a dominant group within a larger community … .  A group defined by reference to 
enough of these characteristics would be capable of including converts, for example, 
persons who marry into the group, and of excluding apostates. Provided a person 
who joins the group feels himself or herself to be a member of it, and is accepted by 
other members, then he is, for the purpose of the 1976 Act, a member.
90
 
 
These criteria have been used in subsequent cases to determine that Rastafarians 
are not an ethnic group because they cannot show a separate identity either from 
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other Jamaicans or indeed from the rest of the Afro-Caribbean community.
91
 
Muslims have been unable similarly to establish protection on the grounds of 
race because they are geographically widely dispersed, and so cannot point 
towards a common ethnic origin.
92
 Jehovah’s Witnesses have also failed to 
establish that they are a distinct ethnic or racial group.
93
 
 
As noted by Hepple and Choudhury, the concept of indirect discrimination 
(discussed below) has also been invoked under the Race Relations Act in order to 
seek redress for detriments suffered on religious grounds.
94
 In CJH Walker v 
Hussain,
95
 for example, a blanket rule by an employer preventing employees 
taking leave during a busy period of time (which happened to be a Muslim 
holiday) was challenged by seventeen employees under the Race Relations Act. 
Their case relied on the fact that all seventeen claimants originated from the 
Indian subcontinent and could thus claim a common ethnic origin. Both the first 
instance tribunal and the EAT found that the respondent had indirectly 
discriminated against the claimants: the only group affected (negatively) by the 
application of the blanket rule were 'Asian Muslims', and the respondent was 
unable to offer a satisfactory justification. Although in this case the claimants 
were successful, when the same reasoning under the Race Relations Act was 
applied in different circumstances, the limitations of this avenue of redress for 
‘religious’ claimants is clear. For example in Safouane & Bouterfas v Joseph Ltd 
and Hannah
96
 two Muslim employees had been summarily dismissed for, inter 
alia, taking time for prayers during the lunch period. An industrial tribunal 
concluded that this did not amount to indirect racial discrimination by the 
employer, because both the claimants and the respondents belonged to the same 
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North African ethnic Arab minority – the former were Muslim, the latter 
respectively Jewish and Christian Coptic.  
 
‘Conscience Clauses’97 
 
Outside of discrimination law, there are a small number of specific exemptions 
from certain workplace activities enshrined in particular statutes. 
 
Probably the most well-known and long-standing example is the clause in the 
Abortion Act 1967 which allows medical staff to refuse to participate in abortion 
procedures if they have a ‘conscientious objection.’98 This right of refusal was 
extended to embryo research in 1990
99
 and would have been extended to apply to 
assisted dying under a private members Bill introduced to Parliament in 2004.
100
 
Where abortion is concerned, conscientious objection is not referenced to a 
religious or other form of belief. In fact, no grounds for this objection are 
specifically required, albeit that the burden of proof that a genuine objection 
exists rests with the medical practitioner.
101
 It is perhaps safe to assume that a 
large number of practicing members of religious faiths will be amongst those 
medical practitioners who avail themselves of this clause,
102
 but it is significant 
that it is the objection, not the motivation for the objection, which triggers the 
available protection. 
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There are limits on the exercise of the conscience clause under the Abortion Act. 
For example, those medical professionals who oppose abortion in all 
circumstances absolutely are required, conscientious objections notwithstanding, 
to participate in abortions if this is required to save the life or prevent serious and 
permanent physical or mental injury to a pregnant woman.
103
 This is likely to 
affect only a small group of particularly stringent conscientious objectors. 
However, many more are likely to be affected by a more significant limitation on 
the exercise of conscientious objection - that it has been held to apply to medical 
treatment only. Thus, in R v Salford AHA ex parte Janaway,
104
 a doctor’s 
secretary, who was Roman Catholic, was unsuccessful in arguing that she was 
entitled to use the exemptions under Section 4(1) of the Abortion Act to justify 
her refusal to type a letter of referral for a patient seeking an abortion. The 
exemption was held to apply only to actual participation in the hospital treatment 
leading to abortion. Similarly, in a Scottish case under the same legislation, 
Doogan & Anor, Re Judicial Review,
105
 the exemptions for conscience were held 
not to apply to two midwifery sisters (both Roman Catholic) who opposed being 
required to ‘delegate, supervise and support staff in the treatment of patients 
undergoing termination of pregnancy’. 106  These activities were held not to 
constitute direct involvement in abortion because ‘[n]othing [the applicants] have 
to do as part of their duties terminates a woman's pregnancy.’107  
 
These judgments strongly suggest that any indirect participation in abortion does 
not fall within the available protections for conscientious objection. Thus, 
participation in pre- and post-operative care would be excluded, including 
potentially the referral by GPs to an abortion clinic.
108
 There is, however, a 
second conscience clause which permits GPs to refuse to make such referrals 
where they have a conscientious objection to abortion, but which requires them 
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to make ‘prompt referral to another provider of primary medical services who 
does not have such conscientious objections’.109 What this means is that the GP 
must indirectly assist the patient to be referred to an abortion clinic, via another 
GP who is not opposed to terminating a pregnancy. This represents a serious 
limitation on the exercise of conscience. Inter alia, it excludes from protection 
those GPs who struggle to see a moral difference between referring a patient to 
an abortion clinic and referring a patient to another GP, for inevitable onward 
referral to an abortion clinic.
110
 In other words (to adopt the language of moral 
philosophy), it accommodates only those who adopt a rigidly deontogical view of 
the moral rightness of their own actions, and not those who take a broader 
consequentialist view of the likely ultimate effect of those same actions.
111
 
  
Equally, for those to whom it does apply, the mechanism for conscientious 
objection may also be flawed so as to make it difficult, in the face of various 
pressures, to exercise it without cost.
112
 This point was made clearly in the 
Parliamentary debate on the issue of abortion during the passage of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill in 1989: 
 
Unfortunately, however, there are many different ways in which the present 
conscience clause of the Abortion Act does not work effectively. Management can 
indicate that promotion prospects will be damaged if medical personnel do not take 
part in abortions. Candidates for interview for medical appointments will not be 
successful in some cases unless they agree in advance that they will take part in 
abortions. Peer group pressure—the burden falling upon other overworked medical 
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personnel—can persuade individuals to become involved in abortions about which 
they are unhappy.
113
 
 
These criticisms of an ‘opting out’ arrangement may well find an echo in other 
examples where conscientious objection is a legitimate option but is not viewed 
with a friendly eye by managers to whom it may create a measure of 
administrative or operational inconvenience. 
 
Another example of an apparently religiously-neutral conscience clause, and 
which was noted earlier, is that available to retail and betting workers.
114
 Here, 
the mechanism is very different to that employed in the Abortion Act – rather 
than requiring the conscientious objector to ‘opt out’ or otherwise be assumed to 
have consented to involvement, the retail or betting worker is assumed not to be 
a Sunday worker, unless she chooses to ‘opt in’ (a similar arrangement to that in 
force for those who wish to waive their rights to work only a 48 hour week
115
). 
Thus, any need to establish the basis of any conscientious objection is entirely 
obviated.  
 
A rather different conscience clause is that available to Sikh construction 
workers. They are excused from wearing a hard hat in place of a turban on 
construction sites by virtue of the Employment Act 1989.
116
 This represents a 
rare example of a specific statutory exemption relating to employment (in this 
case from health and safety legislation) on the apparent grounds of ‘religion’.117 
There are some extenuating circumstances which help to explain why, uniquely, 
health and safety legislation should give way to religious obligations. This is a 
                                                 
113
 HC Deb 27 July 1989, vol 157, col 1371-72, Mr Kenneth Hargreaves MP.  
114
 Employment Rights Act 1996 Part IV. 
115
 Working Time Regulations 1998, reg 5. 
116
 ibid., s 11. 
117
 Another example existed from 1971 – 1992. Prior to the ending of the ‘Closed Shop’ under the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 s 137 and, where this practice 
existed, a ‘genuine religious objection’ was one of the few reasons accepted, without loss of 
position, for refusal to join a trade union; see R Benedictus, ‘Closed Shop Exemptions and their 
Wording’ (1979) 8 Ind LJ 160.  
128 
function of the universal requirement that construction workers should wear hard 
hats (this is distinct from other occupations where Sikhs might be accommodated 
by being assigned to other duties not requiring the wearing of a hard hat) – thus, 
without an exemption, Sikhs would be entirely excluded from construction work, 
thought to be an important source of paid occupation for Sikhs in the UK.
118
 In 
another example with implications beyond employment, Sikhs enjoy an 
exemption from the otherwise universal obligation to wear a motorcycle helmet; 
inter alia, this prevents their exclusion from courier and delivery work.
119
 
Whether such provisions, considered in terms of the models in Chapter 3, 
actually represent significant concessions specifically for freedom of religious 
expression is cast into doubt by the curious position of the Sikh, for whom, as 
has been noted, the boundaries are blurred between religion, race and culture. 
This being the case, the exemptions for Sikhs, limited as they, may rather 
represent support for the Model VI (protection for minority religions only), 
where religion is a proxy for the apparently more important ‘rights’ connected to 
race under its widest meaning. 
 
There is a further source of conscientious objection provisions which may exist 
by virtue of professional codes of conduct. For example, empowered by the 
Pharmacy Order 2010,
120
 the General Pharmaceutical Council has produced a 
binding code of conduct which includes, at face value, a potentially wide-ranging 
conscience clause; it requires pharmacists to: 
 
Make sure that if your religious or moral beliefs prevent you from providing a 
service, you tell the relevant people or authorities and refer patients and the 
public to other providers.
121
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As the services which pharmacists may refuse to provide are not specified,
122
 nor 
the circumstances in which such refusals may be made, this represents a much 
more inclusive approach to conscientious objection than that contained, for 
example, within the Abortion Act. 
 
There are thus a small number of statutory exemptions for workers on the basis 
of ‘conscience’. Those that that are controversial relate to medical practice and 
are religious-neutral – objections do not need to be located with reference to a 
particular religious or philosophical world-view. As has been seen, these 
exemptions are narrowly interpreted by the courts. They are fiercely opposed by 
some, particularly in respect of abortion.
123
 
 
For conscientious exemptions on other grounds which affect workers, there 
appears to be little appetite to legislate to accommodate these. This is clearly 
evident from the failure to amend legislation to include ‘opt outs’ for workers 
and officials required to implement legislation advancing same-sex rights - such 
as civil partnerships and gay adoption – and who might object on religious 
grounds. Such an amendment
124
 was unsuccessfully moved in 2003 by Lady 
Blatch during a debate on the Local Government Bill of that year; had it been 
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successful, it would have permitted a right to ‘opt out’ for Christian social 
workers who did not want to participate in adoptions by homosexual couples.
125
  
A more recent amendment, 126 wider in potential scope, was moved by Lady 
O’Cathain in the House of Lords during a debate on the Equality Bill in 2005:127 
 
(1A) For the avoidance of doubt the prohibition in subsection (1) shall include—  
(a) requiring a registrar or any other person to arrange, officiate at or otherwise 
participate in the registration of a civil partnership under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
(c. 33), 
(b) requiring a registrar or any other person to arrange, solemnise or otherwise 
participate in the registration of a marriage involving a person whose gender has 
become the acquired gender under the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (c. 7), 
(c) requiring any person to participate in any placement under section 18 of the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c. 38) (placement for adoption by agencies), or any 
application under section 49 of that Act (application for adoption) where the placement 
is with, or the application is made by, a couple who are not a married couple, or one 
applicant is part of a couple within the meaning of section 144(4)(b) of the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002 (general interpretation etc.),  
where the person concerned has a conscientious objection on the basis of his religion or 
belief.
128
 
 
Lady O’Cathain withdrew the amendment after the Government refused to 
accept it. Baroness Scotland, on behalf of the Government of the day, supported 
this decision with reference to the more general protections offered by the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 – the inference 
being that these offer sufficient protection in such cases (although with hindsight 
this has proved to be somewhat misleading).
 129
 
 
The reliance on the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations (and 
now the relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010) in lieu of a specific 
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conscience clause does of course create a much more qualified right to protection 
for conscience as opposed to the absolute right which would be conveyed 
through a specific opt-out clause.  
 
What is not explained is why these regulations are considered to provide 
sufficient protection for those opposing, for example, civil partnerships and not 
those opposing abortion. Indeed, the passage of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008, provided a clear and recent opportunity to withdraw the 
conscience clause on the basis that sufficient protection for conscientious 
objection lay elsewhere in domestic law. This did not occur. An explanation as to 
the differential treatment of these two types of conscience claim is mooted by 
Kenneth Norrie. He suggests that  
 
health care professionals are not carrying out public duties in the way that registrars 
are; abortion is not an inherent and necessary part of health care, in the way that 
registration of civil partnership is within the registration system; and refusing to 
perform abortions does not constitute systemic discrimination against an equality-
vulnerable class.
130
  
 
Norrie’s analysis implies: firstly, that there is a critical distinction of some kind 
between the conduct of a public duty, for which no opt-out can be countenanced, 
and the conduct of an activity which cannot be so classified; secondly, there is a 
distinction between activities which are core and non-core to the job role, and 
opting out of the former is less acceptable than opting out of the latter; thirdly, 
the characteristics of the group in some way potentially disadvantaged by the 
conscience clause should be taken into account – if this group is considered to be 
disadvantaged then this should be weighted against the conscientious objector 
(who is recast as a ‘discriminator’). The problem with this analysis is that it 
considers the case from all perspectives save that of the conscientious objector. 
The demands of individual conscience presumably do not change in response to 
the public nature of the role or task in question, nor how core the task is thought 
to be, nor who might be in some way ‘offended’ by the objection. Nevertheless, 
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from the perspective of the legislature, it would seem that it is a policy decision 
not to promote religious rights in these circumstances and to insist that public 
officials act against conscience or leave their role. This aspect of public policy is 
most congruent with Model I (exclusion). 
 
England and Wales (Post-2003) 
 
Based on Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU adopted the Framework 
Equality Directive in 2000.
131
 The directive outlawed discrimination in 
employment and vocational training on the grounds of religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, disability and age. In transposing the Directive into law, the British 
Government introduced, inter alia, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 which came into force on 2nd December 2003 and apply in 
England, Wales and Scotland.
132
 These regulations were, in turn, replaced by the 
Equality Act 2010, where the drafting was broadly replicated with minor 
changes.  
 
Definitions 
 
How religion is defined is of some significance. The relevant EU directive 
provides little steer in terms of definition - ‘religion and belief’ is one of the 
prohibited grounds for discrimination in employment, but no further elucidation 
of the reach of these terms is offered.
133
 
 
This was transposed into the original text of the 2003 Regulations in an expanded 
form as follows: ‘In these Regulations, “religion or belief” means any religion, 
religious belief, or similar philosophical belief.’134 Under the Equality Act,135 the 
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definition changed slightly, largely to incorporate protections for those without 
religion or belief: 
 
(1) Religion means any religion and a reference to religion includes a reference 
to a lack of religion.  
(2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief 
includes a reference to a lack of belief. 
 
In 2006 the Regulations had been amended in order to remove the word ‘similar’ 
from ‘philosophical belief’ and this revised formula was carried across into the 
Equality Act.
136
 Ostensibly this would appear to weaken the link between 
religion and belief suggesting that the bar was being in some way lowered to 
allow beliefs which could not quite sufficiently similar to a religion or a religious 
belief. Vickers suggests however, that the change in wording was put into effect 
merely in order to placate some humanists and atheists who objected to the 
implication that their beliefs were similar to religious beliefs.
137
 This issue was 
considered by the judge in Grainger Plc & Others v Nicholson
138
 who, examining 
the relevant debates in Hansard, agreed with Vickers and thus concluded that the 
amendment to the wording was not materially significant in terms of adding or 
subtracting from the original definition. 
 
Nevertheless, Grainger was a highly significant ruling in terms of understanding 
the legal definition of belief. In brief, the case was concerned with whether or not 
a belief in man-made climate change was capable, if genuinely held, of being a 
philosophical belief for the purpose of the 2003 Religion and Belief Regulations. 
The judge in the case concurred with the employment tribunal (pre-hearing 
review) that it was. In doing so, he determined five criteria to apply in 
determining whether or not a given belief or set of beliefs fall under the scope of 
the 2003 Regulations: 
 
(i) The belief must be genuinely held. 
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(ii) It must be a belief and not [  ] an opinion or viewpoint based on the present 
state of information available. 
(iii) It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour. 
(iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance. 
(v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible 
with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others 
… .139 
 
In applying these criteria, in the instant case, the judge found that a belief in 
man-made climate change was capable of being protected under the Regulations, 
despite the fact that it may be ‘a one-off belief’ (as opposed to a comprehensive 
world-view, or, in the judge’s words, an ‘-ism’) and not necessarily shared by 
others.
140
 This judgment would seem to suggest a broadening of protection for 
sincerely held beliefs, including beliefs based on science and political beliefs,
141
 
albeit that the judge still clearly intended that boundaries should still apply – not 
all beliefs will qualify. Perhaps particularly interesting is the fifth criteria – 
compatibility with dignity and the fundamental rights of others, a criteria drawn 
from ECHR jurisprudence and originally applied in considering the definition of 
‘belief’ in McClintock.142 Although perhaps a mechanism to continue to exclude 
racist beliefs from protection,
143
 it nevertheless imposes a relative requirement 
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135 
that a belief should be generally considered acceptable ‘in a democratic society’. 
Unless the meaning here is restricted to outlawing physical harm to others (akin 
to beliefs in human sacrifice, genital mutilation, etc) and then extended to apply 
to religious beliefs, then a number of beliefs which might otherwise be worthy of 
protection could be called into question, including, for example, any religious 
beliefs which may appear to be incompatible with the dignity of women or gay 
and lesbian people, or which might involve a denial of vital medical treatment to 
minors. 
 
Direct Discrimination  
 
The focus in this section will be on how far the direct discrimination provisions 
of the Equality Act offer protection for forms of religious expression in the 
workplace. 
 
The definition of direct discrimination is found under section 13 of the Equality 
Act: ‘A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected 
characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.’144 
Religion and belief is ‘a protected characteristic’, as are age, disability, gender 
reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, sex 
and sexual orientation.
145
   
 
Fundamentally, the definition of direct discrimination is designed to identify and 
render unlawful any behaviour by an employer (or another actor in the 
workplace) which involves subjecting a worker to a ‘detriment’ because of their 
protected characteristic. For example, a failure to promote someone because she 
is a Hindu would amount to direct discrimination because of the protected 
characteristic of religion and belief.  
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Direct discrimination is potentially a powerful protection for employees for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the normal obligation on the claimant to show an 
adequate degree of ‘proof’ before proceeding with a claim is reversed.146 The 
claimant need only show a prima facie claim; the onus is then on the employer to 
satisfy a tribunal that it did not in fact engage in discrimination.
147
 Secondly, 
aside from the occupational requirement provisions of the legislation, there is no 
defence against a direct discrimination claim on the basis of religion and belief 
(unlike indirect discrimination which can be defended as proportionate). As 
noted in R (E) v JFS Governing Body
148
 this means that direct discrimination in 
favour of minority religious or racial groups cannot be justified, just as 
discrimination against such groups cannot. For some this represents a regrettable 
‘defect’ in the law;149 certainly it does not align with Model VI (protection for 
minority religions). 
 
For a direct discrimination claim to succeed, a ‘comparison’ is usually 
required.
150
 In religion and belief cases, a tribunal will examine whether or not, 
for instance, a Buddhist was treated less favourably than a Hindu either was, or 
would have been, treated in the same circumstances. Thus the comparison can be 
either real or hypothetical, but the circumstances of the comparator and the 
claimant must be the same, with only the religion being different. Once less 
favourable treatment has been established, the question then arises, was religion 
the ground of the less favourable treatment, or did the less favourable treatment 
have some other cause? The formula was set out by the House of Lords thus: 
would the claimant have been treated in the same way but for his (in this case) 
religion or belief?
151
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The pressing question for the subject at hand is how far the basis of direct 
discrimination, thus defined, actually protects religious ‘expression’ as opposed 
to ‘belief’ itself; in other words, how far might tribunals adopt the ECtHR 
approach of distinguishing between a forum internum and a forum externum, and 
protecting the latter not the former? If they do so, how might they draw the line 
between the two? For example, would a blanket requirement that all male staff be 
clean-shaven directly discriminate on the basis of belief (protected) or merely on 
the basis of conduct inspired by belief (unprotected)?
152
 As a second example, 
might an employer be able to treat a grievance from a Christian member of staff 
less favourably than a grievance from a gay member of staff, if it could argue 
that the Christian’s grievance was, or was related to, a manifestation of the belief 
rather than the belief itself? Could it thus admit that it subjected the Christian to a 
detriment but argue that this was on a basis unprotected by the Regulations, 
arguing that the circumstances were not the same?
153
 
 
Indirect Discrimination 
 
Indirect discrimination is defined under section 19 of the Equality Act as 
occurring when: 
 
(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, 
criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant 
protected characteristic of B’s.  
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is 
discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if—  
 
(a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the 
characteristic,  
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(b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a 
particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not 
share it,  
(c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and  
(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim.
154
 
 
Indirect discrimination because of the protected characteristic of religion and 
belief extends protection to workers whose employer imposes an apparently 
neutral requirement which has a much more significant and detrimental effect on 
people (otherwise in the same circumstances as others to whom the requirement 
applies) who hold a particular religious belief. For example, if an employer 
imposed a uniform requirement which prevented staff wearing any form of head 
covering, then this would be a requirement which would be difficult for many 
Muslim women to meet on the basis of their faith-based conviction that they 
must wear a headscarf in the company of men.
 155
 This requirement would be 
therefore ‘indirectly discriminatory’. As another example, if a pharmacy required 
that all staff issue contraceptives to customers this would indirectly discriminate 
against Roman Catholic Christians who have a faith-based objection to the 
practice of contraception and who would thus find it difficult to comply with the 
requirement.  
 
In order to be successful in an indirect discrimination claim, the claimant must 
show that he has suffered (or would suffer) a ‘particular disadvantage’ as a 
Christian, Muslim, etc, as a result of a specific requirement in the workplace, a 
disadvantage from which others do not or would not suffer. Thus, at its most 
basic, the claimant would need to show that a specific requirement has 
disadvantaged, or would disadvantage, a religion that he belongs to, or a belief 
arising from that religion which is shared by others. This test is more relaxed 
than its forerunner; the wording of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, as 
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originally enacted, required proof that the proportion of women who could 
comply with a work requirement was ‘considerably smaller’ than the proportion 
of men who could so comply.
156
 As Fredman notes, quantifying what was meant 
by ‘considerably smaller’ gave rise to some considerable legal dispute.157 The 
wording of the Equality Act (and before that the Religion and Belief 
Regulations), by avoiding the need to quantify the scope of the disadvantage, 
tends to obviate the first problem. The second problem may however remain to 
some extent. For example, is a ‘particular disadvantage’ suffered by a single 
Roman Catholic protected, or is it necessary to identify a group, or ‘pool’ of 
Roman Catholics who share the same disadvantage?
158
 Tribunals may favour the 
need to identify a group disadvantage as this is more in the spirit of the origins of 
the concept of indirect discrimination.
159
 However, there is also a view that more 
individualised religious beliefs should be admitted into the scope of protection. 
Vickers, for example, argues that this is more in keeping with the ECHR, which 
courts are legally obliged to take account of.
160
 Thus, the expression of a 
sincerely held religious belief, which may be shared by few if any others, would 
not be excluded from the scope of indirect discrimination per se. That said, when 
the test of proportionality is subsequently applied, it would be possible for a 
group disadvantage test to apply indirectly. As Vickers observes: 
 
If an employer refuses to adapt a uniform rule to reflect the dress codes of a 
large proportion of the local workforce, such a refusal may be viewed as 
disproportionate; failure to accommodate one employee's religious views may 
be more easily regarded as proportionate.
161
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The test of proportionality forms part of the defence against indirect 
discrimination claims – in essence there is a justification defence which is 
currently framed in UK law as showing that a particular criterion, provision or 
practice represents ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’ For 
example, a chocolate factory might be able to justify as proportionate a policy of 
requiring all staff who are directly involved in the production process to be clean 
shaven for reasons relating to the legitimate aim of hygiene, even though this 
would represent prima facie indirect discrimination towards would-be Sikh 
employees.
162
 It should be noted that the notion of a legitimate aim is not 
restricted to the economic interests of the employer and there is the clear 
possibility that employers may be able to offer justification arguments based on 
for example, the interests of other staff members or the desire to project a secular 
image to the public.
163
 
 
It is worth noting the difference in this wording from that used in the original 
directive which requires that the indirectly discriminatory provision, criterion or 
practice ‘is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving 
that aim are appropriate and necessary.’ 164  As Vickers observes, although 
tribunals are required to interpret discrimination law in the light of the original, 
the alternative wording of the regulations (and subsequently the Equality Act) 
appears to put less emphasis on the ‘necessity’ of any practice before an 
assessment of proportionality is carried out,
165
 which would appear to be to the 
potential advantage of the employer. Baker locates the responsibility for the same 
problem with the judiciary, arguing that judges in the UK have deliberately 
avoided the ‘necessity’ requirement ‘in order to avoid exposing employers to the 
harsh scrutiny represented by the ECJ requirement that indirectly discriminatory 
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rules be necessary to meet a real need for the business.’166  Instead, he argues, the 
UK courts have applied a form of ‘proportionality balancing’ which allows an 
employer to offer apparently acceptable reasons to justify its indirectly 
discriminatory provision, criterion or practice (PCP) but without needing to show 
a real need for that PCP. Thus, the employer’s ‘justification succeeds regardless 
of the availability of less discriminatory means’.167 
 
Harassment 
 
The general definition of ‘harassment’ is defined under section 26(1) of the 
Equality Act as follows: 
 
(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if—  
 
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected 
characteristic, and  
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of—  
(i) violating B’s dignity, or  
(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for B.
168
  
 
Harassment is a legal concept which originally emerged from case law as a form 
of direct discrimination. A successful claim for harassment (under one of the 
protected grounds under discrimination law) therefore required the claimant to 
identify a comparator. As a result of the staged implementation of the 2002 EU 
Equal Treatment Amendment Directive,
169
 existing domestic law changed and 
new discrimination legislation thereafter incorporated a free-standing definition 
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of harassment. Harassment no longer requires a comparator to be identified. 
Rather, the law now reflects an approach based on the concept of ‘dignity’. If 
someone’s dignity is (seriously) violated on the grounds of a protected 
characteristic, then it is likely to constitute an unlawful act of harassment. Since 
the implementation of the Equality Act 2010, it is not necessary for an individual 
actually to possess the relevant protected characteristic to make a claim of 
harassment. 
 
The primary determinant of harassment is individual perception, above a certain 
threshold of ‘reasonableness’ to protect against claims by those who are (or 
choose to appear) very easily offended. A single act, if sufficiently serious, can 
be considered to constitute actionable harassment, but in most cases more than a 
single act will be required. It is generally agreed that fairness requires that the 
would-be harasser (‘Person A’) should be aware that his actions are offensive to 
Person B on the grounds of the protected characteristic.
170
 This will not 
necessarily be immediately obvious to Person A, not least if Person B’s religious 
sensibilities are unknown. Nevertheless, the perception of B remains highly 
significant,
171
 such that what might be inoffensive, even amusing to some, might 
be sufficiently offensive to another to trigger a harassment claim. 
 
When an act of harassment takes place against one employee by another, it is 
primarily the employer who is considered liable for the consequences under the 
doctrine of vicarious liability which applies in discrimination law even if the 
employer does not know that a discriminatory act has taken place.
172
 The 
employer can mitigate its liability by demonstrating that it took all reasonable 
steps to prevent discrimination or harassment taking place.
173
 Having a policy, 
which is communicated to staff, is one way in which it can seek to do this.
174
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An illustrative example of harassment on the grounds of religion and belief is 
provided by the Muslim Council of Britain: 
 
Following a particular incident, Islam features largely in the media. 
Consequently, stereotypical and hurtful comments in the workplace are 
routinely made about Muslims, upsetting certain Muslim employees. Such 
behaviour may amount to harassment, even if not specifically directed at one or 
more individuals, but at Islam as a religion or Muslims as a group more 
generally.
175
 
 
Equally, harassment might result from unwelcome remarks about a co-worker’s 
chosen form of religious expression, such as the wearing of a headscarf or cross, 
or to beliefs he or she is thought to hold.
176
 To this extent, the harassment 
provisions of the Equality Act are likely to provide a degree of protection for 
employees who wish to express their religious identity or religious convictions 
without enduring various forms of hostility from co-workers or managers.  
 
Far more problematic, for the purposes of this thesis, is the potential for the 
protections against religious harassment to be used as a means of suppressing 
religious expression in the workplace. Harassment on the grounds of religion 
could easily encompass giving offence to non-religious co-workers or co-
workers of a different religious faith. The intention is not likely to be a deliberate 
attempt to cause offence – this is merely a potential by-product of a more worthy 
aim. The religious employee may well rather have an urgent concern for the 
spiritual well-being of co-workers and strongly desire to see them converted to 
the same religious faith. This is quite distinct from a deliberate desire to offend 
which may come from taunting religious colleagues because of their religious 
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faith. The distinction between the two has led some American commentators to 
distinguish helpfully between ‘animus-based’ and ‘non-animus-based’ 
harassment.
177
 However, although it is helpful analytically to consider the 
difference in motive, motive is in fact irrelevant in the UK; from a legal point of 
view, it is the ‘offensive’ result which is of significance.178 There is a further 
possibility which exists by virtue of the harassment provisions of other aspects of 
discrimination law. For example, a religious employee may feel constrained to 
point out to a homosexual colleague that her lifestyle is ‘sinful’ and urge her to 
repent. This may constitute harassment because of the protected characteristic of 
sexual orientation, again despite the non-animus motive. However, there exists a 
further complication. To discipline a religious employee for harassment when 
seeking to convert or morally guide a colleague is likely to infringe his rights if 
he sincerely believes that to seek to convert or to point out sin in others is a 
requirement of his religious faith. Thus, he himself may be subject to indirect 
discrimination and possibly harassment by his employer. Vickers summarises the 
difficulty succinctly:  
 
Take the example of a religious employee who attempts to convert a non-religious 
colleague, but who offends him in the process. In such a case, three rights interact: 
the nonreligious employee’s right to be free from religious harassment, the religious 
employee’s right to free speech, and both parties’ rights to freedom of religion. In 
some cases, the religious interests of an employer may also become involved. The 
entry of freedom of religion into an already complex equation makes the correct 
parameters of religious harassment more difficult to draw.
179
 
 
With this in mind, the harassment provisions are potentially a double-edged 
sword, with one blade congruent with Model V (protection) and one blade 
congruent with Model I (exclusion).
180
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A Duty to make Reasonable Adjustments 
 
Under the provisions of the Equality Act an employer is under what is known as 
‘a duty to make reasonable adjustments’ to the workplace or to work practices in 
order to accommodate the needs of disabled employees such that they are able to 
work in particular roles.
181
 The duty may involve some additional costs to the 
employer and may also entail a modest element of ‘positive discrimination’ in 
favour of disabled employees.
182
 Such a duty does not extend beyond the 
protected characteristic of disability. However, it has been mooted that a similar 
duty should be introduced in the UK in respect of religion and belief akin to that 
employed, for example, in the USA under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
1974,
183
 which establishes a duty to ‘reasonably accommodate’ the needs of 
religious employees.
184
 Such a duty would require employers to alter workplace 
rules and practices in order to accommodate workers’ religious beliefs where it is 
‘reasonable’ to do so. For example, it may be that an employer would be required 
to alter a shift rota to accommodate the wish of a Christian employee not to work 
on a Sunday.  
 
What is meant by ‘reasonable’ is perhaps the area which is likely to be most 
problematic. In the USA, for example, the duty of reasonable accommodation is 
circumscribed at the point that it creates ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the 
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employer’s business.’ 185  Courts in the US have interpreted this in favour of 
employers such that undue hardship is suffered if the costs of accommodation are 
more than ‘de minimis’, and complaints by other workers can be considered a 
‘cost’.186 Although this formula, applied to the United Kingdom, is satisfactory to 
some commentators,
187
 it is submitted that it is unlikely to provide a significant 
boost to the protection model. However, there is no reason to adopt a ‘de-
minimis’ threshold and the more stringent requirements of the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments for disabled employees might provide a more robust 
template for future innovations. Such a proposal is likely to encounter some 
resistance, however, as it may be considered to create more protection for 
religion than is enjoyed in respect of other protected characteristics, thus creating 
unequal treatment.
188
 How far differential treatment for religion and belief vis-à-
vis other protected characteristics can be justified will depend on the extent to 
which it is possible to argue that religion and belief by its very nature requires a 
different legal approach to that which is applied for example to sex or race. If so, 
it would not be unique amongst the protected characteristics; as has been seen, 
disability is also treated differently. 
  
Occupational Requirements 
 
Given the presentation in Chapter 3 of Model IV (‘islands of exclusivity’), 
attention will now turn to those aspects of discrimination law which have a 
bearing on opportunities for people to work together within the environment of 
the religious beliefs they share – i.e. within a religious organisation. One 
consequence of anti-discrimination legislation, in terms of general principles, is 
that it acts to prevent discrimination on the grounds of religion in any context 
unless by exception. Thus, organisations with a religious character would 
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normally be prevented from failing to consider candidates for employment with a 
different, or no, religious affiliation. This effect led to some Christian groups 
opposing the original legislation on the basis that it would be potentially 
injurious to the religious identity of churches and religious organisations.
189
  It 
will be recalled that there are two basic legal mechanisms to address this problem 
in order to protect organisations from the reach of particular aspects of 
discrimination law, in full or in part – through general exemption or through the 
mechanism of (in the UK) occupational requirement exceptions.  
 
Under the Equality Act 2010,
190
 occupational requirement exceptions are made 
in two circumstances for employers with a religious ethos. The first is to allow 
such employers to make it a requirement for a jobholder ‘to be of a particular 
religion or belief’ is they can show that, based on the ‘nature or context of the 
work’, it is an ‘occupational requirement’ to reserve a particular job for someone 
holding a particular set of religious beliefs, and that it is ‘a proportionate means 
to achieve a legitimate aim’ to apply this requirement.191 The Explanatory Notes 
to the Act illustrate how this occupational requirement exception is intended to 
apply: 
 
A religious organisation may wish to restrict applicants for the post of head of 
its organisation to those people that adhere to that faith. This is because to 
represent the views of that organisation accurately it is felt that the person in 
charge of that organisation must have an in-depth understanding of the religion’s 
doctrines. This type of discrimination could be lawful. However, other posts that 
do not require this kind of in-depth understanding, such as administrative posts, 
should be open to all people regardless of their religion or belief.
192
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However, it may be objected that this example takes an instrumental rather than 
an organic view of the nature of working for a religious organisation.
193
 A 
religious organisation may well argue that a very large number of job roles, even 
those apparently lacking a particular ‘religious’ purpose, should be reserved for 
people with a shared religious commitment, given the context in which the 
religious organisation operates. This argument was successful in Muhammed v 
The Leprosy Mission International,
194
 where a tribunal accepted that it was a 
legitimate occupational requirement for a Christian ethos organisation to restrict 
the job of finance administrator to Christians because of the context in which the 
job role was carried out, in particular a core emphasis on the importance of 
Christian prayer across all of its activities. However, in two cases brought against 
Prospects, a Christian charity dedicated to helping adults with learning 
disabilities, a rather different conclusion was reached.
195
 In these cases, 
Prospects’ staffing policy, which required all staff except some administrators to 
be practising Christians, was found to be discriminatory: each post should have 
been considered separately to determine whether or not it could be reasonably 
covered by an occupational requirement exception. 
 
On the face of it, therefore, the occupational requirement exceptions for religion 
under the Equality Act 2010 do permit employees, sharing the same religion, to 
work together where their organisation has a religious ethos and where it is 
considered ‘proportionate’ in the particular ‘employment context’ to be inclusive 
only of those of a particular religion.
196
 These conditions do, however, represent 
two considerable caveats, and how narrowly they will be applied by an 
employment tribunal is somewhat uncertain.  
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There is however a further issue to explore. This is the detailed interpretation of 
what constitutes a religious ethos. For example, if for these purposes an 
organisation is considered to have a ‘Christian’ ethos and is thus able, subject to 
the caveats highlighted, to employ only Christians, then there remains the 
question of what actually constitutes a Christian – is this for the organisation to 
decide? One possibility is to allow further subdivisions by Christian 
denomination, or, perhaps more helpfully, by broad theological grouping, such 
that an organisation’s evangelical Christian ethos or Anglo-Catholic Christian 
ethos might be recognised as distinctive – even then, due to differences of 
emphasis within theological traditions,
197
 it would perhaps be desirable that 
organisations define their own ethos, for example, by way of a ‘statement of 
faith’ to which would-be job applicants would be required to subscribe. 
 
The second area of occupational requirement exceptions under the Equality Act 
apply in circumstances where a religious ethos organisation would be otherwise 
engaged in unlawful discrimination on the basis of other protected characteristics 
such as sex, sexual orientation and gender reassignment. It is strongly arguable 
that religious employees are not free to associate together within ‘islands of 
exclusivity’ if their respective religion’s requirements for individual lifestyle are 
not enforceable. A Christian organisation may be able to justify a policy of 
reserving the job role of, for example, youth worker, for practising Christians, 
but can it also insist that the youth worker conforms to Christian teaching on 
human sexuality and so agrees to abstain from same-sex activity? In employment 
such exemptions apply when ‘the employment is for the purposes of an organised 
religion’198 and the exemption is necessary to meet either of what are referred to 
as the ‘compliance’ and the ‘non-conflict’ principles. 199  The compliance 
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principle is engaged if the exception is applied ‘so as to comply with the 
doctrines of the religion.’ 200  The non-conflict principle is engaged if the 
exception is applied ‘so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious 
convictions of a significant number of the religion's followers’.201 In other words, 
people can be excluded from certain employment roles in religious organisations 
because the religion itself teaches that certain protected characteristics are 
incompatible (in certain employment roles) with that religious belief, or because 
a significant number of adherents of that religion believe that there is an 
incompatibility (for example, and on either basis, women can be lawfully 
excluded from the Roman Catholic priesthood
202
). The second principle is 
helpful as it circumvents the need for a court to conduct a detailed inquiry into 
religious doctrine.  
 
This second category of exceptions from the effects of discrimination because of 
religion and belief on the basis of other protected characteristics, is more 
narrowly drawn than the first category of occupational requirement exceptions 
for religion and belief per se.
203
 Critically, this category applies only to 
‘organised religion’ rather than religious ethos organisations. The significance of 
this was explored in R (Amicus MSF Section) v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry,
204
 a case in which aspects of discrimination law, relating to religious 
exemptions on the basis of sexual orientation as it then stood, were challenged as 
to their compatibility with the relevant parts of the original EU Framework 
Directive 2000. Richards J observed that the term ‘organised religion’ was 
narrower than ‘religious organisation’ and provided the rather significant 
example that the employment of a teacher in a faith school is likely to be ‘for 
purposes of a religious organisation’ rather than ‘for purposes of an organised 
religion’ and thus likely to be outside the scope of the exemption.205 Vickers 
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concludes, writing in 2003, that overall there is ‘significant leeway to religious 
organisations to discriminate in favour of their own members but [it] stops short 
of allowing discrimination on other grounds in the name of religion.’206 It would 
seem that this conclusion might, in certain circumstances at least, apply to 
‘organised religions’ (applying the Amicus bifurcation) following the (first 
instance) decision in Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance,
207
 where 
the refusal by a diocese (clearly conforming to the definition of organised 
religion) to employ a gay Christian youth worker was judged to constitute sexual 
orientation discrimination. This case was complicated by the fact that Reaney 
had undertaken, at interview, to remain celibate whilst employed in the role, but 
the diocese seemingly had doubts about whether or not he would be able to meet 
that commitment. It was this issue, rather than the requirement for gay employees 
to be celibate per se, which resulted in the particular outcome of the case.
 208
 
 
Although the exemptions under discussion are narrowly drawn, it is significant 
that, during the passage of the then Equality Bill 2009, the Government 
attempted to narrow them further: by recasting the exemptions as applying 
exclusively to roles wholly or mainly concerned with the ‘liturgical or ritualistic 
practices of the religion’, or ‘promoting or explaining the doctrine of the 
religion’;209 and by requiring that this be applied only when it is ‘proportionate’ 
to do so.
210
 It is clear that the job prospects of a prospective gay Christian youth 
worker (such as Reaney) were prominent in the minds of those involved in the 
drafting of the Bill, hence an explanatory note which stated: ‘This exception is 
unlikely to permit a requirement that a church youth worker who primarily 
organises sporting activities is celibate if they are gay.’211 Faced with strong 
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opposition in the House of Lords over the possible consequences for religious 
freedom
212
 and with limited time before the 2010 general election, the 
government accepted an amendment
213
 proposed by Lady O’Cathain, and carried 
by the House, which had the effect that the legal position in respect of 
occupational requirements, enshrined in the Equality Act 2010, remains 
fundamentally that of 2003.
214
 
 
A further issue is concerned with whether or not religious employees within the 
islands of exclusivity are actually able to conduct their work according to the 
religious principles they espouse. Whereas it may be assumed that there is no 
reason why this should not generally be the case, it may be more difficult in 
certain circumstances which typically arise when the religious organisation is 
involved in providing an educational, commercial or a funded ‘public service’. 
The most high-profile example of such a difficulty arose during the passage of 
the Equality Act 2006 Sexual Orientation Regulations 2007
215
 which outlawed 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in terms of the provision of 
goods and services, with only a narrow exemption for ‘organisations relating to 
religion or belief’ (with the same caveats which apply under the Equality Act 
2010), unless they are educational establishments, mainly ‘commercial’ in 
character, or they provide services with and ‘on behalf of a public authority 
under the terms of a contract’ - in which cases there are no exemptions at all.216  
The plight of the Roman Catholic adoption agencies which faced either closure 
under the Regulations or the requirement to act against faith by asking their staff 
to facilitate adoptions by homosexual couples is illustrative of the difficulties 
which religious employees will encounter if the religious organisation to which 
they belong is required to act against the teaching or doctrines of that religion. 
For most religious organisations the resulting strains may well become 
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intolerable forcing their closure
217
 (or at best secularisation) and thus, inter alia, 
leading to the abrupt exile from an island of exclusivity for religious employees 
who had hitherto found refuge there. 
 
Public Policy 
 
Procurement and the Equality Duty 
 
Daintith employs the classical term imperium to describe the state’s power to 
identify and define rights and to enforce these rights through the imposition of 
sanctions.
218
 However, he utilises a second term, dominium, to describe the 
power the state exercises through its influence, particularly the influence based 
on its ‘buying power’. As modern states have considerable procurement power 
and seek to engage the private sector in providing numerous services, it is argued 
that they have an immense power to influence organisations which seek lucrative 
contracts with the state government to provide such services. This power could 
be used in the equality field, for example to require organisations to behave in 
particular ways which might constrain their normal freedom of action and require 
them to promote objectives which they might not otherwise have pursued.
219
 
 
In the UK there is clear evidence that state buying power has been used in this 
way. For example, any organisation tendering to supply legal aid work is 
required by the Legal Services Commission (a non-departmental public body) to 
have an equality and diversity policy which ‘sets out how you will promote 
equality and tackle discrimination in your organisation and meet the diverse 
                                                 
217
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needs of the clients you serve.’220 Some quite detailed guidelines are provided on 
what should be included in the policy and how it should be monitored.  
 
For many organisations, such requirements may not be unduly burdensome. 
However, for some religious ethos organisations, the effects may be, for them, 
malign. For example, in 2008, residents at a care home belonging to the Christian 
charity, Pilgrim Homes, refused to circulate a questionnaire four times per year 
to residents asking about their sexual orientation in support of its ‘fair access and 
diversity policy’; nor would it agree to use images of elderly gay, lesbian, 
bisexual and transgender people in its promotional literature, arguing that this 
would be disrespectful to the beliefs and values of its Christian residents.
221
 The 
Local Authority withdrew £13,000 of funding from the charity as a result on the 
basis that ‘there had been limited progress in making the home open to the gay 
and lesbian community’.222 Although this decision was later overturned after 
Pilgrim Homes threatened legal action, it illustrates the difficulties that islands of 
exclusivity (and by extension those who work there) can have if they are found 
not to be sufficiently committed to promoting aspects of ‘equality’, such as 
sexual orientation equality, which are fundamentally at odds with their religious 
ethos. Where these organisations are reliant on funding from central or local 
government, withdrawal of funds may be a significant threat to their continued 
financial viability. 
 
That public policy should be used to promote equality, including in procurement 
activities,
223
 has to a large extent become a legal obligation as a result of the 
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Equality Act 2010. In the Act, there is a proactive ‘equality duty’ which applies 
to ‘public authorities.’224  This includes a general duty which requires public 
authorities, in the exercise of their functions, to have due regard for the need to: 
 
(i) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct 
that is prohibited by or under this Act; 
(ii) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant 
protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; and 
(iii) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and persons who do not share it.
225
 
 
Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who 
share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it is further 
defined as involving duties to ‘tackle prejudice’ and ‘promote understanding.’226  
 
It has been suggested that one of two possible effects of such an objective on 
state approaches to religious ethos organisations is likely to follow over time. 
The first would be that public authorities increase their funding of religious ethos 
organisations in order to increase the reach of these organisations, on the 
assumption that they contribute to ‘fostering good relations’ and ‘advancing 
equality’ (a Model V interpretation of the duty). The second would be that public 
authorities would reduce or even cease financial support for religious 
organisations, presumably on the basis that they are divisive and do not 
contribute to the relevant equality goals (a Model I interpretation).
227
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Promoting Religious Equality? 
 
As one of the protected characteristics which the equality duty commits public 
authorities to promote is religion and belief, it might be anticipated that efforts 
would be made in support of religious manifestation at an individual level. 
Although the duty dates back to the implementation of the Act in 2011, it is 
nevertheless telling to consider the efforts made by the Government in support of 
religious equality prior to 2010. Two areas will be examined: firstly, the role of 
the EHRC; and secondly government-sponsored guidance in the area of religion 
and belief. 
 
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) was established under the 
Equality Act 2006 and became operational on 1 October 2007, at which point 
three earlier commissions became defunct – the Commission for Racial Equality, 
the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Disability Rights Commission.
228
 
The purpose of the EHRC is to promote equality and diversity across all of the 
protected characteristics; to encourage good practice and to work towards 
eliminating unlawful discrimination and harassment.
229
 This clearly includes the 
workplace. It is also required to promote understanding and good relations 
between members of different groups (defined as those who share a protected 
characteristic) and to work towards reducing hostility and prejudice.
230
 
 
It is important therefore to highlight that the EHRC is required to promote 
equality on the basis of religion and belief in the same way as for any other 
protected characteristic. Thus, on the face of it, the creation of the EHRC is 
congruent with Model V (protection for religious expression). However, at the 
time the EHRC was set up, there began to be concerns that ‘relatively powerful 
interest groups … would swamp other less powerful interests’ and so the EHRC 
might not be impartial and even-handed in upholding the interests of the various 
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protected characteristics.
 231
 If this analysis is correct, there is other evidence 
which suggests that religion and belief (particularly with regard to religious 
expression) may be one of the characteristics which has been ‘swamped’. Indeed, 
it is possible to go further and contend the EHRC has at times displayed a degree 
of hostility towards religious expression, particularly the expression of 
Christianity in the workplace. When the Chairman of the EHRC, Trevor Phillips, 
was interviewed by the Daily Telegraph in 2011, he made the following rather 
telling observations about those seeking protection for their religious beliefs: 
 
I think the most likely victim of actual religious discrimination in British society 
is a Muslim but the person who is most likely to feel slighted because of their 
religion is an evangelical Christian … I think for a lot of Christian activists, they 
want to have a fight and they choose sexual orientation as the ground to fight it 
on. I think that whole argument isn't about the rights of Christians. It's about 
politics. It's about a group of people who really want to have weight and 
influence and they've chosen that particular ground.
232
  
 
The comments would appear to imply a rather negative assumption about the 
motivation of evangelical Christians with which many may disagree; it also 
minimises the difficulties that they face in response to legislation which impinges 
on their freedom of conscience or freedom of religious expression, which is 
apparent in the workplace. Clearly these are only comments by an official of the 
EHRC (albeit the most senior official). However, the actions of the EHRC itself 
also appear to suggest, at times, a lack of sympathy towards Christian religious 
expression.
233
 In Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy,
234
 a case where the rights of 
Christians to run their bed and breakfast establishment in conformity with their 
religious beliefs clashed with the rights of a homosexual couple to share a double 
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room, the EHRC financially supported the sexual orientation rights against the 
religious rights, funding the legal expenses of the homosexual couple concerned. 
Earlier, when the Christian B & B owners lost their case at first instance, it was 
the EHRC who, apparently against the wishes of the gay couple involved and 
thus unnecessarily, decided to cross-appeal for more damages (an appeal it later 
dropped on the basis that it had been an ‘error of judgment’).235 This and other 
evidence suggests that the EHRC may at times display a degree of hostility to 
(Christian) religious expression (a Model I approach).
236
  
 
The discussion will now turn to government-funded sources of advice, and their 
content, concerning how the law affects religious expression in the workplace. 
Perhaps the most significant of these is a guide prepared by the Advisory, 
Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), a non-departmental public body 
with a brief, inter alia, to provide legal and good practice guidance to employers 
and employees.
237
 Written in 2005, the guide dwells largely on dress and 
grooming requirements and religious holidays. Supportive of religious 
expression in these domains, the ACAS guide tends to focus on accommodating 
the practices of minority religions in the workplace (in keeping with Model 
VI).
238
 No references are made to forms of active manifestation or conscientious 
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objection to activities involving the promotion of sexual orientation rights, which 
have become closely associated with Christian forms of expression in the 
workplace, except a critical and rather unlikely example of active manifestation 
(which is clearly designed to discourage it as a form of harassment): 
 
A member of staff is devout in her belief. She continually refers to her 
colleagues as “heathens” and warns them of the consequences they may suffer 
as a result of their lack of belief. Distressed by her intimidating behaviour, her 
colleagues complain to their manager that they are being harassed.
239
    
 
Whereas the ACAS guide is the source of guidance most likely to be used in the 
workplace, other guidance is available which has been funded or part-funded by 
the UK government.
240
 It is perhaps telling that the following organisations have 
been provided with government funding to provide quasi-official ‘good practice’ 
guidelines for employers on religion and belief in the workplace: the Muslim 
Council of Britain,
241
 Stonewall,
242
 and the British Humanist Association.
243
 That 
a Muslim organisation should be supported in providing advice to employers on 
religion in the workplace is unsurprising. Rightly, the MCB guidance focusses on 
issues specific to Muslims. It is surprising however that no guidance has been 
provided by other religious groups with support from a government department 
or other public authority.
244
 What is more surprising still is that the government 
should be providing funding to organisations with interests which are frequently 
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opposed to religious interests, to advise on religion in the workplace. Such 
guidelines are unlikely to be free from influence from the interests of Stonewall 
and the British Humanist Association. The latter, for example, suggests that 
‘[a]ttempts by employees to convert people or to use the work environment to 
proselytise are highly likely to amount to harassment of their colleagues.’245 This 
statement is controversial as it ignores the distinction between ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ proselytism246 and seems likely to mislead employers as to the likely 
reach of the law, and may thus have a chilling effect on religious speech.
247
 The 
net effect of all the guidance appears to be support for both Model I (exclusion) 
and, not without contradiction, Model IV (support for minority religions).  
 
It should be noted at this point that there are also ethical codes of practice issued 
by professional bodies (often as a result of secondary legislation empowering 
them to do so) which may act to encourage or discourage religious expression. 
Such codes, for example, have been issued by: the (now defunct) General 
Teaching Council for England (GTCE), the General Social Care Council, the 
General Pharmaceutical Council, the General Medical Council (GMC) and the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC). Some of these codes (in fact those 
applying in the healthcare sector) make specific reference to a practitioner’s own 
religious beliefs and provide guidelines as to how these may or may not 
influence their professional activities.
248
 Other guidelines do not make specific 
reference to a practitioner’s religious beliefs, but provide general guidelines on 
                                                 
245
 BHA, Guidance on Equality of ‘Religion or Belief’, 8. 
246
 As recognised by the ECtHR in Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397; see discussion in 
Chapter 7. 
247
 See comments to this effect in J Wynne-Jones, ‘Christians risk rejection and discrimination for 
their faith, a study claims’, Telegraph, 30 May 2009; copy at: 
<<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/5413311/Christians-risk-rejection-and-
discrimination-for-their-faith-a-study-claims.html>>, accessed 27 April 2012. See also Chapter 7 
for a more detailed discussion of proselytism and religious speech in the workplace. 
248
 The guidelines for pharmacists were considered earlier in this respect; and the GMC and NMC 
guidelines respectively will be considered in Chapter 7. 
161 
upholding equality and diversity as values which have the potential to impact 
negatively on an individual’s religious beliefs.249  
 
The draft code of conduct for secondary school teachers, written by the GTCE in 
2009, is illustrative of this problem. One of the underlying principles of the code 
(‘principle 4’) was that teachers should ‘promote equality and value diversity’, 
and this included the obligation to ‘[p]roactively challenge discrimination, 
stereotyping, and bullying, no matter who is the victim or the perpetrator’.250 
Concerns were raised about this draft principle by Christian groups, on the basis 
that the wording might require Christian teachers to act against their consciences 
to ‘promote’, for example, homosexual relationships, or the teachings of another 
religion, with which they disagreed.
251
 In this case, the problem was obviated by 
the response of the GTCE, which changed the wording to remove the 
requirements to ‘promote diversity’ and to ‘proactively challenge’ 
discrimination.
252
 However, not all professional bodies have been willing 
necessarily to accommodate such concerns, and professional obligations with 
regard to valuing diversity may remain a stumbling block for religious 
expression.
253
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a range of legal and policy materials have been considered, all of 
which have a bearing, directly or indirectly, on freedom of religious expression 
in the UK workplace. In the process of examining these materials, consideration 
has been given, in each instance, to the congruence with the models presented in 
Chapter 3. The purpose of this concluding section is to provide a summary and 
an overall assessment. 
 
Given the range of legal and policy materials and the overall time frame during 
which they have appeared, it is perhaps unsurprising that the picture is 
complicated. Prima facie, it might appear that overall ‘protection for religious 
expression’ (Model V) is the dominant model. After all, the ostensible purpose of 
much of the legislation is to support religion. This includes both the recognition 
of positive rights, principally through the incorporation of the ECHR into UK 
law (through the Human Rights Act 1998) and also the recognition of ‘negative’ 
rights (the right not to be discriminated against because of religion and belief) 
through the relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (and earlier 
discrimination law). However, it is quickly evident that although these legal 
provisions provide a degree of protection, this is only unequivocal in respect of 
certain core religious ‘activities’ (such as the right to a religious identity or the 
right to worship). Religious ‘expression’ in the workplace is far less protected. In 
terms of the ECHR, such protection is eroded firstly by a recognition (in Article 
9(2)) that ‘manifestation’ of religion may be constrained by various factors and, 
secondly, through the application of two ‘filters’ – the manifestation/motivation 
requirement (which takes a narrow view of what forms of religious expression 
will be recognised as a legitimate ‘manifestation’) and the controversial ‘specific 
situation rule’ (which provides a possible basis to exclude protection in the 
workplace sphere). Under the provisions of UK discrimination law religious 
belief and identity are protected, chiefly through direct discrimination provisions. 
However, in terms of religious expression, employers are able to provide a 
justification defence for ‘indirectly’ discriminating against people when they 
manifest their religious beliefs in the workplace. There are a few examples of opt 
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outs to particular laws which serve to protect some very specific examples of 
religious expression in particular contexts (e.g. in healthcare) but these are few, 
often historic, and narrow in scope. Attempts to extend opt outs to other areas 
have been resisted by the UK government. 
 
In respect of the other models, it is plain that the law itself provides virtually no 
‘special’ support for Christianity, the historic religion of the United Kingdom 
(Model II), albeit that the ‘convention’, that many economic and social activities 
cease on a Sunday, is still strong (although not in the retail sector). There is 
perhaps more evidence in support of Model VI (protection for minority religions) 
at least in terms of the development of discrimination law. The Race Relations 
Act 1976 provides an ongoing basis for supporting Sikh and Jewish expressions 
of religion, and it was partly in response to Muslim pressure that discrimination 
law was extended to cover religion and belief (a development opposed by some 
Christian groups), with the clear expectation that other minority religions, thus 
far unprotected, would benefit. It is may also be inferred from the ACAS 
guidance, published shortly after the introduction of the original Employment 
Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations, that the needs of religious minorities 
were at the forefront of policy development at that time. The very specific 
regulations applying to Northern Ireland only are perhaps the clearest example of 
the law seeking to protect ‘minority’ religion (in this case Roman Catholicism). 
 
The Equality Act 2010 does recognise ‘religious ethos organisations’ and 
‘organised religions’ for the purposes of ‘occupational requirement’ exceptions 
to discrimination law. To this extent at least, the concept of ‘islands of 
exclusivity’, and the rights of religious staff to populate them (Model IV), are 
recognised. However, the freedom of such islands is significantly curtailed by the 
very limited extent of the exceptions on religious grounds (not least the apparent 
need to justify exceptions for each post rather than according to a more generally 
applicable principle) and the even greater limitations when other strands of 
equality are invoked, such as sexual orientation. No religious ethos organisations 
seem able to restrict employment according to religious teaching on sexual 
orientation, and organised religions appear able to do this only in very restricted 
circumstances.  
164 
 
There is one form of ‘prohibited conduct’ which has significant potential to 
adversely affect workplace religious expression – this is ‘harassment’ on the 
basis of a protected characteristic. As the law is unconcerned with motive, both 
animus and non-animus harassment are prohibited. As a result, there is a 
significant question mark concerning how far employees are free to express their 
religious beliefs verbally, particularly if those beliefs have the capacity to offend 
others  on the grounds of their religion (or non-religion), sexual orientation or 
gender. Employers concerned about their liability for religious harassment of 
employees may have an incentive to significantly restrict religious speech in the 
workplace. This aspect of the law is therefore congruent with Model I (exclusion 
of religious expression). Religious expression for some employees may also be 
constrained by the provisions of codes of conduct issued by professional bodies 
(which are empowered to do this by secondary legislation). 
 
Thus far, it is clear that elements of the various models (with the exception of 
Model II) can be identified from the legislation and policy landscape presented in 
this chapter. What is also evident is that there has been a considerable expansion 
in the reach of the relevant legislation, particularly since 2003. This in turn has 
had a considerable impact in reducing employer discretion (Model III, laissez-
faire). As noted above, employers can still restrict forms of religious expression 
when they can provide a clear justification of the need to do so (i.e. where this 
represents a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim). However, in 
respect of any employer which consciously chooses to support religious 
expression, there are also some potential legal restrictions, particularly in terms 
of verbal expression. Policy initiatives too may affect an employer’s approach 
towards religious expression by employees (it might for example ban proselytism 
in the workplace outright on the advice of the EHRC-funded British Humanist 
Association guidance), this is particularly likely when acting on such policy 
advice might bring rewards (such as success in a bid for government funding). 
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Chapter 5: Negative Manifestation 
Introduction 
 
This chapter considers how tribunals have dealt with cases in which employees 
have objected to performing aspects of their contractual work for reasons 
connected to their religious beliefs. The objections fall into two broad categories. 
The first concerns objections to working at particular times or on particular days 
due to the desire or perceived obligations of (in the language of article 9 ECHR) 
‘worship’ and ‘observance’, ‘either alone or in community with others’. For 
example, a Muslim employee might object to working during a Friday lunchtime 
because he feels obliged to attend Friday prayers; equally, a Christian may object 
to working on a Sunday because she feels obliged to attend Church. The second 
category concerns objections for reasons intrinsic to the work itself, or an aspect 
of it, because it is objectionable on religious grounds.  
 
Both categories are reactive to the demands of the workplace itself rather than 
proactive – it is the employer who initiates or perpetuates the work or 
environment which gives rise to the objection. They can thus be characterised as 
forms of ‘negative manifestation’ of religion in the workplace and some of the 
consequent legal and policy issues raised will be the same, not least whether or 
not the employer is bound to rearrange contractual work in order to 
accommodate the religious employee and, if so, in what circumstances. However, 
objections to the nature of the work (or some aspects of it)
1
 are rather different in 
a number of ways from objections to the structuring of that same work. The 
employee is, after all, saying that he disapproves of something the employer 
                                                 
1
 Generally objections for religious conscience have been raised concerning particular tasks or 
duties of employment. There has been, however, at least one recent tribunal claim (for sexual 
harassment) involving an objection by a young Muslim woman to the wearing of uniform she 
considered to be immodest; see L Cockcroft, ‘Muslim waitress told to wear sexy, low-cut dress 
wins payout’ The Daily Telegraph (London, 16 June 2009) 13. Cases such as this raise questions 
overlapping conscientious objection and symbolic expression (considered in Chapter 6). 
166 
wants him to do - there is an implicit moral judgment which is absent from 
requests to rearrange the timing or structure of that something. The former 
arguably represents a different and more direct challenge to the employer, its 
discretion or its values, than the latter. From the point of view of the employee, 
this form of what may reasonably be termed ‘conscientious objection’ is also 
likely to be more personally challenging. It is arguably rather more difficult to 
say to an employer that one feels that something an employer wants one to do 
offends against conscience than to say that the timing is wrong. To make a stand 
in this way will thus require more courage. For both parties to the employment 
relationship, the stakes may thus be higher. 
 
In this chapter both categories of negative manifestation will be considered in 
turn before a general conclusion is drawn.  
 
Negative Manifestation during working time due to Religious 
Obligations 
 
In the first part of this chapter, how far the desire (or obligation) felt by 
employees with religious convictions to engage in one or more of these three 
elements might relate to their employment obligations will be considered. There 
is clearly the potential for conflict if the employer requires the employee to be 
present in the workplace at a time when the employee has a religious obligation 
which he may well consider to be more important than the obligation owed to the 
employer. In such cases, the employee may wish to ‘negatively manifest’ his 
religious convictions by seeking to ‘opt out’ of working at particular times in 
order to pursue worship or observance alone or in the company of others. Such 
activities are most likely to take place outside of the workplace, although in some 
instances the religious obligation might be discharged on the employer’s 
premises (e.g. daily Islamic prayers in a dedicated prayer room). 
 
In the following sections the relevant case law will be examined. Prior to this 
analysis, there is brief discussion of the issues concerned from the perspective of 
the religious employee. As these issues are to some extent dependent on the 
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nature of the religion itself, this discussion will be structured with reference to 
different religious traditions.  
Religious obligations requiring ‘time off’ – some examples by religion 
 
Judaism 
In Judaism there is a divinely ordained day of rest from work known as the 
Sabbath. This was first ordained in the creation narrative: having created the 
heavens and the earth in six days, God rested on the seventh and made this a holy 
day.
2
 The obligation was made more specific in the form of the tenth 
commandment given to Moses: 
Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy. Six days you shall labour and do all 
your work, but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord your God. In it you 
shall do no work: you, nor your son, nor your daughter, nor your male servant, 
nor your female servant, nor your cattle, nor your stranger who is within your 
gates. For in six days the Lord made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all 
that is in them, and rested the seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed the 
Sabbath day and hallowed it.
3
 
The Jewish Sabbath begins at sunset on Friday night (a time which varies greatly 
depending on the seasons) and it ends at nightfall on Saturday.
4
 Keeping the 
Sabbath remains mandatory for observant Jews, and the rules of Sabbath 
observance are strict and most forms of working, both domestic and commercial, 
are forbidden.
5
 In addition, Jews attend the synagogue for collective prayer on 
Friday nights and Saturday, and many also meet in the synagogue collectively on 
weekday evenings, when they may recite both obligatory afternoon and evening 
prayers at the same time.
6
  
                                                 
2
 Genesis 2 v 3. 
3
 Exodus 20 v 8-11 (NKJV); see also Deuteronomy 5 v 12-15. 
4
 Y Green, ‘When does the day begin?’ (2008) 36 Jewish Bible Quarterly 81. 
5
 See, for a discussion of the restrictions on Sabbath activities for observant Jews, Gavison and 
Davison, ‘Days of rest in multicultural societies’, 190-193  
6
 G Robinson, Essential Judaism (Pocket Books 2000), 7-54. 
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Christianity 
After the death and resurrection of Jesus, the early Christians began to use the 
first day of the week as a day set aside for worship in community (sometimes 
known as ‘the Lord’s Day’) and that practice became established and continues 
to this day. How far the obligations imposed by the Jewish Sabbath apply to the 
Christian Sunday is a point of theological dispute. This has led to different 
positions emerging among Christians. One position is to view Sunday as the 
Christian Sabbath. Although this does not mean that all of the obligations 
incumbent upon Jews on the Sabbath apply, the fundamental principle that the 
Sabbath must be strictly observed as a day of rest from secular labour (unless, by 
concession, this labour is required to provide emergency services
7
) still applies to 
Christians.
8
 Another position is to take a more relaxed view of the Christian 
Sunday and to see it as a New Testament innovation and therefore fundamentally 
different from the Jewish Sabbath – in fact, more of an opportunity for rest and 
spiritual activity rather than a day to be observed in a traditional Sabbatarian 
manner.
9
 This distinction is important as it suggests that taking time off work on 
a Sunday is considered mandatory under the traditional Sabbatarian view, but not 
mandatory under the more flexible ‘New Testament’ view. However, although 
there are differences amongst Christians in the view taken of obligations towards 
Sabbath observance, the majority of practising Christians share an imperative to 
attend worship in congregation with others – this almost invariably takes place 
on a Sunday.  
 
Certain Christian sects take different positions. Seventh Day Adventists, for 
example, reject the decision by the Christian Church to celebrate Sunday as the 
Lord’s Day and retain Saturday as their Sabbath, which is to be ‘observed’ as 
‘the day of rest, worship and ministry’ in accordance with ‘God’s unchangeable 
                                                 
7
 Jesus healed on the Sabbath, and spoke of the lawfulness of ‘saving life’ and ‘doing good’ on 
that day (Mark 3 v 4). 
8
 See, for a contemporary version of this argument, I Campell, On the first day of the week: God, 
the Christian and the Sabbath (Day One Publications 2005). 
9
 See for example, J Boice, Foundations of the Christian Faith (IVP 1986), 234. 
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law’ from Friday evening until Saturday evening.10 Jehovah’s Witnesses, on the 
other hand, reject the entire concept of the Lord’s Day although they do tend to 
meet on a Sunday, as well as mid-week; attendance at weekend and mid-week 
meetings is considered equally obligatory.
11
  
 
Islam 
In Islam, the practice of the daily Salah of praying five short prayers (whilst 
kneeling towards Mecca) at different times of the day (of which between two and 
four may take place during normal working hours) is considered mandatory by 
some Muslim groups.
12
 This will have a clear impact on the workplace as it will 
be necessary to briefly withdraw from workplace activities for the duration of the 
prayers. However, this requirement is not recognised as binding by all Muslims: 
some permit the afternoon and evening prayers to be said together at the same 
time;
13
 whilst others omit to say the prayers at all.
14
 Where these prayers are 
carried out there is no obligation to do so in company with others except on a 
Friday, where a congregational prayer, the Jumu’ah, is held on Friday lunchtimes 
(between 1 and 2 pm); for most Muslim groups it is mandatory to attend this at a 
mosque.
15
 Indeed there is a specific injunction in the Quran with particular 
application to refraining from work in order to attend Friday prayers: 
O you who believe, when the Salat is announced on Friday, you shall hasten to 
the commemoration of God, and drop all business. This is better for you, if you 
only knew. Once the prayer is completed, you may spread through the land to 
                                                 
10
 Seventh Day Adventist Church, Fundamental Beliefs, see 
<<http://www.adventist.org/beliefs/fundamental/index.html>>, accessed 12 May 2012. 
11
 A Holden, Jehovah's Witnesses: Portrait of a Contemporary Religious Movement (Routledge 
2002). 
12 B Zaheer, ‘Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims make the case 
for a new interpretation of section 701(J)’ (2007) U. Ill. L. Rev. 497, 502. 
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 MCB, Muslims in the Workplace, 14. 
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Europe (Kok Pharos 1995), 101. 
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seek God's bounties, and continue to remember God frequently, that you may 
succeed.
16
 
To facilitate the Salah prayers there is an argument that an employer, with 
sufficient resources (e.g. an appropriate room which is not used or used 
infrequently), should provide some basic facilities. The MCB guidance makes 
the following observation: 
Employers are not required to make costly adjustments for religious observance 
at work. However, employees may request access to a place to pray, and if it is 
possible to provide a room without an unacceptable adverse impact on business 
or other staff, then employers may be found to be indirectly discriminating if 
they refuse such a request.
17
  
 
The guidance goes on to specify that the room should be quiet and unadorned 
with posters, pictures or photographs. It also makes recommendations about the 
supply of facilities for the wudhu ritual of feet washing which often precedes 
prayer – this could, for example, involve providing ‘storage in the washroom 
areas for a plastic washing-up basin and a small jug.’18 
 
There are some further requirements specifically affecting Muslims. It is for 
example suggested that Muslims may wish to take time off for lunch later than 
they might normally so do in order to break their fast at the permitted time during 
the Ramadan period of fasting.
19
 There are also certain religious holidays where 
many Muslims are likely to request leave, including the three most important - 
Eid-ul-Fitr, Eid-ul-Adha and Yawm Al-Ashura. These annual holidays occur at 
different times each year according to the lunar calendar. Equally, Muslims are 
mandated to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca (the Hajj) at least once in their lifetime 
(and must accompany a widowed mother or sister).
20
 This is estimated to require 
                                                 
16
 Quran 62 v 9-10. 
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an extended period of leave of between two and three weeks in duration.
21
 The 
period where Muslims engage in the Hajj is fixed each year in accordance with 
the lunar calendar and so falls on different dates in the solar year.
22
 It may be that 
particular circumstances arise when a Muslim employee has a pressing 
conviction that he should embark on the Hajj during work time; certainly, there 
may be a strong desire to do so, as Muslims are encouraged to perform the Hajj 
as soon as they have sufficient funds to do so.
23
 
The Case Law 
 
Thus far, the religious basis of the desire for time off for religious observance 
and worship has been considered. In Chapter 4, consideration was given to the 
ECHR jurisprudence which chiefly concerns the issue of conflict between 
religious obligations outside of the workplace and work time. Attention will now 
turn to the relevant domestic case law. There is little authoritative case law, such 
that it is difficult to accurately assess the legal position in respect of this form of 
manifestation.
24
 What is helpful to the analysis, however, is the thorough 
consideration given to the implications of Article 9 in Copsey v Devon Clays and 
how this case may be contrasted with very similar cases under the Religion and 
Belief Regulations 2003.  
 
In Copsey, the claimant had been employed by Devon Clays since 1988, as a 
team leader in the sand processing plant. A shift system was in operation 
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22
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23
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24
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Monday to Friday with frequent weekend overtime, particularly on Saturdays.
25
 
In late 1999, Devon Clays Limited won a new contract which substantially 
increased production in the sand processing plant. This led to a decision to 
extend the operating hours to seven day working, 24 hours per day, with a new 
shift system for all staff covering the whole period.
26
 Copsey (and three other 
staff) objected to working on a Sunday and a special provision was temporarily 
made for him not to work on that day, with a corresponding reduction in pay.
27
 
However, some two years later, another increase in production was necessary in 
response to a further new order. A meeting was held with Copsey and he was 
required either to join the Sunday shift system or to accept a redundancy 
package. At this point he indicated that his opposition to Sunday working had a 
religious basis.
28
 He was given the option, which he refused, of working in the 
resin coated sand plant where there would be a reduced requirement for Sunday 
shifts. Following the failure of further negotiations, including the possibility of 
an alternative lower-paid laboratory job which he was unwilling to accept, 
Copsey was dismissed (without a redundancy payment) on 31 July 2002.
29
  He 
then lodged his claim at an employment tribunal. Copsey argued that his 
employer had been under an obligation to accommodate his religious objections, 
which it had failed to do, and he had been unfairly dismissed. 
 
The tribunal found that Devon Clays had made some efforts to accommodate 
Copsey, including the offer of alternative positions and had approached his 
colleagues to discover how far they might be willing to take on disadvantageous 
additional Sunday shifts in the place of Copsey (but found that there was little 
support for his position). Equally, Copsey himself did not adopt an entirely 
inflexible stance. He had said he was willing to work on a Sunday in an 
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‘emergency’ although the judgment records that it was not possible to agree on 
what such an emergency might be.
30
  
 
The tribunal determined that Copsey’s dismissal was not connected to his 
religious beliefs but was the direct result of his refusal to conform to a seven-day 
shift pattern. It found this dismissal to be fair under the category of ‘some other 
substantial reason’.  Devon Clays had a sound business reason to require Copsey 
to work on Sundays, in response to ‘significant increases in production 
requirements’ which was more than a mere whim.31  The EAT rejected Copsey’s 
appeal and, following this, he applied to the Court of Appeal.  
 
The Court of Appeal gave a much more nuanced consideration of the possible 
impact of Article 9 ECHR on Copsey’s unfair dismissal claim. Mummery LJ 
observed that, in the absence of other authority, the ‘link between [Copsey’s] 
dismissal and his wish to manifest his religious beliefs [was] sufficiently material 
to bring the circumstances of the dismissal within the ambit of Article 9.’32 Thus 
the issue would become one of justification under Article 9 (2). However, he 
applied the EComHR rulings in Ahmad, Konttinen and Stedman,
33
 to determine 
that, on the basis of this line of authority, in Copsey’s ‘specific situation’34 (in the 
workplace) there was no interference with his Article 9 rights: ‘[t]he 
Commission's position on Article 9, as I understand it, is that, so far as working 
hours are concerned, an employer is entitled to keep the workplace secular. In 
such cases an employee is not in general entitled to complain that there has been 
a material interference with his Article 9 rights.’35   
 
As Article 9 did not therefore apply in this case, there was thus no need to 
consider  justification arguments, although Mummery stated that, as Devon Clays 
had ‘done everything that they could to accommodate Mr Copsey’s wish not to 
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work on Sundays’, then, had there been any interference with Article 9, it would 
probably be justified.
36
  
 
It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 4 that Rix LJ, in a partially 
dissenting opinion, took a more sceptical view of the consistency and application 
of the ECHR case law, however, he agreed with Mummery LJ that the employer 
had acted reasonably in its eventual decision to dismiss Copsey and had thus 
discharged its obligation to justify its interference with the claimant’s Article 9 
rights, if engaged.
37
 In the process however Rix clearly articulated the need for 
an employer to demonstrate that it had sought to make reasonable 
accommodations in order to justify restrictions on the religious rights of its 
employees: 
 
It seems to me that it is possible and necessary to contemplate that an employer 
who seeks to change an employee’s working hours so as to prevent that 
employee from practising his sincere adherence to the requirements of his 
religion in the way of Sabbath observance may be acting unfairly if he makes no 
attempt to accommodate his employee’s needs.38 
 
The exact nature of the anticipated accommodation is naturally not articulated in 
full. However, there is a general implication that the obligation belongs to the 
employer to initiate, and a corresponding onus on the employee to respond 
constructively. However, in Lord Neuberger’s opinion, there is a suggestion that 
the onus may be on the religious employee, when asked by his employer to work 
on a Sunday, ‘to identify another worker, with his particular skills, who would be 
prepared to work in his place on a Sunday.’ 39  It is submitted that this is 
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unsatisfactory. The burden should naturally be on the employer to seek 
alternative ways of meeting its objectives (as indeed occurred in Copsey), not the 
employee. 
 
One of the first cases to test similar issues under the Religion and Belief 
regulations was Williams-Drabble v Pathway Care Solutions Ltd and anor
40
. The 
employment tribunal judgment in this case just predated the Court of Appeal 
decision in Copsey and is therefore particularly ripe for comparison. Article 9 
arguments were not raised in Williams-Drabble – thus similar issues were 
examined under entirely different legal provisions.   
 
The facts of the case were as follows. Williams-Drabble was a practising 
Christian. She made this clear when she applied to work for Pathway Care 
Solutions Ltd in 2003 and it was agreed at the subsequent interview that she 
would not be rostered to work shifts on Sundays which would prevent her from 
attending a church service which began at 5 pm. In 2004, Williams-Drabble was 
told that she would in fact be required to work a shift beginning at 3 pm on 
Sunday. Williams-Drabble refused. She was told that she had a choice - to work 
the Sunday shift; to ask another employee to exchange shifts with her; or to hand 
in her notice. She chose to resign, and lodged a claim at an employment tribunal 
for discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief.  
 
The tribunal found that Williams-Drabble had indeed suffered indirect 
discrimination. Requiring her to work when she normally went to church on a 
Sunday imposed a provision, criterion or practice which had an adverse impact 
on Christians. The employer was unable to show that the changes to the work 
rosta were a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
 
There is an issue in Williams-Drabble which was not fully explored by the 
employment tribunal but which was considered in Copsey. This is the question of 
how far the employer’s responsibility to accommodate the religious employee in 
these circumstances extends. In Williams-Drabble it could be argued that the 
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employer had made some de-minimis attempts to accommodate the claimant by 
allowing her the option of finding a substitute for the Sunday shift if she possibly 
could and this would appear to be in line with Neuberger’s obiter dicta in 
Copsey, but somewhat out of step with the implications of Rix LJ’s comments 
about the obligations on the employer to make reasonable accommodation. It 
would have been helpful to hear an opinion in the context of a claim brought 
under discrimination law on whether or not putting the onus on the employee to 
accommodate herself could ever be sufficient to discharge an employer’s 
justification defence for indirect discrimination.  
 
The same rationale was applied, with the same result, in Edge v Visual Security 
Services Limited.
41
 In this case, the claimant had been employed as a security 
officer by Visual Security Services Limited. Edge was a committed Christian and 
did not wish to work on a Sunday. It had been agreed at interview that he would 
not normally do so. Despite this, he found he was increasingly rostered to work 
that day. At length, he informed his employer by letter that he was no longer 
willing to do so. He was dismissed as a result. The employment tribunal found 
that the employer did not need to roster Edge to work on a Sunday – there was 
evidence that the work could have been completed without his involvement that 
day. As the Tribunal also found that Edge was disadvantaged on religious 
grounds by the requirement to work on a Sunday, he was successful in his claims 
for indirect discrimination and unfair dismissal. Interestingly, the tribunal made a 
rare reference to both underlying rationales for absence from work on a Sunday 
(observance and worship): 
 
Sunday working would put people of the same religion as the claimant 
(Christians) at a particular disadvantage when compared with other persons 
because they would not be able to attend Church Services on Sunday, quite apart 
from the narrower, but perhaps equally important requirement, to observe 
Sunday as a day of rest.
42
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177 
In Patrick v IH Sterile Services Ltd,
43
 the claimant, a Jehovah’s Witness, was a 
trainee laboratory technician. On entering employment, he came to an 
arrangement with his employer that he would not be required to work on 
Sundays,
44
 although his contract did not specify fixed hours of work. A few 
months later, due to market pressures, the staffing policy changed such that 
employees on flexible contracts (including Patrick) were expected to cover the 
weekend shifts.
45
 Patrick objected ‘that he was a Jehovah’s Witness and was 
required to attend the Kingdom Hall for the purpose of worship and other duties 
to the congregation every Sunday.’46 The judgment records that his manager held 
extensive discussions with Patrick to see if his position could be accommodated 
during which he apparently became ‘hostile and aggressive’. 47  He was 
subsequently dismissed on the basis of an unsatisfactory probation period (there 
was also evidence of persistent unauthorised absence and lateness).
48
 He then 
lodged his claim for religious discrimination with the employment tribunal. 
 
The tribunal concluded that there had been no direct discrimination. All 
technicians were required to start working on a Sunday and therefore Patrick had 
been treated no differently from anyone else. In dealing with the indirect 
discrimination claim, the tribunal found that Patrick was disadvantaged by being 
compelled to work on a Sunday, but it concluded that the employer could justify 
its actions on the basis that it had shared out the obligation to work on Sundays 
equally across the workforce, irrespective of religious obligation. Without any 
reference to legal authorities, it observed: ‘We do not think it would be 
appropriate to exempt someone who wishes to practice worship on a Sunday 
from the obligation to cover Sunday work provided the requirement to do so was 
shared out equally.’ 49  This is a curious conclusion involving no apparent 
consideration of adverse impact – the very principle on which the law of indirect 
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discrimination is based! It is evident that the correct application of the law 
requires the tribunal, having identified adverse impact, to move on to a proper 
consideration of proportionality. This it failed to do.  
 
In Cherfi v G4S Security Service Ltd,
50
 the claimant, a practising Muslim and a 
security guard, claimed, inter alia, that he had been indirectly discriminated 
against on the grounds of religion when his employer had required him to remain 
on site on Friday lunchtimes from 13 October 2008. This placed him under a 
particular disadvantage as a Muslim who wished to attend Friday prayers in 
congregation. Prior to that it had been his practice to attend Friday prayers at the 
Finsbury Park mosque, which usually required more than the standard one hour’s 
lunch break as it was two bus rides away from his place of work.
51
   
 
At a hearing before an employment tribunal, Cherfi was unsuccessful in his 
indirect discrimination claim. However, a claim for direct discrimination on the 
grounds of religion succeeded.
52
 This was because the claimant had been singled 
out to be disciplined (in 2007) for taking an extended lunchbreak on Fridays 
when this was in fact common practice amongst the security guards
53
 (although 
he was later given official permission to continue attending the mosque)
54
.  
 
Cherfi appealed the indirect discrimination decision before the Employment 
Appeals Tribunal. The EAT agreed with the employment tribunal that Cherfi had 
been placed at a disadvantage as a practising Muslim by not permitting him to 
attend prayers in congregation (the first stage of his indirect discrimination 
claim),
55
 albeit that it recognised a ‘desire’ rather than a religious mandate to 
manifest Islamic religion in this way.
56
 However, moving on to the second stage, 
the EAT also endorsed the tribunal’s findings that G4S had a ‘legitimate aim’ of 
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meeting the operational requirements of a new client that security staff remained 
on its site for the full duration of operating hours (including paid lunchbreaks).
57
 
It also found that the tribunal had correctly balanced the competing claims and 
that it was proportionate to require Cherfi to remain on site during his Friday 
lunchbreak,
58
 giving weight to both the impracticability of employing a 
temporary replacement for Cherfi during Friday lunchtime only; and Cherfi’s 
rejection of an offer of an alternative contract with a pattern of working Monday 
to Thursday with some weekend working (Cherfi was not prepared to work on a 
Saturday or Sunday).
59
  
 
In Abdulle v River Island Clothing Company,
60
 a manager’s refusal to allow a 
Muslim employee time off for Salah prayer during a particularly busy day for the 
retailer where no alternative cover was available was disputed.
61
 The refusal was 
a one-off incident and involved a temporary manager who was unfamiliar with 
the particularly clothing store, where the claimant worked, and its staff. The 
employee concerned made a claim for religious discrimination. Her claim 
succeeded on the basis that the employer had not sought to justify its actions, nor 
did it have a formal store-wide policy for dealing with requests for religious 
accommodations of the kind Abdulle sought.
62
 The tribunal was particularly 
critical that a large employer such as River Island had not developed guidelines 
to assist managers in making decisions in this area. Nevertheless, the tribunal 
made it clear that there were, in its view, limits to an employee’s realistic 
expectation of an accommodation by his employer and particularly that an 
employer may be justified in varying any arrangement at short notice in response 
to unexpected events such as staff sickness or extreme weather conditions. 63 
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It is interesting to consider this in the light of the claimant’s willingness in 
Copsey to support his employer by working on Sunday in ‘emergency’ situations. 
It may be that this emerges as a ‘minimum’ expectation of employees who are 
normally allowed time off for religious reasons. If so, employees who take a 
more flexible view of the timing of their religious commitments will find this 
less burdensome than those who believe that working at a particular time (e.g. 
the Sabbath) is expressly forbidden. 
There is a tribunal judgment concerning time off for the Hajj, Khan v G and J 
Spencer Group plc t/a NIC Hygiene Ltd.
64
 In this case, the claimant had received 
an unclear response to his request for extended leave (including an element of 
unpaid leave) to go on the pilgrimage. He had chosen to go anyway and on return 
he was dismissed for having taken unauthorised absence. The reasoning in this 
case did not extend to a discussion of how far the Hajj was mandatory and the 
possible implications of a conclusion on that point; however, the case was 
decided in favour of the claimant, due in large part to the ambiguity of the 
employer’s response to the holiday request and the fact that there was some 
evidence that it was practicable to accommodate it.
65
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
The purpose of the first half of this chapter has been to examine the approach 
taken by courts and tribunals to issues of negative manifestation in the workplace 
associated with requests for time off for religious activities which take place, in 
large part, outside the workplace.  
 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that the privileged position which Sunday once enjoyed 
in England and Wales has been largely legislated away – Sunday is in large 
measure a working day particularly in the retail and hospitality sectors but also in 
                                                 
64
 (2005) ET Case No. 1803250/04. 
65
 There has also been an interesting claim by a Roman Catholic employee who chose to take 
unauthorised time off for a pilgrimage and was, in consequence, dismissed; this was held to be 
fair at tribunal partly due to the fact that pilgrimages are not considered mandatory for Roman 
Catholics: see Moise v Strettons Limited (2011) ET Case No. 3203326/09. 
181 
a growing number of industrial and service settings. At the same time, it appears 
that courts and tribunals have also lost sight of the original imperative of the 
legislation which pre-dated the liberalisation of Sunday trading - to guard the 
particular status of Sunday as a ‘day of rest’, the observance of which many 
Christians believe is mandatory, with certain exceptions for essential work. 
Instead of considering the obligation felt by some Christians to observe a day of 
rest, courts and tribunals have been more concerned with a narrower question of 
how far work commitments preclude access to attendance at church services. The 
imposition of any restrictions on employees’ freedom to attend church services is 
sufficient to trigger the first stage of an indirect discrimination claim.
 66
 At the 
second stage, employers are therefore required to justify, to a greater or lesser 
degree, such restrictions. Thus, in terms of the ECHR conceptualisation of the 
importance of both ‘observance’ and ‘worship’ (in community), it would seem 
that the importance and scope of a key aspect of the ‘observance’ imperative has 
been significantly downplayed. Observance is of course an elastic term and could 
be framed as referring to religious activities such as ritual prayer which are not 
quite encapsulated by the alternative word ‘worship’; however it also has a 
plainer meaning as respecting religious ordinances (such as the injunction not to 
work on the Sabbath). It is the latter aspect of observance which has been side-
lined or simply ignored (with the exception of Edge where it was recognised to 
some degree).  
 
In addition to Sunday services for Christians, there are a range of other examples 
of demands on the time of the religious employee (e.g. Friday prayers for 
Muslims). In such cases, it is for the employer to justify any restrictions which 
might be imposed on an employee’s participation in such activities as a result of 
working time. Acceptable justification defences naturally revolve around the 
operational requirements of the employer. What remains slightly unclear is the 
extent to which employers are required actively to manage shift rotas in order to 
accommodate the religious employee. It may be inferred from Copsey (insofar as 
a tribunal may feel bound by relevant obiter dicta in that case) that an employer 
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should, as a minimum, permit an employee to seek the co-operation of colleagues 
to make alternative arrangements. It is strongly arguable that the duty to 
accommodate (if such it be) goes further, to require that the employer is 
proactive in looking for ways to reorganise shifts to accommodate, where 
possible, the religious employee. This argument is strongest in situations where 
the employer has imposed a new requirement repudiating an existing 
arrangement with a particular employee. 
 
Negative Manifestation for Reasons of Conscientious Objection
67
 
 
Having considered the first aspect of negative manifestation in the workplace, the 
discussion will now turn to the second aspect – negative manifestation for 
reasons of ‘conscientious objection’. The concept of conscientious objection has 
its roots outside of the workplace and is of interest to political philosophers as 
representing a form of non-violent resistance to the requirements of law, for 
reasons of principle. A number of theorists deal with conscientious objection in 
parallel with the concept of ‘civil disobedience’, implying similarities between 
the two
68
 whilst emphasising that there are distinctive differences.
69
 Identifying 
those differences can help more clearly to identify the concept of conscientious 
objection and, for that reason, will be attempted briefly here.  
 
‘Civil disobedience’ is a term originally coined by the American theorist Henry 
David Thoreau, in his 1848 essay of the same name, to describe his own actions, 
and the motivation behind them, in refusing to pay a tax to fund a war in Mexico 
and the enforcement of a law concerning fugitive slaves.
70
 The term is given 
useful modern definition by Raz as ‘a politically motivated breach of law 
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designed either to contribute directly to a change of law or of a public policy or 
to express one’s protest against, and dissociation from, a law or a public 
policy.’71 The resulting ‘disobedience’ to a particular law or laws thus represents 
a form of public political protest, which is often and necessarily highly visible, 
with the aim of gaining support from others and with the serious intention of 
changing a particular law (which may often be viewed as unjust and therefore 
morally illegitimate
72
). Civil disobedience often involves group protest, most 
often where that particular group interest is at stake (most famously the 
predominantly black civil rights protestors of the 1950s and 1960s in the USA).  
 
Conscientious objection
73
 on the other hand involves ‘a breach of law for the 
reason that the agent is morally prohibited to obey it’. 74  In other words, an 
individual has a compelling reason to believe that he must not obey a particular 
law or carry out a particular legal obligation, and thus chooses not to do so, 
whatever the legal consequences may be. Conscientious objection is thus 
different from civil disobedience. As Rawls notes, conscientious objectors:  
 
… do not seek out occasions for disobedience as a way to state their cause. 
Rather they bide their time hoping that the necessity to disobey will not arise. 
They are less optimistic than those undertaking civil disobedience and they may 
entertain no expectation of changing laws or policies.
75
 
 
It is perhaps fair to suggest that, unlike those engaging in civil disobedience, 
conscientious objectors are not radical idealists. They do not necessarily wish to 
engage others in their objections, nor is the intention of their refusal to effect a 
change in the law or public policy. Rather, they want to be left alone to quietly 
follow the dictates of their own consciences, conflict with authorities only arising 
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if a law or obligation requires them to do something which violates those 
consciences. The nature of this violation of conscience is admirably articulated 
by Childress: 
 
When a person appeals to his conscience or describes his act as conscientious, 
he makes a hypothetical and prospective claim. He claims that if he were to 
commit the act in question, he would violate his conscience. This violation 
would result not only in such unpleasant feelings as guilt and/or shame but also 
in a fundamental loss of integrity, wholeness, and harmony in the self.
76
 
 
This definition underlines the deep significance to an individual’s personal 
identity of conscience and why this should be taken very seriously in a liberal 
state, given the weight attached by liberals to personal autonomy (and its subset, 
moral autonomy)
77
 and dignity. For religious employees, as it was argued in 
Chapter 2, this importance is magnified by the fact that their consciences are 
sharpened by the requirement of obedience to the revealed will of God which 
surely brings an additional and pressing dimension to this ‘intrinsic integrity, 
wholeness and harmony’ of conscience. Childress goes on to develop the notion 
of conscience as a form of sanction for the individual – it is thus a heavy burden 
to bear (rather than a whimsy to be indulged). He concludes that the guiding 
principle should be that conscientious objection is accommodated: 
 
My argument, grounded in an understanding of conscience as a sanction, is that 
we should start with the presumptive liberty of conscience, which then forces 
the state to bear the burden of proof to show that its interests are compelling and 
can be realized through no other means than a denial of the exemption.
78
  
 
Although Childress does not write specifically about a workplace context, his 
analysis provides a helpful reference point for the cases to be considered in this 
chapter which are concerned with situations where employees are faced with a 
dilemma when required to act in accordance with principles which offend 
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conscience. Childress thus identifies one position which is to start with the 
assumption that primacy be given in the workplace to an individual’s moral 
autonomy (unless there are pressing reasons against this). Litwak, considering 
(specifically) public servants, offers a slightly softer version which he calls ‘a 
pluralistic model which attempts, within reasonable parameters, to respect the 
public servant’s moral autonomy.’79 At the alternative end of the spectrum, is 
what Litwak terms ‘a dogmatic model involving absolute institutional 
conformity’ when faced with such a moral dilemma.80 Where this is required by 
an employer, individual moral autonomy is sacrificed to another imperative, and 
the significance of conscience and its requirements is ignored. 
Conscientious Objection in Practice 
 
The actual term ‘conscientious objector’ was first used to describe opponents of 
compulsory vaccinations in the 1890s,
81
 but the label has been historically 
associated most often with individual objections to being conscripted for military 
service, a phenomenon which can be traced back to antiquity.
82
 The modern 
notion that an individual might, because of pacifist Christian convictions, be 
exempted from the military activities of training, fighting and killing, without 
penalty, was first given formal legal effect in 1673 in Rhode Island, New 
England.
83
 The legislation also introduced a key principle that the objector 
should be willing to perform an alternative form of non-combatant service (such 
as that of watchman, or aid to those needing to flee from a place under military 
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threat), in order to attest to the sincerity of the objection and avoid cynical claims 
to escape what was (and is) after all dangerous and unpleasant work.
84
  
 
Conscientious objection to forced military service developed as a doctrine in the 
UK in the first half of the Twentieth Century during periods of mass-conscription 
during the two world wars and the compulsory national military service in the 
late 1940s through to the early 1960s. When mass conscription was introduced in 
1916, it became apparent that there were a range of mostly Christian objectors, 
such as Quakers, on the ground of conscience. Some of these were ‘absolutists’ 
who objected to any form of co-operation with the military, directly or indirectly 
(by performing non-military duties); others were ‘alternativists’ who were 
willing to perform alternative civil employment; and others were ‘non-combatant 
conscientious objectors’, who were willing to perform non-fighting military 
roles.
85
 As a result, the Conscription Acts of 1916, 1939 and 1948 permitted 
conscientious objectors to state their case before a tribunal and made provision 
for possible outcomes to meet each type of objection. Thus, conscientious 
objectors might be awarded either complete exemption from military service or 
conditional exemption (providing alternative civilian service was undertaken). 
Alternatively, they might be made available for call up to non-combatant duties, 
or, if considered to be insincere, combatant duties.
86
 
 
Since the era of mass-conscription in the UK has ended, conscientious objection 
has become a less significant issue for an all-volunteer military.
87
 There has 
been, however, one key development – the right to conscientiously object has 
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been extended to those who have voluntarily accepted a fixed period military 
service, but who have subsequently developed a conscientious objection to this 
service (probably for religious reasons).
88
  Selective conscientious objection (e.g. 
in opposition to the Iraq war) whilst continuing to serve, is not permitted, 
however
89
 (although there is an argument that international standards require that 
it should be).
90
 Therefore, conscientious objection has developed as a concept in 
the military, originally in response to the deeply-held pacifism of some, which in 
turn was often chiefly motivated by Christian convictions. There are some points 
to note from the military experience which may be useful to draw on in a 
discussion referenced to the workplace. It is interesting to note, for instance, the 
process involved in dealing with conscientious objectors – a detailed inquiry by a 
tribunal into the nature of, and sincerity of, the conscientious objection. Equally 
it should be noted that some alternative service was required of the conscientious 
objector, which would also help to attest to the sincerity of convictions.
91
 
Nevertheless, if the nature of the conscientious objection was such that this was 
impossible, an absolute exemption could be granted.  
 
‘Conscientious objection’, a concept most developed when applied to the 
military, has also been applied, in modified form, in other situations, some of 
which have arisen, as Litwak notes, as a result of the liberalisation of Western 
society in the 1960s and the consequent emergence of new moral controversies 
over which society is often polarised, such as questions related to sexual and 
reproductive ethics.
92
 There is however a clear caveat which is required when 
comparing this to the military situation - the employee is rather different from 
that of the military conscript. The latter is of course entering into a form of 
                                                 
88
 MOD, Guide on Religion and Belief in the MOD and Armed Forces [41], 11. 
89
 Khan v Royal Air Force Summary Appeal Court [2004] EWHC 2230 (Admin).  
90
 United Nations Commission on Human Rights Resolution of 8 March 1995 
(E/CN.4/RES/1995/83) concerning conscientious objection is ambiguous about selective 
conscientious objection, as the text of the resolution could be construed to include this: ‘persons 
performing military service should not be excluded from the right to have conscientious 
objections to military service.’ 
91
 See also discussion of ‘sincerity’ in Chapter 2. 
92
 Litwak, ‘Conscientious Objection in Public Service Ethics’, p 80. 
188 
working under compulsion,
93
 whereas the former is freely entering a contract of 
employment (albeit that this freedom is considerably limited by factors such as 
individual skills, domestic and geographical circumstances as well as the realistic 
availability of alternative work);
94
 thus the right to conscientiously object is more 
likely to be considered within the context of a ‘specific situation’ and less likely 
to be absolute.
 95
  
 
Although there are various instances where employees might be required by their 
employers to act against conscience, some are relatively uncontroversial when it 
comes to public policy. There is specific provision for employees to make a 
public disclosure, in good faith, of information to an employer or ‘other 
responsible person’ inter alia if their employers require them, for example, to lie 
or to conceal information relating to: criminal offences; a failure to comply with 
legal obligations; miscarriages of justice; dangers to individuals arising from 
health and safety concerns; or environmental damage.
96
 In such cases, provided 
certain conditions are met, they are protected in employment law from dismissal 
or other detriment by their employers.
97
 
 
However, there are also situations where an individual might be asked by his 
employer to act against conscience where such a request is well within an 
employer’s normal lawful range of discretion. In recent years, there has been 
particular interest in two areas of employment where conscientious objection has 
been common. The first area concerns those healthcare workers and scientists 
with a religious objection to interfering with human life either to terminate it (via 
abortion or the issuing of the ‘morning-after pill’)98 or to in some other way 
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manipulate it through stem cell or similar genetic research. In the United 
Kingdom, the right to object, at least for clinicians, in these areas of medical 
ethics has been enshrined in legislation, and there is little case law to discuss.
99
  
 
The second area concerns objections to the effect of legislation promoting the 
rights and status of homosexuals and, in particular, same-sex couples.
100
 
Individuals who seek to conscientiously object in this second area are likely to be 
slightly further removed from the source of the objection than might be the case 
in healthcare, in the sense that it is the indirect rather than the direct result of 
their actions which offends conscience. They are not after all being required to 
act as the actual agent of the perceived moral harm as might be the doctor when 
carrying out an abortion. Whether this makes objectors less deserving of 
accommodation will be further considered later in this chapter. However, it may 
be noted at this point that there may be inspiration to be drawn from the 
‘absolutist’ objectors to military service who were not prepared to engage in 
activities which even indirectly assisted war preparations. Their objections were 
still thought worthy of respect and potential accommodation.  
 
Questions of religious-based conscience in the workplace do not of course 
inevitably overlap only with questions relating to sexual orientation. There are 
other potential points of conflict, for instance involving objections to the sale of 
certain products or the display of certain messages on religious grounds. Some 
Muslims, for example, might object to the handling of alcohol;
101
 this objection 
has been taken sufficiently seriously by the supermarket, Sainsbury’s, that it now 
allows Muslim employees to ‘opt out’ of handling alcohol in the performance of 
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their duties.
102
 Equally, some Amritdhari Sikhs might object to touching meat or 
meat products.
103
 In a further example, a Christian bus driver might object to 
driving a bus bearing an atheist slogan.
104
  
 
Nevertheless, although there are fault lines for conscientious objection other than 
sexual orientation, the fact remains that the key cases concern this issue. There 
are no absolute rights in law to conscientiously object in this area (such as those 
applying with regard to the healthcare dilemma), nor is the label ‘conscientious 
objection’ recognised.105 Those seeking exemptions therefore have been forced 
to rely on the theoretical protection for conscience (as a manifestation of 
religion)
106
 under employment discrimination law.
107
 Of the potential claims 
under discrimination law, indirect discrimination is the most likely to provide 
protections for religious expression, (including the ‘negative expression’ of 
conscience) as the claimant need only identify ‘a provision, criterion or practice’ 
(PCP) which disadvantages the members of a group to which he belongs (e.g. 
‘traditional Christians’). Thus, the claimant can show that being required to act in 
a particular way represents a ‘barrier’ to himself and others with the same beliefs, 
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as it forces him to act in a way which his religious beliefs forbid – this 
disadvantages him relative to others who do not share those beliefs. Once this 
PCP has been identified, it is then for the respondent to show that applying it to 
the claimant represented ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. 
In other words, the employer is required to shoulder the burden of justification. 
 
Since 2003, there have been three particularly significant cases which generated 
some public debate: McClintock, Ladele and MacFarlane. Each of these cases 
involved an employee or public official ‘conscientiously objecting’ to an aspect 
of his or her role because of its relationship to promoting same-sex relationships. 
These cases will be examined in turn below, with particular attention being given 
to Ladele. This is for three reasons. First, this is the most authoritative case, 
having progressed to the Court of Appeal. Second, it is the only case where there 
was at least one judgment in favour of the religious claimant (at first instance), 
thus widening the scope for analysis. Third, it is arguably the most important 
case as the nature of the objection was clear-cut and the issues raised were 
therefore tackled head on, without the distracting lack of clarity in terms of the 
claimants’ intentions, which slightly muddy the waters in McClintock and 
MacFarlane. 
McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs 
 
The first case was brought by Andrew McClintock who was a Justice of the 
Peace in Sheffield, South Yorkshire and a practising Christian. He served on the 
family bench and one of his duties was to place children for adoption. When he 
became aware in 2004 that, as a result of the Civil Partnership Bill, he might be 
required to place children for adoption with gay and lesbian couples he raised 
concerns by letter, requesting that he be excused from sitting in cases with a risk 
of needing to place a child with a same sex couple, due to the incompatibility, in 
his view, between this obligation and his obligations under the Children’s Act 
1989 (to act in the best interests of children).
108
 At a subsequent meeting, 
McClintock’s request was turned down; he was told that there could be no 
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general exemption from sitting and was reminded that he was bound by his 
judicial oath by which he had undertaken to adjudicate on any case which came 
before him.
109
 Following this meeting, McClintock resigned from the Family 
Bench and began legal proceedings. He did so, primarily, on the basis that a 
refusal to accommodate his request amounted to discrimination on the grounds of 
religion and belief. 
 
The role of the tribunal and the EAT was thus to determine whether or not 
McClintock had suffered direct and/or indirect discrimination on the basis of his 
religion or belief under the provisions of the 2003 Regulations. The initial 
employment tribunal concluded that there had been no direct discrimination, for 
two main reasons; firstly, that there had been no detriment or dismissal (which 
equates to ‘less favourable treatment’) since McClintock had resigned voluntarily 
and secondly because he had not made clear that his objection was related to his 
religious beliefs. It concluded also that McClintock’s objection failed the test of 
being considered to be a philosophical belief analogous to religious, the test 
being articulated as follows:  
 
The test for determining whether views can properly be considered to fall into 
the category of a philosophical belief is whether they have sufficient cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance and are worthy of respect in a democratic 
society.
110
 
 
The tribunal also rejected his indirect discrimination claim, although with limited 
legal reasoning, such that this became the main point of appeal. The EAT 
however, upheld the tribunal judgment with particular emphasis on the fact that 
McClintock’s position was not explicitly based on religious or philosophical 
grounds and so fell at the first hurdle for any kind of discrimination claim. Even 
if this were not so, the EAT concluded that it was a proportionate means to 
achieve a legitimate aim (the employer’s defence in indirect discrimination 
claims) for the employer to insist that:  
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magistrates must apply the law of the land as their oath requires, and cannot opt 
out of cases on the grounds that they may have to apply or give effect to laws to 
which they have a moral or other principled objection.
111
 
 
The EAT, applying European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, also 
rejected McClintock’s attempt to invoke Article 9 ECHR on the basis that the 
right to manifest religious convictions does not apply ‘where a party voluntarily 
places himself or herself in a position where a conflict might arise between his or 
her religious or philosophical beliefs and the duty imposed by an employment or 
office.’112 
 
This case anticipates, in a number of significant ways, the more weighty 
judgment in Ladele to be considered in much more detail below. This analysis 
will be confined therefore to two key issues which arise from this case alone. 
 
The first key issue was whether or not McClintock could reasonably claim to 
have suffered religious discrimination, given that his conscientious objections to 
making same-sex adoption orders were based on a form of public reason
113
 and 
he did not invoke his religious beliefs until after his resignation. His counsel 
creatively attempted to overcome this problem by suggesting, based on the 
judgment in Williamson v Secretary of State for Education and Employment 
(where Lord Justice Rix opined that ‘the deed does not have to express the belief 
in proclaiming it’),114 that McClintock did not need to make an express link 
between his objection and his religious belief.
115
 The EAT thought that this was 
an ‘absurd’ argument in this context, given the burden it would generally place 
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on the employer to second-guess the employee’s true reasons for requests, 
especially if the employee has actively chosen to ‘conceal’ these.116 From this it 
can be inferred that employees need to clearly state that their conscientious 
objections have a religious (or philosophical) basis, if they hope to pass the first 
stage for protection under discrimination law. This has been criticised, on the 
basis that there may be situations where the burden would not be too great for 
employers to infer that there might be an implicit religious objection,
117
 
particularly on an issue so sensitive that, as the EAT itself identified, a certain 
amount of confusion and even inconsistency might not be unexpected.
118
   
 
The second key issue is how far a ‘professional’ oath, specifically here the 
judicial oath to act according to the law ‘without fear or favour’, trumps any 
possible right of conscientious objection. In McClintock’s case, his employer’s 
belief that there was an over-riding public interest that he should abide by his 
judicial oath, and deal impartially with any and every case which might come 
before the family bench, was considered sufficient justification for the refusal to 
countenance an opt-out.
119
 McClintock had after all voluntarily agreed to take the 
oath and apply the law in total. However, there is a caveat. As Zacharias 
observes, the lawyer (or indeed any public official) cannot fully foresee, when 
taking the oath, all the potential dilemmas which might arise during the course of 
employment.
120
 In the case of the judge, he cannot anticipate exactly how the law 
over which he is required to preside may change and develop (how far, for 
example, it might move away from its original Judeo-Christian basis).  
It may thus be that reliance on the judicial oath as a ‘trump’ is not enough. In this 
case for example, inquiries might, in addition, have been made into whether and 
how the Department of Constitutional Affairs had assessed exactly how the 
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public interest would be compromised by acceding to McClintock’s request. 
However, no such evidence was thought to be required.
121
  
Ladele v Islington Borough Council 
 
The second case was brought by Lilian Ladele, a committed Christian, who 
worked at the London Borough of Islington and became a Registrar of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages on 14 November 2002. When the Civil Partnerships Act 
came into force in December 2005, Ladele was required by her manager, the 
Superintendant Registrar, to be formally ‘designated’ a civil partnerships 
registrar. That all registrars of marriage should also be required to register civil 
partnerships was a decision taken locally under the discretion given to 
superintendant registrars by the Registrar General. In advance of this, Ladele had 
let it be known to her employer that she would find it difficult to conduct civil 
partnerships because of her religious beliefs: 
 
A civil partnership is a marriage in all but name. Whether or not there are sexual 
relations it gives the couple who have entered into it the same rights and 
responsibilities as a married couple. Regardless of my feelings for the 
participants (and as a Christian this should only be love), I feel unable to directly 
facilitate the formation of a union that I sincerely believe is contrary to God’s 
law.
122
 
 
Under guidance offered by the Registrar General, Ladele was offered a limited 
compromise whereby she would only participate in civil partnership work 
involving the signing of a register (as opposed to officiating at a ‘ceremony’), an 
offer she rejected. She was then threatened, by letter, with disciplinary action; in 
response, she wrote that that she was ‘placed in a dilemma and had either to 
honour her faith or the demands of the council,’ and asked to be treated 
sympathetically.
123
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Ladele did not receive a reply. However, from then on, the council turned a blind 
eye as she managed to avoid any civil partnerships work by changing shifts with 
colleagues. Nevertheless, there remained tensions, particularly involving two gay 
members of staff (identified by the Tribunal as ‘Dion’ and ‘Victoria’) which 
were articulated at a team meeting on 2 November 2006. The meeting was 
followed by a letter, written by Dion and Victoria, in which they complained that 
Ladele’s refusal to conduct Civil Partnerships was ‘homophobic’, and contrary to 
the Council’s ‘Dignity for All’ equality policy; they claimed that they themselves 
felt discriminated against by her actions. The Head of Democratic Services 
swiftly replied to this letter and subsequently engaged in informal talks with 
Dion and Victoria, explaining that he wished to take action against Ladele but 
could not do so until she became an employee of the council rather than a 
statutory officer (which in fact occurred on 1 December 2007
124
). This 
information was subsequently shared at a meeting of the LGBT forum.
125
  
 
After some further informal (and unsuccessful) attempts to put pressure on 
Ladele to accept that its ‘Dignity for All’ policy required her to undertake civil 
partnerships, she was subjected to disciplinary proceedings. In response, Ladele 
lodged a claim with an employment tribunal for direct discrimination, indirect 
discrimination and harassment on the grounds of religion and belief.
126
 
 
The employment tribunal upheld all of Ladele’s discrimination claims. It took a 
broad view of the scope of direct discrimination, and compared and contrasted 
the different approaches that Borough officials took in dealing with sexual 
orientation issues as opposed to religion and belief issues, drawing the 
conclusion that, in a number of instances, the Council would not have subjected a 
person who was protected under the Dignity for All policy due to their sexual 
orientation to the detriments which Ladele, protected under religion and belief, 
was subjected. 
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With regard to indirect discrimination, the tribunal identified that requiring all 
registrars to register civil partnerships amounted to a ‘provision, criterion or 
practice’ which put those holding ‘orthodox Christian beliefs’ at a disadvantage 
when compared to other people who did not share those beliefs. There was no 
dispute that Islington Borough Council had a legitimate aim in seeking to provide 
‘an effective Civil Partnership arrangement service as an employer and public 
authority which is wholly committed to the promotion of equal opportunities and 
fighting discrimination.’127 Rather, the issue turned on whether or not it was 
‘proportionate’ to insist that Ladele be involved in providing that service. The 
tribunal noted crucially that Islington was able to provide the same ‘first class’ 
civil partnerships service without Ladele’s involvement. Thus, it concluded that:  
 
The Respondent placed a greater value on the rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transsexual community than it placed on the rights of Ms Ladele as one 
holding an orthodox Christian belief. The Respondent showed no respect for Ms 
Ladele’s rights. Their action in applying the first provision, criterion or practice 
was not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
128
 
 
In relation to Ladele’s harassment claim, the tribunal found that the complaints 
by gay members of staff that Ladele was victimising them because of her stance 
on civil partnerships was an act of harassment, as was the failure by management 
to take her view seriously, the breach of confidentiality, the disciplinary process 
and the failure to consider Ladele for temporary promotion.
129
  
 
The Employment Appeals Tribunal overturned the tribunal’s findings. It 
distinguished an overall claim of direct discrimination, arising from the decision 
to designate Ladele as a Civil Partnerships Registrar, from specific detriments. 
With regard to the former, it concluded that Ladele had been treated no 
differently from how another (non-religious) employee would have been treated 
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for refusal to conduct civil partnerships and that ‘[i]t cannot constitute direct 
discrimination to treat all employees in precisely the same way.’130  
 
On the specific detriments suffered by Ladele, the EAT took the view that 
although Ladele’s treatment was ‘unreasonable’, and thus in a sense she suffered 
a detriment, this detriment was not suffered for a ‘prohibited’ reason (i.e. her 
religion or belief) but rather because of her conduct in refusing to conduct civil 
partnerships.
131
  
 
The EAT also applied the comparator principle much more narrowly than did the 
initial tribunal, and determined that an appropriate comparator for Ladele was not 
the gay members of staff (because they were not objecting to performing a civil 
partnership) but rather a ‘hypothetical’ registrar who refused to conduct civil 
partnerships because of ‘an antipathy to the concept of same-sex relationships’, 
but where this antipathy was based on something other than religion.
132
 Again 
this allowed the EAT to conclude that, ‘although management was far more 
sympathetic to the concerns expressed by the two gay registrars than to the 
claimant’s religious views’, this did not constitute direct discrimination.133  
 
The EAT then dealt briefly with the question of harassment. As the claim took 
the form of a series of detriments, the EAT applied its own logic in respect of 
direct discrimination and concluded that although Ladele suffered ‘unwanted 
conduct’ this was not on the grounds of religion and belief but rather on the 
grounds of her refusal to conduct Civil Partnerships.
134
 
 
On the question of indirect discrimination, the EAT accepted that a requirement 
that all registrars should conduct civil partnerships did put Ladele at a particular 
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disadvantage, when compared to others, on the grounds of religion and belief. 
The question remained as to whether or not this represented ‘a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim’. 135  The EAT concluded that Islington 
Borough Council did indeed have a legitimate aim, and this was conceptualised 
as ‘providing the service on a non-discriminatory basis’. As the Court of Appeal 
later observed, this was a rather wider view of the legitimate aim of Islington 
Council than that assumed by the Tribunal which was simply the efficient 
provision of a service.
136
 It also concluded that it was proportionate for Islington, 
if it so wished, to ‘require all registrars to perform the full range of services’ such 
that ‘the claimant could not pick and choose what duties she would perform 
depending on whether they were in accordance with her religious views, at least 
in circumstances where her personal stance involved discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation.’137  
 
The EAT also considered the ECHR Article 9 jurisprudence in order to identify 
whether or not the approach it had taken was inconsistent with it. As in other 
cases, it concluded that there was no conflict – Article 9 having been construed 
to provide ‘very narrow protection indeed for employees’.138 It did consider that 
Ladele’s strongest argument under the Article 9 jurisprudence was that she was 
not employed to carry out civil partnership duties, but that these duties had later 
been imposed upon her, and referred to Lord Rix’s dissenting decision in 
Copsey.
139
 However, it ‘doubted’ whether this argument could succeed here as 
the duties of a registrar had been extended by Parliament and ‘the claimant was 
being required to carry out precisely the kind of tasks those in her situation 
do.’140 It went on to declare that, notwithstanding the ‘doubt’, Ladele’s argument 
was ‘bound to fail’ for another reason and this was because she wished to be 
accommodated in refusing to carry out duties ‘because of hostility to giving 
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effect to the legal rights of same sex couples.’141 The EAT concluded that ’it 
necessarily follows that the manifestation of the belief must give way when it 
involves discriminating on grounds which Parliament has provided to be 
unlawful.’142 In reaching its conclusion, the EAT did not discount, however, the 
possibility that Islington Borough Council might have taken a ‘pragmatic line’ 
and chosen not to designate Ladele as a civil partnerships registrar, and this 
might have been a desirable outcome.
143
 
 
The Court of Appeal endorsed the decision of the EAT in all substantive 
respects, the thrust of its reasoning clear from the following paragraph: 
 
Ms Ladele was employed in a public job and was working for a public authority; 
she was being required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated 
as part of her job; Ms Ladele’s refusal to perform that task involved 
discriminating against gay people in the course of that job; she was being asked 
to perform the task because of Islington’s Dignity for All policy, whose laudable 
aim was to avoid, or at least minimise, discrimination both among Islington’s 
employees, and as between Islington (and its employees) and those in the 
community they served; Ms Ladele’s refusal was causing offence to at least two 
of her gay colleagues; Ms Ladele’s objection was based on her view of 
marriage, which was not a core part of her religion; and Islington’s requirement 
in no way prevented her from worshipping as she wished.
144
 
 
The Court of Appeal went further than the EAT in accepting the arguments of an 
Intervenor, Liberty, who contended that not only was Islington Borough Council 
at liberty to require that all its appropriately designated registrars perform civil 
partnerships duties, it was in fact required to do so by law, due to the effect of 
the Sexual Orientation Regulations 2007. Liberty argued, firstly, that a refusal to 
carry out civil partnerships by someone who is prepared to conduct marriages 
amounts to discrimination under those Regulations (which expressly state that a 
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civil partnership is not materially different from a marriage
145
). Secondly, it 
argued that officiating at civil partnerships amounts to the provision to the public 
of services by a public authority exercising a function; however, under 
Regulation 8(2) public authorities are defined to include ‘any person who has 
functions of a public nature’ and so both Islington Borough Council and Ladele 
are public authorities ‘exercising a function’ and so to refuse to perform civil 
partnerships would be unlawful by either. Thirdly, it argued that under the 
regulations, the Borough would become liable for the unlawful act of an 
individual in refusing to perform civil partnerships.
146
 
 
It is strongly arguable that this is the most significant religious discrimination 
employment judgment and it has generated considerable public interest not least 
in the perception that it is a case where religious liberty and sexual orientation 
protections ‘clash’ and how that clash is to be resolved. There are a number of 
significant points to note from the judgment, and the context which surrounds it, 
and these are set out below, according to theme. 
Belief/action distinctions 
At the EAT and then (still more explicitly) at the Court of Appeal, the distinction 
between Ladele’s religious beliefs and her actions was highlighted. The point 
was clearly and repeatedly made that Islington was not ‘discriminating’ against 
Ladele because of religion and belief, but rather because of her conduct. It thus 
explicitly endorsed the notion that belief and conduct can be separated.
147
 Ladele 
was free to believe what she wished and to be free from discrimination on that 
basis. Interestingly, it can be inferred, from it approving comments about the 
registrars who objected and were not consequently disciplined, that she was free 
to verbally express this belief (at least insofar as making her objections and their 
basis known to colleagues), presumably in spite of any ‘offence’ this might cause 
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to colleagues. What she was not able to do was act on her belief (‘expressed’ or 
otherwise).  
 
The Court of Appeal reframed the analysis slightly to contend that Ladele’s view 
of marriage ‘was not a core part of her religion’ as it was not concerned with her 
personal devotions (‘worshipping as she wished’). It thus cast actions, which it 
was universally agreed were motivated by religious belief, as ‘non-core’ as 
opposed to ‘core’ activities which take place in private alone or in company with 
others. This is in fact a clear application using different terminology of the forum 
internum/externum dichotomy considered in Chapter 2.  
 
The significance of ‘choice’ 
Both the Court of Appeal and the EAT clearly conceptualise religious expression 
as a matter of individual choice – as they put it, Ladele wanted to ‘pick and 
choose’ the duties she was willing to perform.148 Clearly under this construction, 
and using this language, she is the protagonist, actively choosing to indulge her 
whims – there is no sense that she be regarded as responding to a divine 
obligation to act in conformity to the will of God (or the demands of her faith) 
which is how she herself characterised her situation. McCrudden, identifies this 
approach by the courts as a decision, typical of other recent judgments,
149
 ‘quite 
clearly to adopt an external viewpoint rather than a cognitively internal 
viewpoint’,150 and argues that judges should be encouraged to engage in efforts 
to understand religious issues from the internal perspective. In this case, adopting 
an internal perspective would involve a fuller appreciation of the demands of 
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conscience as something beyond a simple matter of an arbitrary individual 
choice. 
‘Discrimination’ 
At the EAT and Court of Appeal stages, Ladele is plainly cast less as a 
‘conscientious objector’ than as a ‘discriminator’, displaying ‘hostility’ to same-
sex relationships. Her attitude is compared at one stage by Elias J to that of a gay 
registrar who objects to performing a marriage of two evangelical Christians, for 
reasons of personal animosity or prejudice.
151
  
 
It was on the basis of such a construction of Ladele as a discriminator against gay 
people and in the light of the initial employment tribunal’s supposed 
endorsement of such discrimination, that Terry Sanderson, President of the 
National Secular Society, wrote an opinion piece in the Guardian in which he 
argued that the logic of the tribunal judgment would permit firemen to refuse to 
rescue homosexuals from burning buildings or doctors to refuse to treat patients 
with HIV.
152
 
 
However, this is a (deliberately mischievous?) mischaracterisation of both the 
tribunal decision and the nature of Ladele’s objection. As has been argued, 
Ladele was not in fact actively seeking to ‘discriminate’ due to a hostility to 
same-sex couples per se but rather to the encouragement of what in her mind 
amounted to same-sex marriage, for her a grave violation of God’s law. Her 
objection was not necessarily rooted in prejudice against homosexuals, as might 
be a fireman’s objection to rescuing a gay man from a burning building, but 
could equally be characterised as a measured objection to being personally 
involved in what she perceived to be the promotion of homosexual activity (a 
very different motivation also from that of Elias J’s hypothetical gay registrar).  
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Indeed this latter point was made by Lord Carey, the former Archbishop of 
Canterbury, in a witness statement before Lord Laws in support of the claimant 
in MacFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd:
153
  
 
The description of religious faith in relation to sexual ethics as 'discriminatory' 
is crude; and illuminates a lack of sensitivity to religious belief. The Christian 
message of 'love' does not demean or disparage any individual (regardless of 
sexual orientation); the desire of the Christian is to limit self destructive conduct 
by those of any sexual orientation and ensure the eternal future of an individual 
with the Lord.
154
  
 
This intervention prompted a degree of clarification on the issue by Lord Laws 
(presiding) who argued that ‘discrimination’ in the eyes of the law focuses on the 
effect of actions and is not linked to motive.
155
 This point was recognised in R 
(E) v JFS Governing Body, where, although a school was found to have 
discriminated in its admission policies on the grounds of race, this did not mean 
‘that these policies are “racist” as that word is generally understood’. 156 
Nevertheless, as Hart notes, ‘discrimination’ is a highly loaded term and even 
when used ‘neutrally’ in the courtroom it can have clear connotations of 
something disreputable.
157
 As noted in JFS, the ‘choice of words is important’ 
and it is desirable for judges to exercise care, (perhaps more so than did Elias LJ 
in Ladele) in applying labels which, when used in common parlance, carry within 
them ‘appalling accusation[s]’.158  
 
Indeed some who oppose the accommodation of conscientious objection in 
circumstances such as those of Ladele have sought to characterise discriminatory 
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conduct as ‘disreputable’ by means of drawing an unfortunate comparison 
between ‘discrimination’ against same-sex couples and ‘discrimination’ against 
mixed race couples. Would society allow a registrar to refuse to perform 
marriages due to objections based on race?
159
 As the answer is plainly ‘no’, then 
the implication is that neither should society tolerate objections based on sexual 
orientation. This contention was dealt with in the oral submissions by counsel for 
Ladele in Ladele v UK, to the effect that objections based on sexual orientation 
are worthy of respect in a democratic society whereas objections based on race 
are not. It is thus a false comparison. This is because the majority position in the 
Christian Church (and indeed other faiths) is that homosexual relationships are 
sinful, whereas there is no such understanding in respect of mixed race 
marriages. It was argued, surely correctly, that the traditional teachings of the 
Christian Church (particularly the established one) must, a priori, be worthy of 
respect in a liberal and democratic society.
160
  
 
Regardless of the apparent motive of Ladele, discriminatory or otherwise, there 
is a more significant argument against permitting conscientious objection which 
focusses on a possible detrimental effect on others, primarily service-users but 
also co-workers. With regard to the former, MacDougall argues that, if sufficient 
registrars (and other public servants) ‘conscientiously objected’ to providing 
services to gay and lesbian people, a situation might result in which ‘gays and 
lesbians could become citizen pariahs, with important governmental services 
being made difficult for them to obtain because of the religious (or “cultural”) 
views of others.’161 It may be objected, however, that this is a very unlikely 
scenario as it would assume a very high proportion of government officials with 
such strong religious convictions that they would be prepared to take the difficult 
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path of conflict with their employer by registering an objection. Nevertheless, the 
point has some theoretical force, however unlikely in practice, if an absolute 
right to conscientious objection were afforded to registrars, irrespective of the 
practical implications of refusal for those seeking a civil partnership. It has rather 
less force, however, if a potential accommodation is highly practicable. Given 
the relatively small numbers of civil partnerships sought (equivalent to only 4.5% 
of all marriages in 2008, and in decline since),
162
 it is likely that accommodation 
will be almost invariably practicable.  
 
MacDougall, writing from a Canadian perspective, also considers a situation 
where a religious ‘veto’ is not absolute but exercisable only in circumstances 
where the ‘service’ can be provided by someone else. In other words, the service-
user does not see a diminution in service. This is much closer to the claimant’s 
arguments in Ladele, accepted by the initial tribunal, that the Civil Partnerships 
service could be provided irrespective of Ladele’s own involvement, as other 
‘willing’ registrars were available. However, MacDougall also rejects this: 
 
Imagine the position of gay and lesbian persons who are told by a civil servant 
that that he or she does not have to serve such people, but will “do his or do her 
best” to find a replacement who has no such scruples. The civil servant will 
provide the service personally only if a replacement cannot be found and clearly 
against his or her better “judgment” (for such a person really is judging the 
situation).
163
  
 
The problem with this analysis, if applied to England and Wales,
164
 is that it 
assumes an extraordinary degree of disorganisation or blatant unprofessionalism 
on behalf of a given public authority. In reality, there is no justifiable reason why 
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a service user should be aware of the existence of any ‘scruples’ internal to an 
organisation; he should see only the ‘external face’ of that organisation, and 
should expect to receive a professional service from a suitably qualified member 
of staff. It would seem that for MacDougall it is the mere knowledge that 
someone wishing to conscientiously object might be accommodated which 
offends. Vickers argues that a workplace application of Feinberg’s work, on 
assessing the harm caused by an offence balanced against the reasonableness of 
the conduct which causes the offence,
 165
 would lead to the conclusion that ‘bare 
knowledge’ of a practice apparently offensive to some should not be sufficient by 
itself to prohibit this practice.
166
 Applied to Ladele, this would suggest that the 
bare knowledge offence to homosexuals of knowing (or suspecting) that a public 
official may not be engaging in Civil Partnerships registrations for reasons of 
religious conscience would be insufficient as a basis to require that official to 
engage in civil partnerships registrations. On balance, the demands of conscience 
weigh more heavily than the bare offence which might indirectly result.
167
 
 
In Ladele, the only actual ‘offence’ (which itself might be reasonably 
characterised as ‘bare knowledge offence’) that is noted in the judgments as a 
result of Ladele’s actions is the offence apparently given to the gay and lesbian 
fellow registrars (i.e. those internal to the organisation). As noted above, the 
Court of Appeal put some stress on this as part of its justification in rejecting 
Ladele’s appeal. Here again, it may reasonably be argued that the right to be free 
from, essentially, an indirect source of offence (Ladele’s objections not being 
directed at, in this case, the gay registrars themselves) needs to be balanced 
against arguably the greater rights of Ladele to be free from an anguishing 
dilemma. 
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The role of goods and services discrimination law 
 
It was argued by Liberty that public officials, acting on behalf of the state, cannot 
‘discriminate’ in ways that the state itself is not allowed to discriminate. This 
argument was accepted, albeit in a qualified way, by the Court of Appeal in 
Ladele.
168
  
 
It may be that Liberty’s interpretation of the Sexual Orientation Regulations is 
correct albeit that it rests on quite a technical argument. If so, then some 
justification is required as to why the religious public servant should be denied 
any kind of protections under discrimination law, essentially at the first stage. 
Such an explanation may be located in terms of the actual role of the public 
servant, particularly regarding a matter of law which is thought to be entirely 
secular in character. In terms of officiating at Civil Partnerships, the religious 
official is simply carrying out the legal obligations of the state.
169
 In theological 
terms, unlike the doctor performing an abortion, where individual culpability 
arises, the registrar is not intimately involved herself in the ‘sinful’ act, but rather 
as a third party – if ‘sin’ results, it is the civil partners themselves who are 
culpable. As MacDougall et al put it: ‘civil servants do not, by officiating at 
same-sex marriages, become themselves parties to same-sex sexual relationships 
or acts, i.e. they do not engage in homosexuality; they simply engage in a 
function that affords status’.170 Under this analysis, the religious official has no 
need personally to engage her religious conscience. In non-theological terms, and 
as the MP Diane Abbot (who intervened in Parliament with a motion to reverse 
the effects of the initial tribunal judgment in Ladele)
171
 put it: ‘[t]he whole point 
of civil partnerships is that they are legal contracts handed out by the state. They 
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have nothing to do with religion and therefore the religious beliefs of a public 
servant carrying them out are irrelevant.’172 
 
This argument has, in part, similarities with those arguments which seek to 
delineate the ‘civil’ character of civil partnerships from the (optional) religious 
character of marriages.
 173
 If the role of the public servant is conceptualised 
entirely as performing a religiously-neutral civil function then any individual 
objections to this are at best misplaced.
174
 
 
There are however two objections to these arguments. Firstly, it is difficult to 
view civil partnerships merely in terms of the signing of a contract. There are 
also ceremonial aspects from which, according to the compromise mooted by 
Islington Council, Ladele was offered an opt-out. These ceremonial aspects are 
clearly intended to ‘celebrate’ the civil partnership,175 and the registrar is fully 
involved in that celebration, albeit on behalf of the state.   
 
Secondly, the distinction between acting on behalf of the state and acting in a 
private capacity may be far less clear to the religious public servant than it might 
be for example to Diane Abbott. By conducting a civil partnership, a registrar 
may feel just as involved personally in endorsing and promoting civil 
partnerships as might a doctor asked to perform an abortion. Whether or not she 
is correct in this view is immaterial. As is plain from the Ladele judgment, as 
elsewhere, it is the sincere belief of the individual religious employee which 
matters. If the religious employee sincerely believes something she is doing 
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offends her conscience, then this in itself should be sufficient to trigger the first 
stage of the available protections. 
 
As it stands, if the Liberty position is correct, and the religious official is 
considered to be a public authority in his own right then a significant injustice 
arises. This is particularly true when there is no principled justification in law for 
identifying an individual as synonymous with the state (in terms of performing a 
‘public function’). For the state, or the public authority, the requirement to carry 
out legal obligations in a non-discriminatory way is clear and unequivocal. The 
way in which it organises itself to do so, with the involvement of other staff (as 
in Islington) or without (as in other boroughs), is surely a very different 
question.
176
  
 
Employer sympathy and direct discrimination 
 
At both the EAT and the Court of Appeal it was acknowledged that Islington 
Borough Council had shown far more sympathy to the gay members of staff and, 
specifically, the grievance they raised, than they showed to Ladele, and the 
grievance she raised. This was clearly demonstrated by the failure to respond to 
Ladele’s grievance, and the almost instant response to the grievance by Dion and 
Victoria. However, the EAT and the Court of Appeal both argued that the 
Council was entitled to do this without engaging in direct discrimination. Elias J 
did this ingeniously by determining that the comparison was too broadly drawn – 
the grievances were not concerned with the same issue and so there was no 
evidential value in drawing attention to the Council’s differential treatment of 
them. Rubenstein is critical of this decision, noting ‘how narrowly the 
comparison is drawn’ (so as to suggest that a claim about discriminatory 
grievance handling can only be brought if the grievance is similar).
177
 He 
attributes this to a judicial ‘zeal to avoid a finding of direct discrimination’ in 
Ladele and one of a series of judgments in discrimination cases where ‘a finding 
that like is not being compared with like has been used by the judges to avoid a 
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finding of direct discrimination where such a finding would conflict with the 
perceived merits of the case’.178 In other words, the comparator test has been 
used by Elias J in such a way as to avoid the natural, but apparently 
objectionable, outcome of the correct application of discrimination law.   
 
If this reading is correct, it suggests that the outcome of the direct discrimination 
case is particularly unfair in respect of Ladele. However, there is a wider point. It 
will be recalled that Elias J noted that ‘the tribunal was far more sympathetic to 
the concerns expressed by two gay registrars than to the claimant’s religious 
views’. However, he determined that the Council was entitled to do this and 
indeed to treat Ladele badly (e.g. by breaching her confidentiality) because this 
was due to her conduct (which happened to be motivated by her religion). The 
judgment expressly addresses and permits a practice which many (including the 
initial employment tribunal) would think contrary to the spirit of discrimination 
law – that an employer can ‘pick and choose’ which protected characteristics 
with which to show most sympathy. It may be submitted that such a situation ‘in 
the light of … mainstream thinking’, which the Court of Appeal thought 
relevant,
179
 is unlikely to favour the religious claimant. 
 
Application of the proportionality test 
The ease with which the EAT and the Court of Appeal accepted that Islington 
Borough Council could demonstrate that its treatment of Ladele was a 
proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim, has caused some comment.
180
 
Vickers has helpfully compared the approach taken towards the same issue of 
justification in sex and race cases and found it to be more demanding of the 
employer, requiring it to show ‘a real need’ of the organisation. She notes that, 
although the Court of Appeal in Ladele identified the legitimacy of the aim of 
providing an equal service to all, it did not consider whether or not this aim 
reflected a ‘real need’ of the Council and concludes: ‘[i]n failing to consider the 
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legitimacy of Islington's aim, the Court of Appeal seems to have subjected the 
Council to a low level of scrutiny, in comparison to the high standard usually 
required in discrimination cases.
 181 
 
Vickers’ analysis leads her to conclude that a hierarchy may be developing in 
discrimination law, where religion and belief is less robustly protected than 
might be other strands such as sex, race and sexual orientation.
182
 If this analysis 
is correct, then it would allow employers to treat religion and belief as less 
worthy of respect than other characteristics and to be spared censure from acts 
which, had the protected ground been different, would have led to a successful 
discrimination claim. 
McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited 
 
The third case was brought by Gary McFarlane, a Christian and former employee 
of Relate Avon Limited (Relate), a counselling service in the field of sexual and 
relationships therapy.  McFarlane had been employed by Relate since August 
2003 initially in the field of ‘marital’ and ‘couples counselling’.  In September 
2006, McFarlane asked if he could undertake a diploma course in psycho-sexual 
therapy (‘PST’). PST appeared to be much more directly involved in sexual 
issues within relationships including advising on sexual techniques. Such work 
was, as the EAT noted ‘liable to give rise to a much more intractable conflict 
with the Claimant’s religious beliefs.’183 At this point McFarlane appears to have 
raised concerns, including a request that he should be exempted from working 
with same sex couples where specifically sexual issues would be involved. 
In December 2007, the General Manager of Relate Avon, Mr Bennett, wrote to 
McFarlane and refused to agree to his request primarily on the basis that it was 
contrary to Relate Avon’s equal opportunity policy. In his letter, Bennett also 
asked for written confirmation that McFarlane would continue to counsel same-
sex couples in both relationships and PST work; failure to do this ‘might’ result 
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in disciplinary action.
184
 In his eventual reply, McFarlane stated that his only 
difficulty was in offering PST to same-sex couples and that his views were 
‘evolving’; as the issue had not yet arisen, disciplinary action was premature. On 
the basis of this reply, Bennett initiated the disciplinary procedure, only aborting 
it after the initial meeting with McFarlane in which he stated that ‘if he were 
asked to do PST work with same-sex couples he would do so and that if any 
problems arose he would then raise them with his supervisor.’185 
 
However, in a subsequent conversation with his supervisor, it appeared (to her) 
that McFarlane had returned to his earlier position on the issue of same-sex 
couples and PST. As a result, the disciplinary process was re-engaged and 
MacFarlane summarily dismissed on the basis that he could no longer be trusted 
to carry out his role in conformity to Relate’s equal opportunities policy and that 
this constituted gross misconduct.
186
 McFarlane appealed unsuccessfully; 
consequently, he lodged a claim for unfair dismissal and religious discrimination 
with an employment tribunal. 
 
The employment tribunal and, subsequently, the EAT dismissed all of 
MacFarlane’s claims. In the light of the Ladele judgment, the EAT in 
MacFarlane did not dwell on practical considerations and instead applied the 
issue of principle to indirect discrimination, as it saw ‘no real difference’ 
between the two situations: 
 
The essence of Elias P’s analysis is that in a case where a body such as the 
Council has such an aim it may properly insist on all employees participating in 
the services in question, even if to do so is in conflict with their religious beliefs, 
because to do otherwise would be inconsistent with the principle which it 
espouses. If that is the case for a local authority, we can see no material 
distinction in the position of a body such as Relate.
187
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A claim for harassment was found by the tribunal to be of no merit and this 
conclusion was not disputed before the EAT. Permission to appeal, originally 
rejected by Elias J, was sought directly from the Court of Appeal. This 
application was heard by Lord Justice Laws who rejected the application in a 
reserved judgment. 
 
In terms of the substantive legal issues, MacFarlane offers little innovation, 
following as it does the reasoning in Ladele. Unlike Ladele, MacFarlane was not 
able to identify any specific detriments, so his only realistic claim was for 
indirect discrimination, a claim which failed for the same reason as Ladele. Once 
again, the claim turned on whether or not it was a proportionate to require all 
employees to be committed to performing all aspects of the counselling service 
for all ‘service users’ without ‘discrimination’. Thus, once again, proportionality 
was not calibrated according to the practicability of making accommodations 
(although, unlike in Ladele, the practicability of accommodating the claimant 
was disputed by the employer), but rather according to this wider principle of 
non-discrimination by both employer and all employees alike. Human rights 
arguments were once again rejected for the same reasons as in Ladele. As 
MacFarlane was not a public servant, arguments akin to those advanced by 
Liberty as to how far the employer was obliged to require all employees to act 
according to these principles were not advanced. 
 
There is one key area where the facts of the case depart significantly from those 
of McClintock and Ladele. In MacFarlane, the claimant was not subjected to a 
change in duties without his express consent; rather, it was as a result of a change 
in duties which he himself sought that the dilemma of conscience for him arose. 
In terms of the legal analysis, nothing turned on this point, yet it may be a 
significant issue if an alternative form of legal accommodation were mooted.
188
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Summary and Discussion 
 
In the second part of this chapter, the ways in which employees have ‘negatively 
manifested’ their religious beliefs through ‘conscientious objection’ has been 
illustrated through an exploration of three prominent employment cases. The 
purpose of this concluding section is to identify the over-arching themes 
emerging from these cases and the commentary surrounding them, in terms of 
how the courts are developing their approach towards conscientious objection 
and to map this approach onto the models presented in Chapter 3. In the process, 
the situation will also be considered from the perspective of the conscientious 
objector, and what options remain to him following the precedents set by these 
cases. 
 
As noted earlier, ‘conscientious objection’ is not a term applied by the law to 
refer to the examples of negative manifestation which have been considered in 
this chapter, nor is it so employed by judges. This is perhaps unfortunate as the 
term benefits from the positive associations with a principled and longstanding 
tradition with its roots in opposition to military service. There are also clear 
parallels between the workplace conscientious objectors and traditional 
conscientious objectors, which makes this a useful explanatory term to apply to 
the former. Both categories of conscientious objector tend to manifest their 
resistance to requirements placed on them by others reluctantly and discreetly; 
they generally do not seek to make wider political statements but reference the 
objection to themselves alone;
 189
 they show integrity by taking a stand in the 
face of the potential hostility of others, thus placing their consciences above what 
is expedient and risking some sacrifice for their beliefs (e.g. in the workplace, the 
loss of a position). 
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Whilst clearly not perceived in these positive terms, the negative manifestation of 
religion described in this chapter has been recognised by courts as having some 
value to the individual, but, crucially, as representing a ‘non-core’ aspect of his 
religious convictions. Thus ‘conscientious objection’ is regarded as a 
manifestation of religion, or a response motivated by religion, but not 
fundamental to the religion itself. This is in keeping with the ECHR 
jurisprudence, but was not a necessary innovation in the interpretation of 
discrimination law. One result of this has been to allow the courts to perceive any 
detriments suffered by the conscientious objector (such as dismissal) as resulting 
from his actions, irrespective of any beliefs underlying those actions. This has 
meant that direct discrimination for workplace conscientious objectors is 
extremely difficult to establish. It has also illustrated the preference of courts to 
examine events from ‘an external’ (or perhaps, more correctly, the employer’s) 
perspective only, and to discount the ‘internal perspective’ underlying the 
motivation of the conscientious objector. Thus, in cases such as these involving 
objections to some consequences of sexual orientation rights, the conscientious 
objector can be construed, as noted above, as a ‘discriminator’ not an objector on 
the grounds of conscience. It is the actions (discrimination) not the motives 
(religious obligation) that matter to the courts, however important the religious 
obligation may be and however trivial the result of the discrimination (in Ladele, 
there was no negative result except some offence to other staff). 
 
Discrimination law has of course two major protections (direct and indirect 
discrimination) and these cases show that ‘conscientious objection’ (although not 
recognised as such) is given some status for protection, prima facie, as a 
‘manifestation of religion’ triggers the first stage of the test for indirect 
discrimination. However, at the second stage, the claims of conscientious 
objection are easily defeated by an employer’s justification defence which 
appears to receive less rigorous judicial scrutiny than is the case in race or sex 
discrimination claims. Whether this is a general conclusion is as yet unclear, as 
the high profile cases, in particular the three discussed in this chapter, all concern 
another protected characteristic. If the central objection does not derive from 
sexual orientation but from, say, an objection to handling alcohol, then it may be 
that the bar would be set higher for the employer in terms of the required 
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justification defence. This is as yet unknown as no such cases have been 
publicised at first instance or reached the EAT. Interestingly, and perhaps 
concerningly, it may be that as a result of a ‘policy’ decision by the courts to 
lower the justification bar in order to prevent ‘discrimination’ on the grounds of 
sexual orientation, there may be a negative precedent set for religious 
conscientious objection claims on other grounds. 
 
On a slightly more positive note, Ladele in particular gives grounds to assume 
that, although manifestation of religion may not be protected, religious identity 
might be. In Chapter 2, a taxonomy of religious expression was presented, using 
which it is possible to distinguish between religious belief in private and different 
degrees of expression, of which one is identity with certain beliefs. Strictly 
speaking, whereas Ladele is entitled, through the protection of the forum 
internum, to hold religious beliefs in private, alone or in company with others, it 
is less clear whether or not the forum internum would extend to protect her 
beliefs if they were articulated in some form in the workplace. Through raising 
objections to registering civil partnerships, Ladele was necessarily identifying 
herself with a religious belief that homosexuality is sinful. As noted in Chapter 4, 
this in itself might be grounds to trigger harassment claims by gay and lesbian 
staff. Indeed, the internal lawyer at Islington Borough Council considered that 
even the polite articulation of her position by letter to management was an act of 
gross misconduct in itself. This case, whilst not definitive on this issue, strongly 
suggests that articulation of an objection in support of religious ‘identity’ should 
receive a measure of protection, particularly if the need to make clear one’s 
religious identity has been prompted or provoked by the actions of the employer.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined negative expression of religion in the workplace and 
has identified two distinct rationales for individuals to seek to ‘opt out’ of work 
at specific times or for specific reasons. In terms of the law, the two rationales 
are treated quite differently, the second raising more complications than the first, 
although some similarities can be identified. 
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In Chapter 3 a range of responses towards workplace religious expression by a 
liberal state were set out. In this concluding section consideration will be given to 
how the discussion in this chapter, themed according to the two rationales 
considered, might relate to these models. 
Time Off 
 
This particular form of manifestation is relatively inconspicuous, with the 
exception of situations where on-site facilities are specifically provided (of which 
the chief example is a prayer room for Muslim staff). In the cases considered in 
this chapter, the provision of prayer facilities has not been the focus of a 
workplace dispute and so the analysis cannot extend to consider this issue. Of the 
cases considered, there is no real evidence to support the contention that the state 
might attempt to exclude this form of negative manifestation of religion from the 
workplace (Model I). There is some limited evidence of protection for this form 
of negative manifestation (Model V), evidenced by those tribunal cases which 
have been successful, albeit that there is also evidence that tribunals will often be 
satisfied that an employer has justified any restrictions on such manifestation. 
Indeed it may be that the successful cases form the exception rather than the rule. 
Equally, it is apparent from the majority judgment in Copsey that protection is 
more limited than it might be due to the application of the ‘specific situation rule’ 
to negative manifestation. This weakens any duty on the employer to ‘reasonably 
accommodate’ (and thus protect) this form of religious expression.  
 
As both Christian as well as Muslim claimants have been successful, then there is 
no evidence that Model VI (favouring minority religions) could be said to apply. 
In respect of Model II (support for a preferred historical religion) there is no 
evidence of any special regard being paid to Sunday as a Christian day of rest. 
The historic position of Sunday in the Christian calendar is not at all a point of 
reference for courts and tribunals; instead Sunday is seen merely as a day on 
which church services are likely to take place.  
 
Finally, the extent to which there is evidence in support of a laissez-faire 
approach (Model III) is debatable. Lord Mummery’s contention in Copsey that 
219 
an employer is entitled to keep his workplace secular can only be said to apply in 
respect of Article 9 (and was of course disputed by Lord Rix). The employment 
discrimination law provisions have certainly led to a restriction on this total 
freedom of action by employers. However, this restriction is not necessarily as 
great as it could be. Employers are still able relatively easily to justify varying 
contracts to the detriment of an employee’s desire to negatively manifest his 
religion. It appears also, although this is not yet definitive, that employers may 
not need to go to the trouble of proactively seeking to accommodate employees 
who might be adversely affected by changes to work rotas, etc – instead they 
may need merely to permit such employees to attempt to arrange the necessary 
‘accommodations’ themselves. In short, despite equality law, employers appear 
to enjoy a large measure of freedom of action in respect of the issues raised by 
negative manifestation of religion in the workplace. 
Conscientious Objection 
 
In applying the six models to conscientious objection, the analysis in this chapter 
provides a degree of support, perhaps paradoxically, for both Model I (exclusion) 
and Model III (laissez-faire).  
 
There is a repeated theme in the cases that it is for the employer to determine 
whether or not to accommodate the request for an ‘opt-out’ on the grounds of 
conscientious objection. The judgments, as has been seen, allow this decision to 
be made by the employer with less justification than might be the case under 
other grounds of discrimination. The tendency has been to accept the employer’s 
proportionality defence with limited question, once a ‘legitimate aim’ has been 
established. Thus far, there is support from these cases for a laissez-faire 
approach by the courts. However, it remains to a degree unresolved as to how 
far, in the case of sexual orientation for example, an employer is truly free to act 
as it wishes in accommodating religious conscientious objection, and how far law 
requires it to refuse requests to conscientiously object. The compromise position 
proposed by the Court of Appeal in Ladele, that once she had been designated a 
Civil Partnerships registrar, the employer lost its discretion to accept an ‘opt out’ 
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request, but not before,
190
 is rather unsatisfactory and, on this point at least, there 
remains a degree of confusion as to the extent of employer autonomy. 
 
In terms of the exclusion of religion from the workplace, Relate, and Lord 
Carey’s intervention in that case, imply a growing perception that religion 
receives insufficient protection, if not hostility, by the courts. This perception is 
perhaps an exaggeration. Nevertheless, it is clear from these cases that the courts, 
whilst expressing some vague sympathy for the religious claimant, make limited 
attempt to engage with the religious nature of the conscientious objection and 
prefer to frame the issues in terms of the actual conduct of the religious claimant 
in seeking not to carry out all of his or her duties. In taking an indulgent view 
towards the employer justification, the courts have created a situation where 
employers, who could easily accommodate the objections of religious 
employees, are permitted to dismiss them instead. This is particularly marked in 
these cases as another protected right, associated with sexual orientation, is also 
in play. It would seem clear that when religious-motivated expression is seen in 
some way to undermine other rights (and consequently ‘discriminate’) then it is 
more likely to be required to give way.  
 
The precedents set by these cases leave the religious employee with a 
conscientious objection in an uncomfortable place. She can rely only on the hope 
that her employer will respond to moral suasion, or individual pressure, and 
agree to allow her the option of conscientious objection, knowing that the law is 
unlikely to provide a means of enforcing this request.
191
 When faced with an 
employer, like Islington Council, which is not prepared to yield, there remains 
the less than enticing options of acquiescence, or to get out of the role (either 
through resignation or dismissal).
192
 It is submitted that this is a deeply 
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unsatisfactory state of affairs. There is a great sacrifice involved for the 
individual – either of conscience and self-respect, or of a valued role and 
consequent income. There is also a negative effect on society in general as a 
number public offices and roles become closed to religious people, further 
marginalising religious ‘voices’ and undermining the very ‘diversity’ which, in 
Ladele, was afforded so much weight as an over-riding policy goal.
193
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Chapter 6: Passive Manifestation 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with ‘passive manifestation’ in the workplace. This 
term is intended to be inclusive of the various ways in which employees might 
seek to express their religious beliefs visually. This might involve:  
 
i. distinct forms of dress (including head coverings); 
ii. the visible wearing of religious symbols, or symbols with religious 
significance to the individual;  
iii. the decoration of individual workspaces with religious symbols and 
artefacts; or 
iv. particular styles of personal grooming (such as the display of facial hair). 
 
These forms of expression are visible in the workplace and clearly identify 
individuals as holding religious beliefs, even if the nature of those beliefs, or the 
conviction with which they are held, is not made clear. In this sense the form of 
manifestation can be said to be ‘passive’; it indicates the presence of religious 
convictions but does not specifically articulate them, unlike ‘active 
manifestation’ which will be considered in the following chapter. It has been 
suggested, based on US jurisprudence, that there is such a thing as ‘symbolic 
speech’. 1 The use of this term at least implies congruence between speech and 
symbol, at least in terms of their effect on others. It is submitted that this is not 
necessarily an aid to the analysis of religious passive manifestation. ‘Speech’ and 
‘symbol’ are different in important respects as media for conveying meaning to 
others – appealing to different senses and in distinctive ways. There are 
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potentially exceptions if the form of symbolism has words attached
2
 or, albeit 
less obviously, a graphic image.
3
 However, it could be argued that in such cases, 
the form of manifestation, because it is articulated, is better classified as ‘active’ 
or a hybrid of ‘passive’ and ‘active’.  
 
The term ‘passive’ is employed in this chapter with reference to the religious 
content of the symbol, dress or grooming. It may be that an item of religious 
dress interferes with an activity which is central to an individual’s job.4 In such 
cases it is difficult to describe the symbol as functionally passive because of the 
way in which it actively interferes with work. However, for the purposes of the 
analysis here, it remains passive as a form of religious expression simply because 
it does not explicitly verbalise religious convictions.  
 
There are, in broad terms, four views which may be taken of passive 
manifestation. The first is to view it as of relatively little importance. Renteln 
argues that this flows from an Anglo-Saxon worldview which gives priority to 
verbal communication and thus underplays the importance of symbols, and 
particularly religious symbols, to minority faiths.
5
 Under this analysis, there are 
two possible consequences. One is that the issue would be relatively uncontested 
and religious people would be free to dress and groom themselves as they wish. 
The second is that the right of someone to dress and groom and otherwise display 
symbols would be seen as of lesser significance in comparison to any conflicting 
rights (e.g., from an employer’s perspective, the desire to present a particular 
image to customers) and would be expected to give way. In Renteln’s view, the 
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latter is the most likely outcome. Both, though, derive from the notion that 
symbolism is of relatively little significance. In terms of the models presented in 
Chapter 3, this view is most likely to fit with a laissez-faire approach – the issue 
being of little importance there is no need to seek to constrain by law the 
discretion of employers through legal means. 
 
The second view would be to recognise that, like other forms of manifestation, 
passive manifestation has some significance for the religious individual, 
particularly members of minority religions, and thus some efforts should be made 
through the courts to restrain employer discretion in support of passive 
manifestation. This view would be most congruent with the ‘protection’ model, 
particularly the protection for minority faiths in Chapter 3. The assumption, as 
with the first view, is likely to be that religious symbolism is broadly neutral in 
its effect on others – its importance is best understood relative to the individual 
concerned. Thus any constraints would require strong justification.  
 
A third view would be that passive manifestation should not be constrained when 
it reflects not just a religious belief but it also reflects national identity (or 
heritage). In the UK and Western Europe, this is most likely to apply to Christian 
symbolism. This view is synonymous with the ‘support for a preferred historic 
religion’ model in Chapter 3. 
 
There is however a fourth view which is that religious symbolism is capable of 
influencing the behaviour or thinking of others and so represents a challenge to 
Western culture. It is thus of potentially great significance (and can only really be 
described as ‘passive’ in the sense that this term can be taken, for analytical 
purposes, to mean ‘non-verbal’).  This view is partly premised on the contention 
that symbolic display is, at best, ‘an “ostensible” intrusion of religious identities’ 
into the public square or, worse, ‘an illegitimate act of propaganda and an 
aggressive act of proselytism.’ 6  Proselytism, in turn, may create unhealthy 
pressure on some, particularly those most susceptible to pressure, to conform to a 
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particular expression of religion. This is particularly noted in the case of the 
headscarf-hijab where it is also argued, girls are most prone to be put under 
pressure by others to dress in a particular way.
7
 A second and linked contention 
is that such pressure, particularly if exerted by men, amounts to sex 
discrimination as women are isolated and restricted by their seclusion within the 
veil and more easily controlled and subordinated as a result.
8
 Thus, religious 
symbolism can promote discrimination. Thirdly, religious symbolism can be 
viewed as ‘subversive’ and a threat to public order. This is the contention of 
secular France, and is summarised by Danchin (who finds it wanting): 
 
According to this argument, the wearing of religious symbols is seen as being 
linked to an increased risk of threats and violence, whether because of 
intolerance and xenophobia directed towards an unpopular religious minority, or 
because of a perceived threat of the rise of religious fundamentalism directed 
towards the democratic values and institutions of the state.
9
 
 
In this context, the Islamic headscarf in particular is frequently viewed as a 
political as much as a religious symbol;
10
 one capable of inciting violence by 
those who oppose what it represents, and also  representing the deliberate 
rejection of the existing democratic political arrangements. Such assertions are 
controversial. For example, it could be argued that the state should focus on 
protecting individuals from a hostile reaction to the wearing of a headscarf rather 
than seeking to curtail the freedom to do so. Nevertheless, such arguments do 
provide a direct rationale for those seeking to restrict the symbolic manifestation 
of religion in certain public places, for example, in schools, in universities and in 
courtrooms. This approach would correspond most clearly to Model I 
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(exclusion), presented in Chapter 3. Such restrictions will have an effect on 
‘workers’, such as teachers and lecturers (as well as other actors such as pupils 
and students). It may also provide an indirect rationale for restrictions on 
employees in other occupations.  
 
As passive manifestation may affect a range of public situations beyond the 
workplace in a way that the other forms of manifestation thus far considered do 
not, there is a range of case law of direct and indirect relevance, much of it from 
outside the workplace. Such case law is useful as it can illuminate some of the 
ways in which the law grapples with the challenges of passive manifestation 
more generally and from a human rights perspective particularly. It has already 
been noted that principles from ECHR jurisprudence have been applied to 
domestic discrimination law,
11
 and that domestic law must be interpreted in line 
with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998. It is therefore analytically 
helpful to identify the evolution of ECHR principles, both at a European and a 
UK level, in relation to passive manifestation, with a view to subsequently 
assessing how far these principles have been adopted in workplace cases, chiefly 
under domestic discrimination law. These principles have developed largely, but 
not uniquely, within an educational context, but as McGoldrick notes ‘can be 
read more widely’.12 
 
In this chapter, therefore, this wider case law will be examined prior to a more 
focussed consideration of the specific workplace case law under the 2003 
Regulations and the Equality Act 2010: firstly, Article 9 ECHR case law will be 
considered and, secondly, employment cases with a relevance to passive 
manifestation will be explored. Principles and key issues from these cases will 
then be employed as part of the analysis of some recent passive manifestation 
employment judgments in England and Wales. 
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Article 9 Case Law 
 
Much of the case law at a European level has been concerned with the right of 
Muslim women to wear the headscarf-hijab (or indeed other forms of Islamic 
dress such as the niqab, jilbab or burka). However, there has been a handful of 
cases brought Sikhs, such as X v United Kingdom,
13
 where the ECtHR found 
against a Sikh who had been required to wear a motorcycle helmet, despite 
having to take off his turban, on the grounds of the legitimate demands of UK 
health and safety laws. 
 
The reason there is a relatively extensive case law in this area is that certain 
states, which are signatories to the ECHR, seek, as a matter of policy, to 
constrain religious expression in the public square in order to promote 
secularism.
14
 A good example of this is France where all but discreet signs and 
symbols of religion have been banned in state schools since March 2004.
15
 The 
general consensus has been that Muslim women who wish to wear the headscarf 
have been disproportionately affected by this, hence the designation, ‘L’Affaire 
du Foulard’ which has come to be associated with it.16 It is notable certainly that 
the law does not appear to unduly affect Christians, for example, who are free to 
wear ‘discreet’ crosses. The French approach, insofar as it has been tested before 
                                                 
13
 (1978) 14 DR 234. 
14
 Although there are many versions of secularism; see, for a recent discussion, relevant to this 
context: I Leigh and R Ahdar, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights (or 
how God never really went away)’ (2012) 75 MLR 1065.  
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 See, for a nuanced critique of the French approach to the headscarf, Laborde, Critical 
Republicanism. 
16 This term in fact pre-dates the Stasi commission and was first applied following intense media 
interest in a school dispute in 1989 over the right of three Muslim girls to wear headscarves in 
class in contravention of a school-wide ban; see: N Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with 
Headscarves:  Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity’ (1994) 4 Political 
Theory 658.  
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the ECtHR, has been accepted as falling within a national margin of 
appreciation.
17
  
 
In Muslim-majority Turkey, under its equally secular constitution, there exists a 
much more wide-ranging ban on the wearing of religious dress or symbols in all 
state institutions.
18
 Other States (such as Denmark,
19
 Belgium
20
 and France
21
) 
restrict the most overt visual manifestations of religious belief. As with the 
Affaire du Foulard, the effect of such provisions has tended to be most negative 
for Muslim women, and for this reason many of the challenges under the ECHR 
have been lodged by Muslims.  
 
Such applications have enjoyed little success for two main reasons. First, the 
ECtHR allows a wide margin of appreciation in this area for member states. This 
position is most clearly articulated in Leyla Sahin v Turkey,
22
 where, in a 
Chamber judgment, the Court rejected an Article 9 application from a medical 
student in Istanbul who had been denied access to lectures and an examination 
because she refused to remove her headscarf in contravention of a regulation 
forbidding the wearing of the headscarf whilst engaged in academic study at the 
university. The Court agreed with the applicant that her Article 9(1) right to 
manifest her religion had been interfered with:  
 
The applicant said that, by wearing the headscarf, she was obeying a religious 
precept and thereby manifesting her desire to comply strictly with the duties 
                                                 
17
 See for example Dogru v France, Appl No. 27058/05 and Kervanci v France, Appl No. 
31645/04, 4 December 2008, the facts of which pre-dated Stasi and related to school headscarf 
bans during physical education lessons. 
18
 Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
19
 Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace 
20
 B Waterfield, ‘Belgium could be first country to ban the burka’ The Daily Telegraph (London, 
31 March 2010); copy at: 
<<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/belgium/7541430/Belgium-could-be-
first-country-to-ban-the-burka.html>>, accessed 25 July 2011. 
21
 For a critical discussion of the French legal approach, see M Hunter-Henin, ‘Why the French 
Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National Identity and Religious Freedom’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 613.  
22
 Appl No. 44774/98 (SC), 29 June 2004. 
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imposed by the Islamic faith. Accordingly, her decision to wear the headscarf 
may be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and, without 
deciding whether such decisions are in every case taken to fulfil a religious duty, 
the Court proceeds on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed 
restrictions of place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in 
universities, constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to manifest her 
religion.
23
 
 
However, in determining whether or not this interference could be justified as 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ (under the provisions of Article 9(2)), the 
Court determined that it could be, on the basis that, in Turkey, the headscarf 
could rightly be perceived as having political as well as religious significance as 
well as a malign effect on those who choose not to wear it (although the 
judgment does not spell out the apparent nature of this effect); thus two 
imperatives were in play - the protection of the ‘rights and freedoms of others’ 
and the ‘maintenance of public order’ – both of which justified restrictions which 
it was proportionate for the university, which had acted sensitively, to apply in 
this case. In the process, the Court set out clearly the principle of deference on 
such questions to the decisions taken by nation states: 
 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at 
stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, 
the role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance 
… . In such cases, it is necessary to have regard to the fair balance that must be 
struck between the various interests at stake: the rights and freedoms of others, 
avoiding civil unrest, the demands of public order and pluralism.
 24
  
 
It thus dismissed the application. This judgment was upheld on appeal before the 
Grand Chamber.
25
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 ibid. [71]. 
24 
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Secondly, the Court (at least pre-2011) has not been particularly supportive of 
the right to display religious symbols, particularly the headscarf-hijab.
26
 In 
Dahlab v Switzerland,
27
 a primary school teacher was forbidden from wearing a 
headscarf-hijab in the classroom because it contravened the principle of religious 
neutrality imposed by law on the Swiss school system. The Swiss Federal Court 
upheld the interdiction on the basis that the wearing of the headscarf constituted 
‘a “powerful” religious symbol – that is to say, a sign that is immediately visible 
to others and provides a clear indication that the person concerned belongs to a 
particular religion.’28 In consequence of her status as a primary school teacher 
and role model for her pupils, the wearing of this powerful symbol by Dahlab 
‘imposed’ Islam upon them, thus potentially interfering with both their religious 
beliefs and those of their parents. In upholding the school’s decision in this way, 
the Swiss Federal Court nevertheless noted the dilemma which this would create 
for Dahlab: ‘ … prohibiting the appellant from wearing a headscarf forces her to 
make a difficult choice between disregarding what she considers to be an 
important precept laid down by her religion and running the risk of no longer 
being able to teach in State schools.’29 
 
In dismissing Dahlab’s subsequent application, the ECtHR made the following 
observations: 
 
The Court accepts that it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful 
external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of 
conscience and religion of very young children. … In those circumstances, it 
cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind 
of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a 
precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, 
is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears 
difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of 
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 Hambler, ‘A Private Matter’. 
27
 Appl No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001. 
28
 ibid. 2-3.  
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tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that 
all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.
30
  
 
The Court determined that to ban the wearing of the hijab-headscarf was within 
the margin of appreciation of Switzerland. 
 
The effect of both of these approaches in the rulings of the ECtHR has been that 
‘[a]ll the cases have accepted that restrictions may be imposed on the wearing of 
Islamic dress in public institutions. Though the justifications vary in detail, all 
generally revolve around the concept of ‘protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others’.’31 
 
How far these principles might apply to Christian symbolism was, prima facie, 
explored in Lautsi and Ors v Italy.
32
 This case was lodged by a Mrs S Lautsi, a 
parent who objected that the prominent display of a crucifix on the wall in each 
of her sons’ classrooms. Under domestic law, the display of such crucifixes is 
mandatory in Italy and so the challenge had widespread ramifications.  
 
The school governors voted to retain the crucifixes and, in 2002, Mrs Lautsi 
began the first of a series of legal challenges in the Italian courts on the grounds, 
inter alia, that the practice undermined the principle of secularism. Her case was 
unsuccessful, the courts taking the view that: 
 
i. the crucifix was a symbol of Christianity in general rather than of 
Catholicism alone, so that it served as a point of reference for other 
creeds;  
ii. the crucifix was a historical and cultural symbol of identity for the 
Italian people; and 
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iii. the crucifix symbolised secular Western values which had originally 
emerged from Christianity. 
 
Mrs Lautsi (along with her two sons) then lodged her case with the ECtHR, on 
the basis that the public display of the crucifix in her sons’ school was contrary 
to her right to ensure that their education was in conformity with her religious 
and philosophical convictions, under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The presence of 
the crucifix also breached her freedom of religion, as protected by Article 9 of 
the Convention. Furthermore, relying on Article 14, all three of them, not being 
Catholics, had suffered discrimination in their treatment in comparison to Roman 
Catholic parents and their children. 
 
In its Chamber judgment in November 2009, the ECtHR upheld the claims.
33
 
Against a backdrop of public outrage in Italy,
34
 the Italian government’s request 
for a grand chamber hearing was granted, and this took place in June 2010. On 
this occasion, the Court overturned its earlier judgment.
35
 It took the view that 
the state could not be held to be seeking to indoctrinate pupils in one particular 
religion merely through the display of a ‘passive symbol’.36 Being passive, such 
a symbol ‘cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of 
didactic speech or participation in religious activities’.37 Equally, there was no 
evidence to show that the display of the crucifixes had encouraged proselytism 
by teaching staff. Thus, there was no interference with the applicants’ rights 
under the ECHR and, as there was no indoctrination, it was within Italy’s margin 
of appreciation to continue to require the display of crucifixes in state schools. 
 
                                                 
33
 Lautsi v Italy Appl No. 30814/06 (SC), 3 November 2009. 
34
 D McGoldrick, ‘Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public Life: 
Crucifixes in the Classroom?’ (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 451. 
35
 Lautsi (GC). 
36
 It thus rejected the argument which had been accepted in the Chamber judgment that the state 
had, in a sense, ‘personally endorsed’ the symbol.  
37
 Lautsi (GC) [72].  
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One of the concurring opinions, in the same vein as the domestic Italian courts, 
stressed the importance of the crucifix as ‘heritage’ for the Italian people: 
 
A court of human rights cannot allow itself to suffer from historical Alzheimer's. 
It has no right to disregard the cultural continuum of a nation's flow through 
time, nor to ignore what, over the centuries, has served to mould and define the 
profile of a people. No supranational court has any business substituting its own 
ethical mock-ups for those qualities that history has imprinted on the national 
identity.... A European court should not be called upon to bankrupt centuries of 
European tradition. No court, certainly not this Court, should rob the Italians of 
part of their cultural personality.’38 
 
It should be noted in passing that this judgment is, at first blush, somewhat at 
variance with Dahlab  and it is now unclear as to how far a prominent religious 
symbol will be regarded by the ECtHR as ‘essentially passive’  (as in Lautsi) or 
as having ‘powerful external’ force, capable of a proselytising effect (as in 
Dahlab). For some commentators, the variance is due to the limited reasoning 
offered by the Court in Dahlab as to how the symbol in question could 
reasonably be said to coerce others, in comparison to the more nuanced judgment 
of essentially similar issues in Lautsi which led to a different and better 
judgment.
39
 For others, the differential treatment evident in the cases is 
regrettable evidence of ‘double standards’ depending on the nature of the 
religious symbol.
40
 Either or both contentions may be correct, but it is also 
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instructive to note some differences between the cases, relevant to this thesis. 
Firstly, in Lautsi, the presence of the crucifix was historic and prescribed by the 
state thus blurring the meaning between the original religious symbolism and the 
role of the symbol as affirming identity or heritage (providing a clear fit with 
Model II under the typology proposed in Chapter 3).
41
 Secondly, and more 
significantly, the symbol was ‘passive’ in the sense that it was detached from the 
schoolteacher in Lautsi, and thus there was not the same sense of personal 
endorsement seen by the conscious decision of the teacher in Dahlab to 
physically wear the headscarf, in a sense ‘activating’ the religious symbol.42 
With these two observations in mind, Dahlab would appear to remain the most 
relevant ECtHR judgment in respect of individual symbolic manifestation, 
particularly with regard to the headscarf.  
 
This would certainly appear to be the view of the domestic courts in the UK. In R 
(Shabina Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School,
43
 for 
example, the approach taken in Dahlab was quite clearly adopted. This case 
involved an application under the Human Rights Act 1998 by a schoolgirl 
forbidden from wearing a jilbab during school hours. The school argued that if 
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Begum was allowed to attend classes wearing the jilbab, this might put pressure 
on other pupils to adopt similar strict variants of Islamic dress. Begum, with her 
brother, successfully sought a judicial review of the school's decision, on the 
grounds that Begum’s right to manifest her religion (Article 9 ECHR) and her 
right to education (Article 2(1) of the first protocol) had been violated. Although 
successful in the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords determined that since there 
were other schools which allowed her to wear the jilbab there was no 
interference with Begum’s right to manifest her belief in practice or observance. 
The Lords also concluded that, had there been an interference with Begum’s 
Article 9 rights, such an interference would be justified because the school in 
formulating its uniform policy possessed a degree of discretion comparable to ‘a 
margin of appreciation’.44  
 
To summarise, these cases are not employment cases per se, although they do 
provide some guidance in respect of some public places such as the classroom 
which are also workplaces. These cases suggest that Article 9 rights can be 
legitimately restricted at the discretion of the state insofar as passive 
manifestation is concerned if the member state is concerned about the possible 
pressure exerted on others through this manifestation, and particularly if the form 
of manifestation is seen as promoting sex discrimination. It is clear that the 
headscarf is the manifestation which is most clearly identifiable in these terms. 
However, the narrowness of the context is also worthy of note – it is confined to 
educational institutions where the ‘susceptible’ young people are considered to 
be at risk of coercion through passive manifestation.
45
 Nevertheless, within that 
context, a generally negative view of the headscarf is permitted, even encouraged 
by the ECtHR, and arguments which might be deployed to restrict its use by 
teachers are provided. 
 
Also from the case law, it may be noted that states can legitimately restrict 
passive religious manifestation when there are practical reasons for so doing, 
such as those associated with health and safety obligations. Finally, the cases also 
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provide arguments in favour of the display of religious symbolism if this 
symbolism can be linked to national identity, under a heritage model (Model II).  
The workplace in England and Wales: pre-2003 developments 
 
Having considered the (primarily) human rights jurisprudence on passive 
manifestation from outside the employment sphere, attention will now turn to the 
workplace, and particularly the case law preceding the 2003 Religion and Belief 
Regulations. This provides some insights into how courts have sought to balance 
employee freedom of expression in terms of dress and grooming with employer 
discretion, and how these rights are triangulated with discrimination law.  
 
Prior to the 2003 Regulations, the extent to which employers have discretion to 
control the dress and personal grooming of employees ‘to convey a message to 
their employees and customers’46 had already been established in principle in 
Schmidt v Austicks Bookshops,
47
 a sex discrimination case brought by Mrs 
Schmidt who had been dismissed by her employer because she refused to comply 
with a new dress code forbidding female members of staff who came into contact 
with the public from wearing trousers. The EAT determined that she had not 
been discriminated against because the employer had also imposed different but 
equivalent restrictions on male staff.
48
 It also stated as obiter ‘that an employer is 
entitled to a large measure of discretion in controlling the image of his 
establishment, including the appearance of staff, and especially so when, as a 
result of their duties, they come into contact with the public.’49 This suggests that 
a right of self-expression, through dress and grooming, does potentially exist, but 
is likely to be subordinate to employer discretion, especially its discretion 
regarding the presentation of a particular uniform image to the public.  
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 [1977] IRLR 360 (EAT). 
48
 A decision later reinforced in Smith v Safeway [1996] IRLR 456, and later in Department for 
Work and Pensions v Thompson [2004] IRLR 348, where the lawfulness of ‘equal but different 
treatment’ between the sexes in the matter of imposing dress codes was affirmed.  
49
 Schmidt [10]. 
237 
 
Other cases, pursued under the Race Relations Act 1976, involve a more explicit 
link to the manifestation of religious belief. Both Singh v Rowntree Mackintosh
50
 
and Panesar v Nestle
51
 involved Sikhs who were rejected at recruitment stage for 
work at chocolate factories on the grounds of hygiene. For religious reasons, the 
respective claimants refused to accept a requirement to wear their hair short or 
shave off their beards. In Singh v Lyons Maid Ltd,
52
 a Sikh worker was dismissed 
from his job in an ice cream factory, after a personal revival of religious 
conviction led to him refusing any longer to adhere to a rule preventing him from 
wearing his hair uncut (for reasons of hygiene). In Singh v British Rail 
Engineering
53
 a Sikh employee refused to put on a hard hat in order to meet 
health and safety obligations, and was consequently dismissed. In each of these 
cases, the respective claimant lost his case, illustrating the extent to which the 
EAT was prepared to accept, relatively unquestioningly, both hygiene and health 
and safety as justifying indirect race discrimination against Sikhs.
54
  
 
In Kingston & Richmond RHA v Kaur
55
 a decision of a Regional Health 
Authority to enforce the wearing of a dress as part of the uniform of female 
nurses was held by the EAT not to discriminate on the grounds of race. The 
applicant, a Sikh, was prepared to comply on condition that she could, for 
religious and cultural reasons, cover her legs by the wearing of trousers in 
addition to the dress. Nevertheless, despite the claimant’s willingness to 
compromise, the EAT held that the employer had a compelling reason to insist 
that she comply rigidly with the uniform in order that the trust should present a 
consistent image to the public.  
 
In summary, prior to 2003, employment tribunals broadly followed the first of 
the three positions considered in the introduction in affording little importance to 
                                                 
50
 [1979] IRLR 199 (EAT Sc). 
51
 [1980] ICR 60, (EAT), 64 (CA). 
52
 [1975] IRLR 328. 
53
 [1986] ICR 22 (EAT). 
54
 Hambler, ‘A Private Mattter?’ 122. 
55
 [1981] IRLR 337 (EAT). 
238 
the right of ‘passive manifestation’. Admittedly, they did accord some small 
weight to an individual’s right to self-expression through dress and grooming.56 
However, this ‘right’ to self-expression, even when informed by race and culture, 
was easily defeated when employers provided a prima facie justification for 
restricting dress and grooming, particularly when based around the concepts of 
hygiene or health and safety. These are of course important considerations and 
fairly easy to invoke as a ‘trump’, but may not, in fact, withstand proper scrutiny 
(if attempted).
57
  
The workplace in England and Wales: post-2003 developments 
 
Having considered the developing principles of Article 9 ECHR jurisprudence, 
as well as the limited employment case law, it is now possible to focus 
specifically on employment case law, since the implementation of the 2003 
Religion and Belief Regulations,  concerning the right to ‘passively manifest’ 
religious convictions in the workplace. Amongst the case law, since 2003, there 
have been two particularly high-profile reported cases as well as a small number 
of unreported cases which nevertheless attracted media attention.  
 
The first of the significant reported judgments is Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan 
Borough Council.
58
 In this case, a Muslim bi-lingual support worker in a primary 
school refused to remove her niqab full face veil when working with children. 
The case thus has similarities to Dahlab. However, unlike Dahlab, the 
employer’s rationale for imposing restrictions on the wearing of the veil was 
entirely unrelated to concerns about sex discrimination, or the possible 
proselytising effect on vulnerable children. Instead, the school’s objection was on 
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the entirely practical ground that the children Azmi was instructing would 
experience greater difficulty in understanding her through her veil than without 
it.  
 
Azmi had indicated that she was willing to remove her veil if the school 
accommodated her in classes where there would be no contact with male 
teachers. The school rejected this potential accommodation as impractical; Azmi 
continued to wear the veil and, after a number of meetings and a period of stress-
related sick leave, she was suspended. She subsequently lodged a complaint 
under all the available heads of discrimination on the grounds of religion and 
belief with the employment tribunal. The tribunal ruled there had been no 
unlawful discrimination, though procedural shortcomings in the way her 
grievance was handled by the school did lead to an award of compensation for 
victimisation. Azmi appealed. 
 
On the issue of direct discrimination, the EAT agreed with the tribunal that the 
way the school treated Azmi should be compared with the way it would have 
treated a woman who (whether a Muslim or not) wears a face covering for a 
reason other than religious belief. It concluded that, given the importance for the 
children’s education of non-verbal communication, anyone whose face and 
mouth were covered would also have been suspended. Therefore, Azmi had not 
been treated any less favourably than anyone else would have been in those 
circumstances.  
 
On the indirect discrimination point, the tribunal accepted that the school had 
applied a practice that put people of Azmi's religion or belief at a disadvantage. 
However, it decided there was no discrimination, because the adoption of that 
practice was justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. In 
reaching its conclusion, considerable weight had been given by the tribunal to the 
‘stringent’ efforts made by the employer to investigate the feasibility of 
alternative ways for accommodating Azmi’s wishes.59 It should be noted that if 
employers do not present evidence to support their contention that there is a risk 
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of an adverse impact on their organisations if an employee wears a headscarf, 
they are likely to lose tribunal cases. This appears to have been the reason why a 
hairdresser, who wished to wear a headscarf, won her case after rejection in a job 
interview.
60
 Overall, this is suggestive of a movement away from the acceptance 
at a more superficial level of employers’ justifications on restrictions (prior to 
2003) and thus a shift from position 1 (presented in the introduction) to position 
2. 
Although Azmi’s behaviour had been inconsistent, in that she presented herself 
in a headscarf but unveiled at interview, and at her initial training course, this 
inconsistency, although noted, was not presented as evidence of insincerity and it 
was common ground that her desire to wear the full face veil was due to a 
genuine belief that this was a religious requirement. However, a key issue in the 
case was how far this represented a religious belief itself or a manifestation of a 
religious belief. This was premised on the contention that a ‘manifestation’ of 
religious belief could only be protected under indirect discrimination provisions 
and could not be protected under direct discrimination. The EAT helpfully 
dismissed this argument, and stated that a manifestation of religious belief could 
be protected under direct discrimination, particularly if what would otherwise be 
the relevant provision, criteria or practice (e.g. the requirement not to be veiled) 
was not ‘apparently neutral’ but rather it might be thought to represent a 
deliberate attempt to disadvantage a religious employee (in this case, a Muslim 
woman). In such cases, although it is a manifestation of religious belief rather 
than the belief itself which is in contention, it may still amount to direct 
discrimination. It concluded that it could therefore see ‘no reason for there to be 
any a priori position that a “manifestation” of a religious belief always has to be 
dealt with as indirect discrimination.’61 
 
It has been critically noted that some prominent Government ministers, including 
the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made a number of public comments as the 
case was being heard, on the necessity that Muslims should better integrate into 
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UK society, and the implicit undesirability of the niqab in classrooms.
62
 
Nevertheless, it is instructive that this linking of Azmi to these wider concerns in 
public discourse (which are aligned with position 4 in the introduction) was not 
considered by the court which focussed strictly on applying the principles of 
discrimination law. 
 
The second of the two high-profile cases was Eweida v British Airways,
63
 where 
the right of an employee to wear Christian symbolism in the face of an 
employer’s hostility was explored. Miss Eweida was a practising Christian who 
worked part-time as a member of check-in staff for British Airways. In 2004, 
British Airways introduced a new uniform policy for customer-facing roles, 
which prohibited the wearing of any visible jewellery around the neck. However, 
exceptions were made for religious symbols which were a mandatory 
requirement of a religion and could not easily be concealed beneath the uniform. 
On this basis, Muslim women were permitted to wear the hijab-headscarf, Sikh 
men were allowed to wear turbans and Jewish men were permitted to wear the 
scull-cap. 
 
During the period 20 May to 20 September 2006, Miss Eweida attended work on 
at least three occasions with the cross visible. She concealed it when asked to do 
so.
64
 However, on 20 September, she refused to conceal the cross, and, having 
also refused an offer of alternative work involving no public contact, was 
suspended without pay. On 1 February 2007, British Airways, under pressure 
from hostile media coverage, amended its uniform policy to allow staff to display 
a religious symbol with the uniform. Two days later Eweida returned to work. 
                                                 
62 M Ssenyonjo, ‘The Islamic Veil and Freedom of Religion, the Rights to Education and Work: a 
Survey of Recent International and National Cases’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 653. 
63
 [2010] EWCA Civ 80, [2010] IRLR 322. 
64
 It was not suggested by British Airways, nor should it be assumed, that to permit the wearing 
of a ‘concealed’ cross represented any form of recognition of the importance of the symbol to the 
individual concerned. Rather, when jewellery (of any kind) was worn but concealed it was of 
little interest to the company, and so outside the parameters of the policy, as it was the outward 
image of customer-facing staff which the company was seeking to regulate. 
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She also filed a claim with the Employment Tribunal that she had been subjected 
to direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and harassment contrary to the 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, and that British Airways had 
made an unlawful deduction of wages during her period of unpaid suspension. 
 
The claim was unsuccessful at the initial tribunal and thereafter at both the EAT 
and Court of Appeal. In addressing Eweida’s claim, the Court of Appeal 
followed the EAT in identifying two key issues which were crucial to the case. 
The first of these issues concerned how far the cross could be considered to be a 
mandatory requirement of her religious belief. The second concerned how far the 
doctrine of indirect discrimination might protect a single individual as Eweida 
was alone amongst BA employees in her insistence on wearing a visible cross.
65
 
It is clear from the written judgment that the EAT recognised that Eweida’s 
desire to wear a visible cross was ‘characteristic’ of her faith and thus should be 
accorded more value than people who might wear a cross for ‘cosmetic 
reasons’66 but that it was not a ‘mandatory’ aspect of her religious beliefs. The 
Court of Appeal concurred with the latter conclusion, noting that ‘[n]either Ms 
Eweida nor any witness on her behalf suggested that the visible wearing of a 
cross was more than a personal preference on her part. There was no suggestion 
that her religious belief, however profound, called for it.’67 As the wearing of a 
cross is not mandatory for Christians thus, in forbidding the practice under a 
wider uniform policy, there was no detriment against Christians. 
 
On the second point, the EAT had concluded that as Eweida’s preference for 
wearing a cross as a religious manifestation was an individual one (which 
follows in part from the fact it was not ‘mandatory’), it could not be within the 
scope of indirect discrimination which required evidence of ‘group 
disadvantage’. Although it did recognise that such an individual preference is 
protected under the ‘religion and belief’ category, this protection was restricted 
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to direct discrimination only, where there is no minimum number of adherents 
required to trigger the available protections. This decision was criticised by some 
commentators, such as Vickers, who wrote: 
 
Although undoubtedly the traditional view is that indirect discrimination 
addresses group disadvantage rather than individual disadvantage, this may be 
inappropriate in the context of discrimination on grounds of religion and belief, 
where such belief can be very personalised.
68
 
 
Vickers suggested that there was a case for interpreting the Religion and Belief 
Regulations to include individual beliefs within the scope of indirect 
discrimination: 
 
Although the wording clearly suggests that a group must be disadvantaged, the 
inclusion of the conditional (‘would apply’; ‘would put’) means that it can, 
technically, apply to provisions that disadvantage an individual applicant and 
that would also put persons of the same view, were there to be any, at a 
disadvantage. Indeed, the parent directive is worded solely in the conditional 
(‘where an apparently neutral provision … would put persons of a particular 
religion or belief … at a particular disadvantage …’), leading some to suggest 
that it may cover individual disadvantage.
 69
 
 
Aware perhaps of such criticisms, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue head 
on and concluded, surely definitively, that the requirement for group 
disadvantage in order to find indirect discrimination remained: 
 
But there is in my judgment no indication that the Directive intended either that 
solitary disadvantage should be sufficient – the use of the plural ("persons") 
makes such a reading highly problematical – or that any requirement of plural 
disadvantage must be dropped. I see no reason, therefore to depart from the 
natural meaning of Reg. 3. That meaning … is that some identifiable section of 
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a workforce, quite possibly a small one, must be shown to suffer a particular 
disadvantage which the claimant shares.
70
 
 
Hatzis offers a sophisticated (but not entirely convincing) critique on this point, 
based on his view (which is similar to Vickers’) that the concept of indirect 
discrimination can be read more broadly to offer protections to the ‘solitary 
believer’. 71 He contends that although the primary objective of the law is to 
provide distributive (group) justice, courts are not precluded from providing an 
individual remedy. 
72
 In its submission to the ECtHR in Eweida and Chaplin v 
United Kingdom, the EHRC argues that a correct application of the relevant law 
is for the courts to establish a hypothetical comparator group by considering the 
beliefs of other people of the same religious faith but not necessarily in the same 
workforce.
73
 Such a ‘hypothetical comparator’ would of course have enabled 
Eweida to meet the plural disadvantage threshold.  
 
Significantly, the initial tribunal in Eweida did consider the potential outcome of 
the claim had indirect discrimination law been engaged and concluded that the 
employer would not have been able to show that applying its policy to the 
claimant was ‘proportionate’ as the interests involved had not been properly 
balanced.
74
 Thus, Eweida’s indirect discrimination claim would have 
succeeded.
75
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During the appeals, there were various interventions from senior church figures, 
concerned at the Eweida ruling, including this observation from the Archbishop 
of York, explaining the importance to Christians of wearing a cross: 
 
For me, the cross is important because it reminds me that God keeps his 
promises. Wearing a cross carries with it not only a symbol of our hopes but 
also a responsibility to act and to live as Christians. This symbol does not point 
only upwards but also outwards, it reminds us of our duties not only to God but 
also to one another … 76 
 
The purpose of this intervention was perhaps to provide a basis in Christian 
theology for the wearing of a visible cross. It does not, however, provide a basis 
for arguing that the wearing of a cross (whether or not it is visible to others) is in 
any sense ‘mandatory’ for Christians which, as has been seen, the courts set as 
the key test to trigger any protections for Eweida. 
 
It was noted in Chapter 4 that the necessity test is well established in human 
rights jurisprudence (albeit that, as discussed, there has been a degree of 
inconsistency, very recently, in its application by the courts). However, it is 
instructive to note in passing that an alternative test has more recently emerged in 
race discrimination law in the area of passive manifestation but in an educational 
context. In Sarika Watkins-Singh v Aberdare Girls’ High School, 77  Sarika 
Watkins-Singh, who was an observant Sikh, challenged a decision made in 2007 
by her school which prevented her from wearing a Kara bracelet on the grounds, 
inter alia, of indirect racial discrimination. The ban was initially justified, as part 
of a blanket prohibition on jewellery for reasons of health and safety. The school 
had also investigated whether or not the wearing of a Sikh Kara was a 
requirement of Watkins-Singh’s religion. Having taken advice, it suggested that 
she could carry it instead.  
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Mr Justice Silber (presiding) upheld the complaint on the basis that the school 
could not show as a justification for indirect discrimination that it was 
proportionate to deny the claimant the right to wear the Kara. Significantly, he 
concluded that the wearing of the Kara was of ‘exceptional importance’ to the 
claimant: 
 
I believe that there would be a “a particular disadvantage” or “detriment” if a 
pupil is forbidden form wearing an item when (a) that person genuinely believed 
for reasonable grounds that wearing this item was a matter of exceptional 
importance to his or her racial identity or his or her religious belief and (b) the 
wearing of this item can be shown objectively to be of exceptional importance to 
his or her religion or race, even if the wearing of the article is not an actual 
requirement of that person’s religion or race.78 
 
It is interesting to note that Silber J rejected the requirement that a practice 
should be mandatory in a given religion for full protection to apply, but rather 
substituted his own test of ‘exceptional importance’ of the practice to an 
individual’s religion. This is attested to by the sincere opinion of the individual 
concerned and also through some form of objective authentication.
 
 
 
Returning to the workplace, Eweida was followed by a similar employment 
tribunal case which received considerable publicity, involving a nurse, Shirley 
Chaplin, who took her employer, the Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation 
Trust, to an employment tribunal for religious discrimination having been told to 
remove (or conceal) a crucifix which she wore around her neck, despite having 
done so for 30 years as a nurse.
79
  
 
Chaplin argued that wearing a visible cross was ‘an outward manifestation of her 
deeply held religious conviction.’80 Her employer argued that the move was not 
specifically about the crucifix, but about health and safety concerns. Some 
                                                 
78
 ibid. [56B] (Silber J). 
79 
Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust (2010) ET Case No. 1702886/2009. 
80
 ibid. [14]. 
247 
religious items, however, could be exempted from the rule, such as Muslim 
headscarves because, suitably styled, they did not pose a health and safety risk.
81
  
The tribunal followed Eweida and dismissed the case on the basis that indirect 
discrimination could not apply as the provision, criterion or practice in question 
affected the beliefs of one person rather than ‘persons’ as the legislation requires. 
This was partly a consequence of the fact that the wearing of the cross was not 
considered mandatory for Christians; therefore the tribunal began from a position 
that it represented an individual expression of religious belief. However in 
Chaplin this decision was somewhat more problematic and led to the dissention 
of one of the wing members of the tribunal. This was because a second nurse in 
the trust, Mrs Babcock, also wore a visible cross for religious reasons, casting 
doubt on how far Chaplin’s belief could be said to be an individual one. 
However, when Mrs Babcock was asked to remove her cross and chain, she did 
so without objection in order to ‘avoid confrontation’. 82  The tribunal, by 
majority, inferred from this that only Chaplin suffered a ‘particular’ 
disadvantage; Mrs Babcock, with her apparently weaker conviction to wear a 
visible cross, suffered only ‘slight’ disadvantage.83 Thus was the tribunal able to 
exclude Mrs Babcock from the formula (of more than one person) which it 
conceded would invoke the first stage of an indirect discrimination claim.
84
  
 
To summarise, in the post-2003 case law, protections for the passive 
manifestation of religion are most likely to arise under the doctrine of indirect 
discrimination. Any protections under direct discrimination are only likely to 
arise if the employer is suspected of wilfully introducing a ‘provision, criterion 
or practice’ for which there is so little justification that the logical assumption 
can only be that the intention was to deliberately discriminate against the 
religious employees affected.
85
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Under the indirect discrimination protections, employers are required to provide 
a clear justification for restrictions on an employee’s right to manifest their 
religion through visual/symbolic means under the formula of demonstrating that 
any restrictions are ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’86 
However, this justification is likely only to be required when a particular 
manifestation is considered to be ‘mandatory’ to the religious belief invoked or 
when there is a ‘group’ of employees disadvantaged or potentially disadvantaged 
by the restriction. This means that expressions of religious belief considered to 
be ‘individual’ (such as wearing a cross) are not protected. 
Conclusion  
 
It is clear from the claims considered in this chapter, and their dogged pursuit 
through the court hierarchy, that some individuals have a strong desire to 
manifest their religious beliefs in the workplace, as elsewhere, through some 
form of passive manifestation. Such passive manifestation may represent an 
external sign of allegiance to a particular religion (as for example in Watkins-
Singh) which the individual may feel under varying degrees of obligation to 
express, or it may represent a personal decision to publicly testify to a religious 
faith (as in Eweida).  
 
It is equally clear that employers often wish to regulate such passive 
manifestation. In the consideration of the relevant case law presented in this 
chapter, a number of justifications have been offered for restrictions. Some of 
these are prima facie neutral about the symbol itself, for example restrictions 
based on health and safety (as in Singh v British Rail Engineering), or hygiene 
concerns (as in Panesar v Nestle), or where the manifestation plainly interferes 
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with a specific work role on a practical level (as in Azmi). Other justifications 
involve a judgement on the lack of congruence between particular symbols (such 
as jewellery in Eweida) and the corporate image of the organisation. Finally, 
some justifications involve an unfavourable value judgement about the meaning 
attached to the symbol itself (as in Dahlab). It is also worthy of note that in some 
cases (e.g. Chaplin), there are suspicions, at least on behalf of the claimant, that a 
neutral explanation for a restriction masks the true reason which is related to 
hostility towards the symbol itself and its meaning.  
 
The form of regulation of passive manifestation by an employer varies and it is a 
reasonable assumption that there will be a direct correlation between this and the 
justification for the regulation. For example, the restrictions in Azmi applied only 
during the process of teaching, where the wearing of the niqab was identified as 
a problem, and not at other times during the course of employment. In Dahlab, 
the restrictions applied when the teacher was visible to her pupils (i.e. all times 
when they might be negatively influenced by her headscarf). In Eweida, the 
restrictions applied whilst engaged in customer-facing roles (hence the offer to 
the claimant of alternative ‘back office’ work).  
 
Recent cases shed light on how the law is developing in response to the resultant 
clashes when employers attempt to regulate passive manifestation for the reasons 
and in the ways discussed. These will be considered here with reference to the 
models presented in Chapter 3. In broad terms, the courts have moved away from 
a laissez-faire approach of broadly accepting employer’s justifications on 
restrictions with limited inquiry (as in the original claims brought under race). 
Exactly what they have moved towards may be less clear. ECHR jurisprudence 
provides a justification for the adoption of an exclusionary approach, at least in 
certain circumstances, based on the perceived negative implications for others of 
the display of certain symbols or dress, chiefly the headscarf. Thus far at least, 
such arguments have not been entertained in the EAT or beyond where the focus 
has been on practical justifications by employers for restrictions. This is 
particularly striking in the Azmi case where arguments might have been 
employed, but were not, analogous to those in Dahlab about the proselytising 
effect on schoolgirls of wearing the full face veil.  Similarly, the recent decision 
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by the ECtHR in Lautsi, and the perceived distinction between discreet symbols 
and more overt symbols, recently affirmed in the domestic case of Watkins-
Singh, would provide arguments in favour of supporting the passive 
manifestation of Christianity as the ‘preferred historic religion’ either for reasons 
connected to national heritage and identity or because the symbolism is typically 
more discreet than for most other religions. However, no such arguments have 
been employed in the tribunals.  
 
There does, however, appear to have been movement towards Model V 
(protection), albeit in a qualified way, through the requirement that employers 
provide clear evidence that any restrictions on passive manifestation fully satisfy 
the test, under the doctrine of indirect discrimination, that they represent ‘a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’. The failure to provide such 
evidence is why, for example, the rejected prospective hairdresser who wished to 
wear a headscarf won her case. However, it would seem from the case law to 
date that ‘protection’ is in fact selective. This is due to the fact that tribunals have 
imported into discrimination law one key doctrine from ECHR case law – the 
‘necessity test’.87 Thus, for a prima facie case of indirect discrimination to be 
argued, the claimant must show that a particular form of manifestation is 
‘mandatory’ to the religious belief invoked. Alternatively, he or she must be able 
to identify an actual group of people with similar requirement for passive 
manifestation so that to deny this would result in group disadvantage. However, 
as demonstrated in Eweida, the group test, as interpreted in that case, will be very 
difficult to satisfy if the practice is not considered, at least by some, to be 
mandatory. The result of this reasoning is, as Hambler notes, to favour minority 
religions, given ‘the greater likelihood of convincing a court of the necessity of 
certain forms of visual manifestation to adherents of these particular faiths’.88 
Seen in this light, it can be argued that in relation to passive manifestation, the 
law has become most congruent with Model IV (protection for minority 
religions) presented in Chapter 3.  
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This position is clearly unsatisfactory. Of the reasons why religious employees 
might want to visually manifest their religious convictions, the application of the 
necessity test cuts away immediately any protection which might otherwise be 
available for those who feel strongly that they should publicly testify to their 
religious faith or a commitment motivated by their faith, even if their religion 
does not require this more generally.  This has potential to create considerable 
unfairness for some religious employees, above all Christians, particularly when, 
as in Eweida, employers would otherwise have considerable difficulties in 
demonstrating the proportionality of dress and grooming restrictions, and the 
religious employee would have a good chance of succeeding in her claim. 
 
In order to address this problem there may be some inspiration to be drawn from 
Judge Silber’s test of ‘exceptional importance’, although clearly not as he 
formulated it (as he explicitly excluded the Christian cross from the potential 
limits of protection). ‘Exceptional importance’ is not as strict as the necessity test 
and it may take greater account of other significant factors, such as religious 
tradition and individual religious experience (identified by Audi and discussed in 
Chapter 2), rather than simply applying the stark question of whether or not a 
practice is ‘mandatory’ to a religious belief. A movement in this direction would 
also extend protection beyond minority religions only towards the model of 
protection for religion generally (albeit qualified when employers have a genuine 
legitimate aim for restrictions and can provide a high standard of evidence that it 
is proportionate to apply them to the detriment of a particular religious 
individual). Ultimately, this would surely be the most satisfactory overall role for 
the law in this area. 
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Chapter 7: Active Manifestation 
Introduction 
 
The term ‘active manifestation’ employed in this chapter is a potentially wide-
ranging one intended to capture the different ways in which an individual might 
proactively articulate his religious convictions to others. The ‘strength’ with 
which these convictions are articulated has potential to vary greatly, both from 
individual to individual and from situation to situation. For example, a weaker 
form of articulation might involve an individual invoking God’s blessing when 
serving a customer, or offering to pray for a patient. Stronger forms might 
include speech ‘in the prophetic tradition’ to point out and rebuke the sin or 
immorality of a co-worker;
1
 or making strong moral statements concerning, for 
example, abortion or homosexuality; or explaining religious doctrine, or personal 
religious experience, to a co-worker with a view to making a conversion of that 
individual (commonly known as proselytism).
2
  
 
Active manifestation differs from negative manifestation which is essentially 
reactive to the demands of an employer. An individual who finds that her 
religious convictions are compromised by either the timing or the nature of some 
of the work which she is required to do is essentially seeking an individual ‘opt-
out’ which may have an effect on co-workers (e.g. by altering a shift rota to 
accommodate the objection) but such effect will be indirect. Active manifestation 
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will usually be proactive,
3
 with the individual directly and explicitly engaging his 
religious convictions vis-à-vis others. Active manifestation will often arise as a 
direct result of an individual’s sincerely held belief that he or she is required by 
the doctrines of his or her faith ‘to communicate religious faith to others, even if 
– in fact, perhaps precisely because – those truths disturb and unsettle those who 
hear them’.4 For example, many Christians believe that Jesus’ final words before 
the Ascension contain an ongoing mandate for all Christians to witness to, and to 
attempt to convert, non-Christians:  
 
Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the 
Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all things that I 
have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the age.
5
 
 
Active manifestation also differs from passive manifestation in that the display of 
religious convictions in visual form certainly has the potential to make an impact 
on others. However, this impact is essentially generalised in character, the 
symbols or grooming bearing a witness to groups of people in general (such as 
colleagues and clients) – particular individuals are not specifically addressed6 as 
they would tend to be when religious convictions are articulated verbally; 
equally, the impact of the symbol may be muted by its continued presence, 
whereas verbal articulation will tend to be briefer, more occasional and therefore 
of more immediate impact on others. As noted in the discussion in Chapter 4, 
active manifestation has the potential to be considered a form of harassment of 
those other actors in the workplace (such as co-workers) for whom being 
exposed to proselytism and other forms of active manifestation may create (or be 
claimed to create) a hostile environment. That said, if active manifestation is to 
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be considered a form of harassment then it is helpful to apply a distinction 
between animus and non-animus harassment.
7
 As the religious employee might 
be most fairly characterised as acting in the perceived best interests of others 
(rather than out of malign intent), then active manifestation conforms to the non-
animus category. Although a benign (or ‘non-animus’) motivation does not mean 
that employees are necessarily protected from the disciplinary consequences of 
harassment, it is clearly a factor which weighs in the judicial process in the US 
and has resulted in some judgments in favour of religious employees.
8
 This is 
surely right as there are two interests to consider – the freedom for some to be 
free from apparent ‘harassment’ on religious grounds, but also the freedom for 
others to follow the dictates of their conscience. As a result, as Berg observes, 
‘[a]lthough these proselytizing activities may offend others in the workplace, 
bans on such activities impose a serious burden on religious freedom and should 
be subject to exacting legal standards.’9 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore active manifestation in the workplace, 
and how the courts approach it, using the reference points, firstly, of the 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, and secondly, workplace cases 
under religion and belief discrimination law (some of which have been settled 
out of court). The workplace cases will be divided into three categories: (i) 
proselytism; (ii) an offer to pray for others; and (iii) religious statements which 
are condemnatory of homosexuality. This is not to suggest that other examples of 
active manifestation might be added, but the key cases (or publicised cause-
célèbres) relate to these issues. 
ECHR Jurisprudence 
 
The ECtHR has considered the legality of religious proselytism per se. A very 
significant case was Kokkinakis v Greece,
10
 which involved a challenge to a 
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Greek law which prevented proselytism in most circumstances, particularly in 
relation to the vulnerable, or where ‘inducements’ were offered. The case was 
brought by Mr Kokkinakis, who, alongside his wife, was a Jehovah's Witness. 
They had both visited the home of an orthodox Christian and Mr Kokkinakis had 
persauded her to allow them in. During the course of a subsequent discussion he 
had tried to convert her. Mr and Mrs Kokkinakis were duly convicted of 
proselytism (Mrs Kokkinakis being acquitted on appeal). Mr Kokkinakis claimed 
before the ECtHR, inter alia, that his Article 9 freedoms had been violated by 
Greece. 
 
Although the Greek law in question did not outlaw all forms of proselytism, the 
ECtHR helpfully addressed the question of whether or not proselytism itself 
could be considered to be legitimate and determined that it could: 
 
First of all, a distinction has to be made between bearing Christian witness and 
improper proselytism. The former corresponds to true evangelism, which a 
report drawn up in 1956 under the auspices of the World Council of Churches 
describes as an essential mission and a responsibility of every Christian and 
every Church.
11
  
 
This is an important statement as it upholds the legitimacy of ‘bearing witness’ to 
others as an essential Christian duty at both a corporate and an individual level. 
The Court also explicitly concluded that ‘bearing witness’ can be considered a 
manifestation of religion and therefore falls under the protections of Article 9.
12
 
In so doing, it also argued that the act of witnessing to others was also justifiable 
on the basis that persuasion might be a necessary catalyst for an individual to 
exercise his freedom to change his religious beliefs (another fundamental 
freedom under Article 9 ECHR): 
 
According to Article 9 (art. 9), freedom to manifest one’s religion is not only 
exercisable in community with others, “in public” and within the circle of those 
whose faith one shares, but can also be asserted “alone” and “in private”; 
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furthermore, it includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, 
for example through “teaching”, failing which, moreover, “freedom to change 
[one’s] religion or belief”, enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), would be likely to 
remain a dead letter.
13
  
 
Thus, according to the Court’s reasoning, the right to ‘bear witness’ (or engage in 
‘true evangelism’) is both a manifestation of an individual believer’s religion and 
also necessary to non-believers and other-believers because, without it, the 
Article 9 rights of the latter groups (allowing the opportunity to change religion) 
would not be fully exercisable. 
 
The actual aim of the disputed Greek law was however upheld. Seeking to 
restrain ‘improper proselytism’, in order to ‘protect the rights and freedoms of 
others’, was considered by the ECtHR to be an appropriate purpose for national 
governments.
14
 In this case, however, the Greek courts had failed to specify in 
what way Mr Kokkinakis had behaved ‘improperly’ and neither did the facts 
support that finding.  
 
Therefore, the ECtHR has categorised proselytism in two ways – ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ respectively, and only the first category enjoys full protection as a 
manifestation of religion.
 15
 The Court did give some guidance on what might 
constitute improper proselytism: 
 
The latter represents a corruption or deformation of it. It may, according to the 
same report, take the form of activities offering material or social advantages 
with a view to gaining new members for a Church or exerting improper pressure 
on people in distress or in need; it may even entail the use of violence or 
brainwashing; more generally, it is not compatible with respect for the freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion of others.
16
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This guidance is useful to a certain extent – it suggests that proselytism will be 
improper when it involves bribing or pressurising people in vulnerable situations. 
However, as it is couched in generalised terms, it can rightly be criticised as 
leaving ‘too much room for a repressive interpretation’ and more precise and 
specific definition by the Court would have been helpful.
17
 However, this is no 
easy task.
18
 
 
Another and subsequent case again involving a challenge to the same Greek law, 
Larissis and others v Greece,
19
 directly relates to employment, albeit to the very 
specific employment context of the military. In this case a group of Airforce 
Officers, who were Pentecostal Christians, were convicted of seeking to convert 
to the Christian faith some amongst the junior ranks who were under their 
command, by repeatedly inviting them to church and by initiating discussions on 
religious matters. They applied to the Court on the basis of an interference with 
Article 9.  
 
The Court agreed with the applicants that that their convictions for proselytism 
amounted to interferences with the exercise of their rights to manifest their 
religion but it found that such interference was justified. Although there was no 
‘evidence that the applicants used threats or inducements’, 20  the Court 
nevertheless considered that the activities of the officers involved improper 
proselytism. In so determining, it focussed on the imbalance of power between 
the officers and the airmen in the context of ‘military life’: 
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In this respect, the Court notes that the hierarchical structures which are a 
feature of life in the armed forces may colour every aspect of the relations 
between military personnel, making it difficult for a subordinate to rebuff the 
approaches of an individual of superior rank or to withdraw from a conversation 
initiated by him. Thus, what would in the civilian world be seen as an innocuous 
exchange of ideas which the recipient is free to accept or reject, may, within the 
confines of military life, be viewed as a form of harassment or the application of 
undue pressure in abuse of power.
21
 
 
As Evans put it: ‘[s]uch cases raise complex issues of competing rights, where it 
is not clear why one set of rights should take precedence over another.’22 In this 
case the sense of obligation to promote Christian beliefs felt by the Pentecostal 
officers, irrespective of the military environment, was clearly subordinated by a 
national government to the rights of non-religious (or other-religious) airmen to 
be free of proselytism. It could also be argued that other rights of the airmen had 
been infringed as, by the Court’s own reasoning in Kokkinakis, an absence of 
proselytism may have a negative impact on the right to change religion.   
 
The decision in this case is clearly intended to have an application to the military 
environment only, with its ‘hierarchical structures’ and given the nature of the 
power differentials between officers and other ranks. However, it is difficult to 
accept the implication that the civilian world is entirely different. In most 
employment contexts, for example, hierarchy and power differentials exist and 
may affect relationships between employees of different levels of seniority, albeit 
not necessarily to the same degree as in military organisations. It might, for 
example, be ‘difficult’, in the words of the Court, for a junior employee ‘to 
rebuff the approaches’ of a manager ‘or withdraw from a conversation initiated 
by him.’ Indeed, the significance of organisational hierarchy in claims for 
religious harassment (because of unwelcome proselytism) has been recognised in 
the civilian workplace in the USA. For example, in Chalmers v Tulon Co,
23
 a 
court stated that an employee’s supervisory position heightened the possibility 
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that her religious speech could create a hostile work environment for more junior 
employees. There remains therefore a question as to how far the reasoning in 
Kokkinakis might in fact be applicable beyond the military employment context 
into a civilian employment context as this has yet to be tested.  
Employment Discrimination Cases 
Proselytism  
Case law in the UK concerning this form of manifestation is at an early stage. 
There is only one relevant case which has gone beyond the initial tribunal level - 
Chondol v Liverpool City Council.
24
 In this case, a social worker contested the 
decision of his employer to dismiss him on the basis, inter alia, that he 
inappropriately promoted his religious beliefs to ‘service users’. This charge 
related to two instances: in the first, Chondol apparently gave a Bible to a service 
user; in the second, he appeared to have engaged in a conversation with a 
different service user in which, according to a subsequent complaint, ‘he was 
talking about God and church and crap like that’.25 These incidents took place in 
2006.  
Chondol was dismissed, following a disciplinary investigation, on 24 May 
2007.
26
 He subsequently brought proceedings before an employment tribunal for 
unfair dismissal and religious discrimination. The tribunal rejected his claims and 
the Employment Appeals Tribunal upheld that finding.  
 
The EAT found that Chondol was ‘aware that the Council prohibited the overt 
promotion by social workers in the course of their work of any religious beliefs 
that they might hold.’27  It also appeared to be common ground between the 
parties that this restriction amounted to a reasonable management instruction.  
Thus, Chondol did not dispute that his employer was entitled to discipline him 
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for sharing his religious views with clients. Chondol’s defence, in respect of the 
first incident, was that he had provided a Bible in response to a specific request; 
and that, regarding the second incident, he had simply asked the question as to 
whether or not the service-user believed in God or went to church.
28
 The 
employment tribunal (endorsed by the EAT) clearly found this explanation 
insufficient and determined that he was fairly dismissed for ‘improperly foisting 
[his beliefs] on service users’ rather than for holding those beliefs himself.29 
 
The rationale for the prohibition on ‘promoting’ religious belief is found in 
Chondol’s dismissal letter: 
 
[W]hile undoubtedly religious beliefs can potentially be an important factor in 
an individual’s life, this is not the case for everyone.  A social worker acting in a 
professional capacity should not be placing an emphasis on religious beliefs that 
is out of proportion to a consideration of the many other factors that impinge on 
an individual’s wellbeing.  An over emphasis on religion could cause distress to 
service users who are already in a fragile mental state.
30
 
 
No internal policy document was presented as an exhibit in support of this 
stance; neither was any reference made to the social workers’ professional code 
of practice.
31
 This latter document, in its current form, does not in fact offer any 
specific guidance on religious expression, and provides rather generalised 
guidelines only to the effect that a social worker ‘must protect the rights and 
promote the interests of service users and carers’, which, inter alia, involves 
‘[r]especting diversity and different cultures and values’.32  
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It is interesting that the position adopted in the dismissal letter was never 
challenged. Not only would the letter itself appear to be an example of policy-
making on the hoof (and thus procedurally unfair, particularly in a situation 
involving a conduct dismissal), the content of the letter may be considered 
objectionable as it requires that social workers suppress any sense of obligation 
to share their faith with those they meet, even by apparently ‘light touch’ means 
(such as offering to give someone a Bible). It is seemingly taken as a given in 
this case that sharing religious beliefs, even in tactful and sensitive ways, is liable 
to cause ‘distress’ to others and impinge on their rights to avoid religious 
discourse.  
Another case, which was not subject to an appeal hearing, concerned an ex-
employee of the Young Men’s Christian Association, Monaghan, who had been 
dismissed from his job as a temporary manager for proselytism, having ignored 
an instruction from his manager ‘that he should not try to convert people to the 
Christian faith’ as he ‘did not want the people who the respondent served being 
subjected to attempts to convert them.’ He claimed, inter alia, direct 
discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief.
33
 As this was a direct 
discrimination claim, the tribunal considered the issue of a comparator and found 
that the manager’s attitude would have been the same regardless of an 
employee’s religious beliefs. As a result, Monaghan had not been discriminated 
against because he was a Christian per se as his manager would have taken the 
same action had he attempted to convert people to other religions. As the tribunal 
put it: ‘[t]he grounds were not the religion or belief of the claimant, but the fact 
that he was trying to convert people which was against the principles of the 
respondent.’34 Monaghan therefore lost his direct discrimination claim.  
Monaghan and Chondol involved claims for direct religious discrimination and 
these were given short shrift for the reasons noted. With hindsight, it is surprising 
that the claimants did not also bring claims for indirect discrimination which 
would have required the employer to demonstrate the proportionality of imposing 
a requirement which had an adverse impact on Christians. 
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Both direct and indirect discrimination claims were, however, brought in similar 
circumstances in Amachree v Wandsworth Borough Council. In this case, a 
homelessness housing officer, Duke Amachree, brought a complaint of 
discrimination and unfair dismissal following the termination of his job at 
Wandsworth Borough Council. A disciplinary investigation leading to his 
eventual dismissal, followed from a complaint by a ‘service user’ in January 
2009, who was seeking housing advice, and was interviewed by Amachree. The 
tribunal referred to her as ‘Ms X’.35 During the course of the interview, Ms X 
revealed that she had a chronic illness and needed to live near a hospital as a 
result. According to the complaint by Ms X, Amachree then ‘proceeded to give 
[her] a half hour lecture on the fact that there was no such thing as incurable 
illness, doctors should never be trusted, that [her] problem was that [she] did not 
have God or faith in [her] life and so was ill as a result.’36 This left her feeling 
‘shocked’ and ‘upset’.37 Amachree’s own account was softer in tone but not 
materially different in substance, except that his recollection was of a much 
shorter conversation.
38
 
The Council took the view that this alleged conversation was a serious offence 
under the relevant disciplinary code such that Amachree might be summarily 
dismissed, and suspended him pending investigation.
39
 It was however later 
pointed out before the employment tribunal that there was no actual written 
policy or guidance about raising religious (or any other) issues with service 
users,
40
 and indeed no guidance of this kind was produced in evidence by the 
respondent. This is arguably an important point which was worthy of greater 
consideration by the tribunal than it received. As Berg points out, where 
employers have no clear over-arching ‘content-neutral’ policy concerning 
employee speech, then ‘a danger exists than the employer’s restriction of speech 
will be selective’ (i.e. more likely to be punitive in the case of religious speech 
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than other forms of speech).
 41
 This argument might have been put (and 
considered) more strongly than was the case. Equally, it could be argued that the 
absence of clear employee guidelines should substantially increase the burden on 
the employer to show that gross misconduct was a reasonable finding on 
investigation, as the employee was patently not engaging in activity which was 
expressly forbidden. 
Amachree was supported by the Christian Legal Centre
42
 who provided a solicitor to 
accompany him to his internal disciplinary hearings. During the course of one of 
these hearings, the solicitor asked two pertinent questions, designed to probe the 
extent of the application of the apparent policy: firstly, would there be a problem 
manifesting a belief ‘physically’ (giving the example of a turban)?; and, secondly, 
would it be acceptable to say ‘God bless’ as a valedictory greeting? No response to 
the first question is recorded in the judgment, but the response to the second was that 
it would not be appropriate.
43
  
 
Following this meeting, and with Amachree’s consent, the Christian Legal Centre 
issued a somewhat inflammatory press release, headed: ‘London Homelessness 
Prevention Officer told “say God bless” and we’ll sack you.’44 The press release itself 
contained information about Ms X, including the fact she was homeless and had a 
chronic health condition. Further newspaper articles, for which Amachree was 
thought to have been a key source, provided more information about the woman’s 
age, health condition and occupation to the point where she could be identified by at 
least one person who knew her father.
45
  What this meant for Amachree, still at this 
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stage an employee, was that the employer had a much more powerful case for his 
dismissal, this time on the grounds of breach of the confidentiality which a service 
user was entitled to expect.
46
  
 
At length, Amachree was dismissed on two counts of gross misconduct: the original 
incident itself, and the subsequent breach of Ms X’s confidentiality. 47  At the 
employment tribunal, Amachree claimed direct and indirect discrimination and unfair 
dismissal. The direct discrimination claim was unsuccessful on the familiar grounds 
that the employer had not penalised Amachree because of his religious beliefs but 
because of his actions. This was of course predictable in the light of preceding cases, 
particularly Chondol. The claim for indirect discrimination was however made 
imaginatively, including the submission that for the Council to instigate a policy 
prohibiting religious discussion amounted to a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) 
which had an adverse impact on Christians, putting them at a particular disadvantage 
compared to people of other religious faiths, agnostics or atheists. The rationale for 
this contention was that Christians are uniquely required, by virtue of their faith, to 
‘live out’ their religious beliefs ‘in both word and deed’.48  
 
This argument was dismissed by the tribunal on the basis that other religions required 
a similar commitment by followers live their lives in conformity to religious 
teachings. This is of course a reasonable conclusion and with hindsight it is perhaps 
regrettable that the claimant’s case that he was obliged to ‘live out’ his faith was 
constructed so widely, rather than focussing on a more specific Christian obligation to 
‘bear witness’ verbally to others. It should be noted however, that the tribunal did 
consider this possibility, although not asked to do so, and opined that a narrower rule 
preventing proselytism would also adversely affect other religions in the same way.
49
 
This point is of course contentious, but the relevant arguments were not raised. This is 
a pity because there is an argument that Christians, for whom there are no mandatory 
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religious dress or grooming requirements, receive no benefit from religious 
accommodations by employers which allow for these aspects only.
50
 Instead, they 
may feel mandated to articulate their beliefs to others verbally. Although the rules 
were not expressly set out in policy terms in this case, it is apparent from the 
responses to questions by the Christian Legal Centre solicitor that Wandsworth 
Borough Council’s emergent policy prevented verbal rather than visual expression.  
This suggests that the policy could indeed be construed as having a differential 
adverse impact on Christians vis-à-vis people of other faiths, contrary to the 
reasoning of the tribunal. However, this would only meet the first part of the test for 
indirect discrimination. The second is of course the employer’s justification. In this 
case, the tribunal argued that Wandsworth would in any event be able to justify its 
position as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. As it stated: 
 
Further, if there were any evidence of disparate impact, it was the tribunal’s 
assessment that … a practice of not allowing the discussion of irrelevant matters at 
interviews was legitimate – namely to ensure that a professional, focused, efficient 
and cost-effective service was delivered to members of the public – and that this was 
achieved by the proportionate means of preventing staff from straying off the 
relevant subject matter.
51
  
 
The claim for unfair dismissal also failed, but this was chiefly a result of the breach of 
confidentiality, the tribunal expressing doubts as to whether or not to dismiss 
Amachree on the sole basis of his remarks to Ms X would meet the test of 
reasonableness.
52
 This is a highly significant point, suggesting that if discrimination 
law cannot provide protection to individuals dismissed for verbally articulating their 
religious convictions, there remains the possibility that the unfair dismissal 
protections of the Employment Rights Act might.
53
 If this were to be adopted as a 
standard by a higher court, it would also suggest that employers may be limited in 
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how far they can go in reacting to verbal religious expression, even in situations 
involving clients. It may be, for example, that a warning is considered to be more 
proportionate than a summary dismissal.
54
 It is also rather salutatory to note that 
Amachree was, with hindsight, poorly advised by the Christian Legal Centre in the 
decision to put the case in the media spotlight,
55
 presumably with the intention of 
putting pressure on Wandsworth Borough Council to drop their disciplinary 
proceedings – a tactic which backfired to the extent of providing a basis for his 
dismissal which the tribunal considered to be well within the employer’s band of 
reasonable responses.
56
 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, professional employment is governed by regulation as well as 
employment law, and the case of Dr Richard Scott involved the alleged contravention 
of the latter, established by the General Medical Council.
 57
 Scott was one of six 
Christian partners in Bethesda Medical Centre, a general medical practice in Kent. 
The Christian character of the practice, and its bearing on the service patients are 
likely to receive, is clear from its stated aims: 
 
The six partners are all practising Christians from a variety of churches and their faith 
guides the way in which they view their work and responsibilities to the patients and 
employees. The Partners feel that the offer of talking to you on spiritual matters is of 
great benefit. If you do not wish this, that is your right and will not affect your 
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medical care. Please tell the doctor (or drop a note to the Practice Manager) if you do 
not wish to speak on matters of faith.
58
 
 
These aims were publicised on the practice website. 
 
In 2011 a complaint to the General Medical Council that he was ‘pushing religion’ 
was brought against Dr Scott by the mother of a 24 year old patient (but on his 
behalf).  Dr Scott had reportedly told the patient that ‘[he] had something to offer 
[the patient] which would cure him for good and that this was his one and only 
hope in recovery’ and that ‘his own religion could not offer him any protection 
and that no other religion in the world could offer [the patient] what Jesus could 
offer him’. 59  Following an investigatory hearing, Dr Scott was given a formal 
warning for failing to meet the standards expected of a doctor, having ‘sought to 
impose [his] own beliefs on [his] patient [and] thereby caused the patient distress 
through insensitive expression of [ ] religious beliefs.’60 
 
The case is interesting in two ways. The first is the conclusion reached by the GMC, 
that Dr Scott was in breach of professional guidelines by discussing his religious 
beliefs with his patient. The relevant section in the GMC’s binding guidance on good 
practice relating to a doctor’s religion and belief states that: ‘You must not express to 
your patients your personal beliefs, including political, religious or moral beliefs, in 
ways that exploit their vulnerability or that are likely to cause them distress.’61 
Supplementary guidance offers slightly more detail: 
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You should not normally discuss your personal beliefs with patients unless those 
beliefs are directly relevant to the patient’s care. You must not impose your beliefs on 
patients, or cause distress by the inappropriate or insensitive expression of religious, 
political or other beliefs or views.  Equally, you must not put pressure on patients to 
discuss or justify their beliefs (or the absence of them).
62
 
 
The problem in this case is one of interpretation. The guidelines are clearly not rigid; 
if they were, there would be an explicit prohibition on discussions involving a 
medical practitioner’s religious beliefs. Instead, the guidelines appear to allow scope 
for such discussions. Indeed the guidelines were broadly welcomed by the Christian 
Medical Fellowship, at the time of drafting, on the basis that there was an implicit 
recognition in the guidelines that expressing religious beliefs can be considered 
legitimate: 
 
We support the view  … that doctors should not ‘impose’ their beliefs, and likewise 
that there should not be ‘inappropriate...expression’ of them. But the use of the word 
‘inappropriate’ means that there must be possible [sic] an expression of beliefs which 
is ‘appropriate’. We are glad the GMC recognises this. 63 
 
Whilst the restrictions on doctors expressing their beliefs are not definitive, they 
clearly revolve around concepts such as the apparent vulnerability of patients; the 
sensitivity with which a doctor expresses her beliefs; and the relevance of these 
beliefs to patient care. The latter is particularly problematic as a Christian doctor 
might see what she believes to be Christian truths as highly relevant to an individual 
patient’s health and well-being (perhaps particularly mental health) in a way that 
others might not. This would appear, prima facie, to leave a large degree of discretion 
to individual practitioners. Dr Scott’s interpretation of his actions was that they were 
within the margins afforded to him by the guidance, and he would appear to have a 
reasonable basis for this belief; the GMC apparently differed.  
                                                 
62
 General Medical Council, Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice (March 2008), s 19; copy at: 
<<http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/personal_beliefs.asp>>, accessed 27 
February 2012. 
63
 Christian Medical Fellowship, An online submission from the Christian Medical Fellowship to 
Personal Beliefs and Medical Practice – GMC Consultation (25 September 2007); copy at: << 
http://www.cmf.org.uk/publicpolicy/submissions/?id=47>>, accessed 2 May 2012. 
269 
 
The second issue follows from the first. The interpretation of the relevant guidance by 
the GMC in Dr Scott’s case was certainly a restrictive one to the point where it seems 
difficult to envisage how the Bethesda Medical Centre would be able to continue to 
act upon its aim of talking to patients about spiritual matters (unless the patients 
choose to ‘opt out’ of this). Among the religious liberty issues at stake here is the 
notional right of individuals to group together into islands of exclusivity – here, for 
Christian doctors to work together to provide what they regard as a Christian medical 
service to the community. This right, in its fullest form, is significantly curtailed if 
they are prevented from articulating their Christian beliefs, and the value of these, to 
patients.  
An offer to pray 
 
The Scott case relates to a form of proselytism, a proactive sharing of religious 
convictions with patients. As discussed in the introduction, there are other forms of 
active manifestation in the workplace. Employees may, for example, wish to invoke 
God’s blessing when dealing with others,64 or they may wish to pray for others. How 
far making an offer to pray for someone during the course of employment leads to the 
risk of disciplinary action was illustrated in the case of a Christian nurse, Caroline 
Petrie, who was suspended from her work as a community bank nurse at North 
Somerset Primary Care Trust following complaints that she had offered to pray for an 
elderly patient after visiting her home. She was suspended pending investigation for 
misconduct by the Trust on the basis that she had failed to meet her obligations in 
respect of equality and diversity under the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) 
code.
65
 This was apparently the second incident in which Petrie had been accused of 
transgressing the code – a year earlier she had been reprimanded for handing a prayer 
card to a patient.
66
 The NMC code is much briefer than the GMC equivalent. There 
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are two relevant sections. The first states that the nurse ‘must demonstrate a personal 
and professional commitment to equality and diversity’.67 Quite what is meant by 
‘equality and diversity’ is left unexplained. Perhaps more problematically still, 
whatever it means, nurses are apparently required to demonstrate both a ‘personal’ 
and a ‘professional’ commitment to it. Whilst the latter might be unsurprising, 
representing the public attitude of the nurse, the former is more troubling as it appears 
to transgress into the forum internum – the private and personal beliefs and 
convictions of an individual. It is submitted that this is likely to contravene the 
ECHR.
68
 The second relevant section states that the nurse must not use his or her 
‘professional status to promote causes that are not related to health’.69 In its plain 
meaning, this certainly may be interpreted as preventing straightforward 
‘proselytism’ (i.e. seeking to convert others to a religious belief). Such a prohibition 
seems in keeping also with the spirit of rather poorly written guidelines intended to 
have general effect amongst NHS employees (albeit that they confusingly conflate 
together proselytism, religious discussions and religiously motivated comments about 
sexual orientation): 
 
Members of some religions, including Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, evangelical 
Christians and Muslims, are expected to preach and to try to convert other people. In 
a workplace environment this can cause many problems, as non-religious people and 
those from other religions or beliefs could feel harassed and intimidated by this 
behaviour. This is especially the case when particular views on matters such as 
sexual orientation, gender and single parents are aired in a workplace environment, 
potentially causing great offence to other workers or indeed patients or visitors who 
are within hearing. To avoid misunderstandings and complaints on this issue, it 
should be made clear to everyone from the first day of training and/or employment, 
and regularly restated, that such behaviour, notwithstanding religious beliefs, could 
be construed as harassment under the disciplinary and grievance procedures.
70
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However, it is difficult to see how Petrie’s offer of prayer, by comparison to 
proselytism a relatively unobtrustive expression of religious belief, can be said to fall 
within the definitions of either ‘promotion’ of her beliefs (under the NMC 
guidelines), or of proselytism (under the wider NHS guidelines), except by a very 
broad and creative construction by her managers.  
Petrie’s case was taken up by the Christian Legal Centre and given widespread 
publicity.
71
 At length, Petrie was reinstated by the Trust which issued a statement that 
it now recognised that ‘[i]t is acceptable to offer spiritual support as part of care when 
the patient asks for it.’72  This represented some movement away from absolute 
hostility to verbal religious expression, but was still too restrictive for Petrie, and by 
extension others with similar beliefs. As Petrie reportedly said, ‘I cannot divide my 
faith from my nursing care’.73   
However, although Petrie herself was unwilling to separate her work from her 
religious convictions, some recent research into the ‘identities’ of student nursing 
staff with religious convictions suggests that many others, perhaps particularly those 
being inducted into the NHS culture, have felt forced into implementing just such a 
divide between their professional and private selves. The authors of the research 
concluded:  
 
The participants in our research adopted two modes of presenting themselves. In the 
hospital, they put on a front which was professionally acceptable by concealing the 
religious beliefs that they perceived as a possible cause of conflicts between values. 
Where there was the possibility of conflict, particularly in the practice setting, the 
students adopted a ‘conventional’ nursing identity, being careful about whether and 
                                                                                                                                    
<<http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/documents/digitalasset/dh_09
3132.pdf>>, accessed 27 February 2012. 
71
 See <http://www.christianconcern.com/cases/caroline-petrie>, accessed 27 February 2012. On 
this occasion personal details about the patient who complained were not made public. 
72
 Caroline Gammell, ‘Nurse Caroline Petrie: I will continue praying for patients’ The Daily 
Telegraph (London, 7 February 2009); copy at: << 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/4537452/Nurse-Caroline-Petrie-I-will-continue-
praying-for-patients.html>>, accessed 27 February 2012. 
73
 ibid. 
272 
how they presented their beliefs. However … the students were able to return to their 
‘true’ identity as religious people when they joined fellow believers in their Sunday 
congregations.”74  
 
It may be that a combination of specific policy, and also the ‘chilling effect’ of cases 
like that involving Caroline Petrie, have resulted in a reluctance by some religious 
employees to make their faith convictions known in workplaces like the NHS.  
 
Active expression and sexual orientation 
 
As noted in the NHS guidelines, it is recognised that some employees may ‘actively 
manifest’ their religious beliefs by expressing a critical view of aspects of some 
people’s lifestyles or conduct. This may be directed specifically to other actors in the 
workplace (for example by sending letters to fellow employees pointing out particular 
sins they were thought to be committing).
75
 Alternatively, it may be generalised, but 
might offend particular groups of people (such as supporters of abortion).
76
 Most 
interest in public discourse has been where religious views are expressed which are 
critical of homosexuality. Such views are almost invariably labelled ‘homophobic’ 
and, outside the workplace sphere, even mildly critical views have triggered police 
investigations in response to complaints of ‘homophobic hate speech’.77 Within the 
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workplace itself, workers are protected from harassment under the protected 
characteristic of sexual orientation.
78
 However, the right to be critical of homosexual 
behaviour is also an aspect of religious expression and as such is likely to fall within 
the notional protections for the protected characteristic of religion and belief. In 
consequence, there are competing rights at play.
 79
 It would appear from the cases 
which follow in this section that a likely outcome is that sexual orientation rights are 
generally to be preferred over religious expression and thus ‘homophobic speech’ is 
likely to be forbidden in most workplaces (e.g. the NHS), certainly those with 
discrimination or harassment policies in place. Quite how ‘homophobic speech’ is 
defined, and with what enthusiasm it is punished, are of course different questions. 
 
In an early case under the 2003 Religion and Belief Regulations, Apelogun Gabriels, 
who had worked for the London Borough of Lambeth,
80
 claimed that his dismissal 
for distributing ‘homophobic material’ to co-workers was unfair.81 He also claimed, 
inter alia, direct and indirect religious discrimination. Gabriels was a lay preacher and 
he also organised prayer meetings for Christian staff which were held (by permission) 
on council premises. During one such prayer meeting, Gabriels presented a hand-out 
to participants which contained verses which he had selected from the Bible which 
were critical of homosexual activity. The hand-outs were also shared with a small 
number of co-workers who were not members of the prayer group and were seen by 
some other staff members who, finding them offensive on the grounds of sexual 
orientation made an official complaint. Following this complaint, Gabriels was 
subject to the disciplinary process and was, at length, dismissed for reasons of gross 
misconduct.  
  
It is unsurprising that Gabriels was disciplined, given that he allowed material which 
was offensive on the grounds of sexual orientation to be promulgated, quite 
unnecessarily, outside of the prayer group forum. Nevertheless, the decision to 
dismiss him may have been unduly harsh. The material he circulated was not targeted 
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against particular co-workers and, although apparently rather careless, it was not 
suggested that he deliberately handed the material to people who he expected to be 
offended by it. 
 
Whilst both the employer and, subsequently, the tribunal took seriously the right of 
gay and lesbian staff to be free from harassment, both appeared to take the competing 
claim - the right of a Christian employee to quote Bible verses – rather less seriously, 
to the extent that this right barely weighed at all in the decision making process. 
Indeed the tribunal appeared to have difficulty with the Bible itself, commenting, ‘the 
Tribunal considered the wording of the selected extracts from the Bible involved to 
be uncompromising and strongly condemnatory of homosexual conduct.’ 82  It is 
submitted that this is a concerning observation by the employment tribunal. As 
Hambler comments: 
 
As it is not easy to find references to homosexuality within the plain meaning of the 
Bible which are not in some way ‘uncompromising and strongly condemnatory’ it is 
difficult quite to see what the tribunal was driving at here except unwisely to do what 
in effect the Court of Appeal in Amicus v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
refused to do and seek to exclude ‘homophobic verses’ of the Bible from acceptable 
discourse.
83
 
 
It may be that tribunals should more sensitive to Lord Walker’s guidance that ‘in 
matters of human rights, the court should not show liberal tolerance only to tolerant 
liberals’,84 and appreciate that religious views (for example, about homosexuality), 
which many people consider to be beyond the pale, find a basis in a legitimate 
understanding of sacred texts. This is not to suggest that religious employees should 
have carte blanche to air these views whenever they wish in the workplace. 
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However, the mere fact that these views are expressed should not tilt the outcome of a 
disciplinary investigation or a tribunal hearing before other factors are taken into 
consideration. There is a strong hint of this in the Apelogun Gabriels decision.
85
 
 
Whereas in Apelogun Gabriels it was clear that the ‘active manifestation’ took 
place within the workplace and in work time, the boundaries between work time 
and an employee’s ‘own time’ may not always be immediately evident. For 
example, a shift worker in a care home, David Booker, was reportedly suspended 
in 2009 after a co-worker complained about his Christian views on homosexual 
clergy and same-sex marriages which had come to light during a ‘wide-ranging 
conversation’ between the two workers during a night shift.86 How far such a 
conversation can be said to have been a work conversation and how far a private 
one is not entirely clear-cut, taking place as it did in a work environment but 
voluntarily between two people during a period well outside of normal working 
hours, and where the work itself clearly did not require concentrated attention.
87
 
As a result, suspension (with the possibility of dismissal) might be considered a 
somewhat heavy-handed response by the employer. 
 
A further example illustrative of the apparent grey area between private and 
public conduct is the High Court action brought by Adrian Smith, a housing 
manager and committed Christian, who worked for Trafford Housing Trust and 
                                                 
85
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who was demoted with a 40% reduction in pay as a disciplinary sanction.
88
 This 
was because he had made comments on his Facebook site mildly critical of the 
prospect that same-sex marriages might be conducted in church. The Trust 
argued, inter alia, that posting such comments on Facebook had the potential to 
prejudice the reputation of the Trust and breached the staff code of conduct (by 
promoting religious views to colleagues and customers);
89
 and that this amounted 
to gross misconduct.
 90
 
  
Significantly, Briggs J., who found that Mr Smith had been wrongfully 
dismissed, determined that, although on his Facebook page Mr Smith had listed 
his occupation as a manager at the Trafford Housing Trust, no reasonable reader 
would thereby conclude that his postings were made on the Trust’s behalf.91 He 
also considered that there was no realistic damage to the reputation of the Trust 
by association with the comments, given that they were made by an employee in 
a private capacity, outside working hours and in a moderate way.
92
  
 
Briggs J. also dealt with the issue of to what extent the Trust could legitimately 
claim that its code of conduct applied beyond the workplace to govern the 
opinions expressed on Smith’s own Facebook page and accessible to colleagues, 
concluding that it did not: 
 
… it was his colleagues' choice, rather than his, to become his friends, and that it 
was the mere happenstance of their having become aware of him at work that 
led them to do so. [Smith] was in principle free to express his religious and 
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political views on his Facebook, provided he acted lawfully, and it was for the 
recipients to choose whether or not to receive them.
93
 
 
He also opined that an employer’s prohibition on the promotion of religious 
views could only apply within the workplace because of the clear ‘potential to 
interfere with the employee's rights of freedom of expression and belief’ if the 
employer attempted to apply it to an employee’s non-work activities.94 He did 
acknowledge some (presumably rare) exceptions to this rule, such as the sending 
of an email from home targeted at work colleagues.
95
 
 
Although the facts of this case arguably made the decision clear-cut, the 
judgment is nonetheless welcome for making it clear that an employer cannot 
normally fetter an employee’s religious expression outside of the workplace, 
with a particular emphasis on the private use of social media. Whether or not an 
employer would be acting reasonably if it attempted to fetter ‘moderate’ religious 
expression (like that of Smith) within the workplace remains however an issue to 
be properly tested in a court or tribunal in the future (although the analysis in the 
Smith judgment gives a hint that perhaps it would not be). 
Conclusion 
Specific issues arising 
 
In this chapter, a range of examples of ‘active manifestation’ have been considered, 
and how both employers and tribunals have responded. In this section, some general, 
and tentative, observations will be made on the basis of these examples. 
 
The first point to note is the apparently hostile reaction by some employers to active 
manifestation. In one sense this is not surprising, given the legal framework in place. 
As Berg notes with reference to the US (but with equal applicability to the UK): 
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Remember that religious speech is, at least potentially, singled out for special 
limitation in the workplace by the very existence of anti-harassment rules. ... 
Without the duty to accommodate weighing in the balance, the law arguably 
creates incentives for employers to restrict religious speech.
 96
 
 
As there is no specific duty to accommodate (except that very weak version which 
can be inferred from the first stage of the test for indirect discrimination),
97
 it is 
perhaps unsurprising that many employers have taken a hostile stance which is in this 
sense the easiest option. However, such a policy may be short-sighted for other 
reasons as it entails a failure to recognise the malign effects on employee morale of 
using workplace regulation to outlaw religious speech in total.
98
  
 
The second point to note from evidence considered in this chapter is that some 
employers appear not only to be hostile to active religious expression but seem to 
over-react when faced with examples of it. This is particularly evident in the various 
decisions to dismiss staff often for a one-off incident. Although tribunals have been 
reluctant to find dismissals in such circumstances unfair, it is noteworthy that in 
Amachree the tribunal strongly implied that dismissal for the ‘incident’ of proselytism 
itself would not be reasonable. Such an over-reaction creates injustice for the 
religious employees concerned and may intimidate other staff to hide their religious 
beliefs in the workplace for fear of possible consequences. 
 
The third point to note is that, in the (admittedly limited) evidence considered in this 
chapter, employers may not always seek to draw distinctions between different forms 
of active manifestation, particularly in the interpretation of their policies. Thus, in the 
NHS, an offer to pray for a patient may be seen in a similar light as an attempt to 
convert that patient. This suggests, inter alia, that the ECHR concepts of ‘proper’ and 
‘improper’ proselytism have not percolated downwards to inform policy making and 
interpretation. Not employing this dichotomy has potential advantages and 
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disadvantages. In this instance it is the disadvantages which are in play, as a failure to 
distinguish between milder forms of religious expression, such as an offer to pray (to 
which it might be argued no reasonable person could legitimately take offence) and 
stronger forms (where there might be legitimate objection), merely results in the 
suppression by employers of both.  
 
However, to rely without further discrimination on a straightforward dichotomy 
between proselytism (forbidden) and expression short of proselytism (permitted), 
could also lead to injustice. A proposed way forward for employers when engaging in 
policy-making, and for tribunal investigations, would be to use the ‘proper/improper’ 
filter (although adopting more useful terminology) as a first stage test, such that 
‘mild’ expression is always permitted; ‘stronger’ expression is not forbidden per se, 
but may be subject to further restrictions (which may depend on the nature of the 
work, or the job role, or the organisational environment). In policy formation, the 
onus should always be on the employer to offer genuine and credible reasons for 
restrictions on stronger forms of religious expression. As Berg suggests ‘ … 
requiring the employer to show some disruption or other significant cost before it 
restricts the speech can ensure that the employer acts from more than just 
disagreement with or hostility to the employee’s message. The high status of 
religious speech justifies efforts to root out such hostility.’99 
 
The fourth point to note is the implications of active manifestation beyond the 
workplace. Under the ECHR, whilst the specific situation rule is controversially 
applied to allow employers to restrict manifestation of religion in the workplace, 
the same rule cannot be applied to manifestation beyond the workplace. 
However, amongst the cases considered in this chapter, there have been some 
instances where employers have penalised employees for active manifestation 
within a grey area between the work and non-work spheres. This ‘grey area’ is 
perhaps in part a consequence of the fact that the domains of work and ‘non-
work’ cannot always be neatly compartmentalised. 
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Links to models  
 
In Chapter 3, various models of potential state responses to workplace religious 
expression were set out. In this section, the evidence for the application of these 
models to active manifestation will be considered. 
 
Conclusions concerning how courts approach this issue remain tentative because of 
the very limited authoritative case law. However, what can be ascertained so far is 
that tribunals certainly have not acted to ‘protect’ religious expression (Model V). 
Where Article 9 arguments have been advanced (usually indirectly), the specific 
situation rule has been applied to deny the right to active manifestation. Equally, 
indirect discrimination claims have been rejected at both the first and the second 
stages. Instead of protecting active religious expression, tribunals rather allow 
employers the leeway to exclude religious expression (Model I). This is particularly 
evident in the discrimination decisions. When it comes to unfair dismissal, the 
evidence appears to be that tribunals adopt a more laissez-faire approach (Model III). 
The emerging evidence here is not necessarily one of uncritical endorsement of 
decisions to dismiss because of active manifestation, but nevertheless a reluctance to 
substitute a finding of unfair dismissal – hence in Amachree there is a clear 
suggestion that the employer had over-reacted by dismissing Amachree, but the 
dismissal was allowed to stand (ostensibly for different reasons). 
 
The reasons for the tribunals’ stance may well be due, in part, to a general suspicion 
of ‘individuals whose religious beliefs and practices are an integral part of their daily 
lives’100 (a suspicion shared by employers).  However, it may also be due, in another 
part, to tribunals’ awareness of laws concerning harassment and their double effect on 
religious expression. Consideration of the possible effects of ‘offence’ to others forms 
part of the analysis, implicitly or explicitly (for example, in Apelogun Gabriels and 
Monaghan).  
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As well as providing some indications of the development of judicial approaches 
(largely at first instance), these cases and examples also provide some evidence 
of the approaches taken by the state in its capacity as employer. Here, the 
‘exclusion’ model is even more evident. For example, NHS policy, buttressed for 
many staff by legally-recognised professional regulations, appears to outlaw 
proselytism and other forms of religious speech without any serious attempt to 
find any accommodations for those employees for whom religious speech is of 
primary importance to their identities. Religious employees are therefore forced 
to ‘privatise’ their faith, as their employer subordinates their right of active 
religious expression to the rights of others not to encounter religious expression, 
whether or not they would find it objectionable. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The Models Revisited 
 
The first chapter of this thesis was preoccupied with an attempt to conceptualise 
and categorise religious expression, and a ‘taxonomy’ of religious expression 
was presented, ranging from belief and identity to more contentious forms of 
expression, using the headings: passive, negative and active manifestation. The 
purpose of the discussion was therefore, in large part, to identify what aspects of 
religious expression might have an effect on others, with an aim of understanding 
both the nature of such expression and the motivation underlying it. The second 
chapter dealt with how the law might react to religious expression and set out 
various models, each of which represented a particular imperative:  
 
(I) the exclusion model with the aim of suppressing religious expression;  
(II) support for a preferred historic (‘majority’) religion only; 
(III) laissez-faire (to allow the employer to respond); 
(IV) protection but only within ‘islands of exclusivity’ (religious 
organisations); 
(V) protection; and 
(VI) protection for minority religions only.  
 
These models have been used as reference points in the analysis presented in this 
thesis and will be revisited in the first part of this concluding chapter. 
 
There are three immediate and perhaps unsurprising conclusions which may be 
drawn from the application of the models. The first is that modern law in 
England and Wales does not offer any enduring ‘special’ support for the 
expression of the ‘majority’ historic religion of Christianity in the workplace. 
There are some very limited exceptions, for example, the existence of an opt-out 
283 
for retail workers
1
 and the remnants of restrictions on Sunday trading,
2
 but, it has 
been argued, these were concessions during a rapid process of the erosion of 
State sponsorship of a rest day.
3
 Administratively, many government activities 
cease on Sunday (and often Saturday also), thus providing a rest day for staff, but 
it may be argued that this is entirely due to the cultural legacy of the timing of a 
rest day (rather than any enduring deference to Christianity), which a majority of 
writers agree would be problematic to dismantle, given the difficulties of 
reaching a consensus on an alternative. The second is that the principle of 
forming ‘islands of exclusivity’4  for religious workers to retreat to has been 
largely rejected. Exemptions from discrimination law are, with the theoretical 
exception of denominational schools,
5
 narrowly drawn for religious ethos 
organisations making it difficult for them to maintain robustly ‘religious’ staffing 
policies,
6
 particularly given the subordination of these exemptions to other rights 
in cases where they might involve discrimination on other grounds such as sexual 
orientation.
7
 Looked at more positively, the assumption therefore is that religious 
people will remain in ‘mainstream’ employment rather than marginalised into 
religious ‘ghettos’. The third is that employers’ freedom of action has been 
reduced over time, particularly since 2006, by the passage of laws to regulate 
religious discrimination, although a degree of discretion still remains. 
 
It is also apparent that the model, protection for minority religions, is influential, 
but not in its fullest form. The argument that religion should be protected because 
of its cultural value has not been embodied into law or its interpretation, and 
remains a theoretical possibility only, albeit one which enjoys a degree of 
academic support.
8
 Nevertheless, the model has some practical influence not 
least in the focus on minority religions in some of the guidance material (e.g. the 
                                                 
1
 Employment Rights Act 1996, Part IV; see discussion in Chapter 4. 
2
 Sunday Trading Act 1994. 
3
 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
4
 Esau, ‘Islands of Exclusivity’. 
5
 Under the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (s 58); see discussion in Chapter 4. 
6
 Equality Act 2010, Sch 9, s 3. 
7
 See Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance. 
8
 See, for example, McColgan, ‘Class wars?’ 
284 
ACAS guide)
9
 and, more significantly, in the more positive impact on minority 
religions, as opposed to Christianity (a religion more characterised by personal 
convictions) of the development of the ‘necessity test’ (see below).  
 
Where conclusions are more difficult to draw is in respect of the reach of the 
remaining models: suppression and protection. The Equality Act 2010, for 
example, contains elements of both. In making unlawful direct and indirect 
discrimination because of the protected characteristic of religion, the legislation 
appears to be congruent with the protection model. Yet, in applying the definition 
of harassment to religion and belief in the same way as the other relevant 
protected characteristics,
10
 such that workplace religious speech might be 
considered to create an offensive environment for others and giving employers a 
clear incentive to suppress it, the legislation appears to be congruent with the 
exclusion model.  
 
The tension between the models is also evident at a judicial level. In one respect, 
judges acknowledge the value of religious expression to individual claimants yet, 
at another, they frequently utilise various devices (such as the specific situation 
rule, or the necessity test)
11
 to prevent the extension of legal protection to 
religious expression and so allow the employer to suppress it. 
 
What this overall tension between these two (opposite) imperatives points 
towards is perhaps a more general confusion in respect of religious expression 
and how far it is deserving of protection. This confusion finds its expression in 
part in a linked series of dichotomies which appear to have an effect on law-
making and judicial interpretation in the United Kingdom: the apparently public 
or private nature of religion; core and non-core expressions of religion; and the 
respective roles of choice and obligation in religion. 
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Public/private dichotomy 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a view that religion, and its outworking, is 
something essentially private in nature and not something which should be 
brought into the workplace. Under this perspective, the workplace is considered 
to be in some way part of the ‘public’ forum, and by contrast, activities take 
place in the non-work sphere are (usually) ‘private’ in nature. This view appears 
to inform the ECtHR specific situation rule which implies that an individual’s 
religious convictions can be taken off at the entrance of the workplace, and put 
on again at the exit. Such a view might also lead to greater sympathy for that 
form of negative manifestation of religion in the workplace where employees 
request time off for pursuing what are, essentially, private devotions. Although 
these activities may be carried out in community with others, they are 
nevertheless separate from the workplace (unless the employer has agreed to 
provide facilities such as a prayer room). The partial success of employment 
tribunal claims, where time off for religious activities outside of the workplace 
has been denied, supports this contention. 
 
There is however a problem with this view. It is a highly questionable 
assumption ‘that human beings should worship God on Sundays or some other 
chosen day and go about their business without reference to God the rest of the 
time.’12 Religious employees do not necessarily accept that their most cherished 
beliefs should be kept discreetly hidden in public; rather they may ‘seek to 
integrate their lives and integrate their activities’.13 Indeed they may feel under 
an obligation to do so. The public/private (or, alternatively, work/non-work) 
dichotomy denies religious employees the opportunity to express their beliefs in 
the workplace; it also risks trivialising religious practices as being at the same 
level as a sport or leisure activity which an individual pursues in her spare time, 
with little implication for the rest of her life, including her working life. 
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Core/non-core dichotomy 
 
A second dichotomy is that which can be identified between ‘core’ and ‘non-
core’ religion. This dichotomy most often appears in two ways. The first and 
most common application of the concept is where it is used to distinguish 
between elements of religious belief and practice which are seen as giving rise to 
an absolute right as opposed to those elements which are seen as somehow less 
significant and with the potential to have restrictions applied. Article 9 ECHR 
encapsulates this this aspect of the dichotomy by identifying the right to freedom 
of religion as somehow separate from freedom to ‘manifest’ religion. Freedom to 
manifest religion is clearly a qualified rather than an absolute right, as it is this 
which can be subjected to restrictions. Essentially the same dichotomy was 
applied by Lord Justice Neuberger (in Ladele) who described Ladele’s 
conscientious objection (a manifestation of her religion) as ‘not a core part of her 
religion’;14 he then gave what can only be taken to be an example of what would 
constitute a core part of her religion: ‘worshiping as she wished’.15 In essence, in 
both ECHR jurisprudence, a distinction is applied between the forum internum 
and the forum externum.
16
 The precise boundary between these two terms may 
not always be easy to draw. However, it would seem that in broad terms, and to 
utilise the typology of religious expression presented at Chapter 2, religious 
belief and identity and the right to worship with others, are seen by courts to 
belong to the forum internum and so ‘core’; whereas, the forms of expression 
considered in Chapters 5 to 7 are considered part of the forum externum and so 
‘non-core’. A very similar distinction has been read into religious discrimination 
law, such that detrimental treatment due to religious belief receives full 
protection, under the doctrine of direct discrimination where justification 
defences are not permissible; whereas religious expression tends to find more 
qualified protection under the doctrine of indirect discrimination, where 
justification can be offered as a defence. ‘Non-core’ religious expression does 
therefore receive some legal recognition; there is prima facie protection, but 
                                                 
14
 Ladele (CA) [52]. 
15
 ibid. 
16
 C v the United Kingdom (1983) 37 DR 142; see discussion in Chapter 2. 
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there are various bases for restricting such expression, including in consideration 
of the rights of others,
17
 or if the employer is able to show that the restriction 
represents ‘a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’18 
 
There is, however, a second application of the core/non-core dichotomy which 
essentially involves an assessment by courts of the centrality of particular forms 
of religious expression to a given religion. Those which are considered central 
are therefore ‘core’ and carry more weight than those considered to be non-
central which could therefore be characterised as ‘non-core’ and thus carry less 
weight. This point is amply illustrated with reference to a further filter which has 
been developed in ECHR case law (and has been transferred in turn to domestic 
discrimination law) - the necessity test, the effect of which has been particularly 
evident in ‘passive manifestation’ cases. This filter accepts as ‘manifestations’ of 
religion only those forms of religious expression which are considered to be 
‘mandatory’. For this reason, the right to wear a cross at work has been excluded 
from protection as courts have considered that it is not mandatory to Christianity 
but only ‘motivated’ by Christianity. 19  As a result, even the ‘first stage’ 
protection afforded to manifestations of religion can be denied when the 
necessity test is invoked. This expressly creates a division within the forum 
externum, the effect of which is that non-mandatory forms of religious 
expression lose even what little protection is offered to mandatory forms. It 
should be noted that the legitimacy of this filtering device (which, in some recent 
cases, has not been consistently applied) is currently being challenged in Eweida 
v UK and Chaplin v UK; it may be therefore that this obstacle to the protection of 
religious expression is removed when judgment is handed down. 
Obligation/choice dichotomy 
 
A third dichotomy is reflected in the very different attitudes towards the role of 
choice and its alternative, obligation, as the primary motivation underlying 
                                                 
17
 Art 9 (2) ECHR. 
18
 Equality Act 2010, s 19(2)(d). 
19
 See Eweida v British Airways. 
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religious expression. One view is that religion is a matter of obligation – an 
individual responds to the call of God which he could not resist even if he 
wanted to.
 20
 Another view is that religion is essentially a matter of choice. An 
individual chooses his religion and so chooses to take on the beliefs and 
obligations associated with that religion. As Lord Justice Sedley put it in Eweida: 
 
[T]he same definition is used for all the listed forms of indirect discrimination, 
relating to age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. One cannot help observing 
that all of these apart from religion or belief are objective characteristics of 
individuals; religion and belief alone are matters of choice.
21
 
 
But choice is a questionable concept to apply without qualification to religion 
and belief. If actions motivated by or expressing religion and belief represent a 
deliberate choice, then that choice can be denied. The value placed on individual 
autonomy gives some value to those choices but allows them to be subordinated 
to other imperatives (such as those arising from the other, apparently immutable 
‘protected’ characteristics) with great ease.22 Moreover, when seen through the 
prism of ‘choice’, the decisions an individual may make can allow her to be 
characterised negatively. Thus, a person convinced because of her religious 
beliefs that she should ‘conscientiously object’ to an aspect of her job, can be 
described (depending on the nature of the objection) as a ‘discriminator’, and the 
conscientious objection denied.
23
 Such a view plays into a lurking suspicion of 
religious expression, in its ‘stronger’ forms, as something potentially malign and 
destabilising, and likely to intrude on the rights of others.   
 
Thus far, an analysis has been presented which suggests that protections for 
religious expression are in practice weak, not least due to the influence of 
                                                 
20
 Alternatively, particularly in the case of minority religions, there may be an additional 
obligation which is owed to a wider group of religious adherents, to follow its ‘cultural’ practices.  
21
 Eweida (CA) [40] (Sedley LJ). 
22
 This analysis gives some advantage to those members of minority religious groups who are 
also recognised as protected on the basis of their ethnic or racial grouping. 
23
 As in Ladele; see discussion in Chapter 5. 
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perspectives which are at best sceptical, at worst hostile. Some of these 
perspectives find expression in legal approaches which remove protection 
entirely from some forms of religious expression. Many other imperatives may 
‘trump’ the right to religious expression, particularly any rights connected to 
other protected characteristics, even where indirectly engaged (such as in cases 
of conscientious objection to activities promoting same-sex relationships). It is 
submitted that this treatment of religious expression derives from a series of 
contested beliefs about the essentially private nature of religion, the optionality 
of various forms of manifestation and the primacy of choice, rather than 
obligation, in forming religious convictions. The problem with this approach is 
that it sees religious expression through an external prism and fails to engage 
with the experience and values of the religious employee. 
 
An alternative approach is to view religion, subject to a test of sincerity,
24
 as a 
highly significant, if not the most significant, aspect of an individual’s life, and 
the personal autonomy which allows him to pursue that life.
25
 Indeed, many 
religious people build their lives around their religious convictions and are 
unprepared to compromise these convictions as they feel that their obligations to 
God outweigh their obligations to human authorities.
26
 If this alternative 
approach is to be preferred then it follows that that the right to express and 
manifest religious beliefs should be accorded a high status in law – higher than is 
currently the case such that ‘protection for religious expression’ should be the 
dominant legal model. How this might be achieved is the subject of the next 
section. 
Moving further towards the Protection Model – An Assessment of 
the Options 
 
Thus far it has been argued that whereas there is some protection for workplace 
religious expression, there is a competing imperative, exclusion, which manifests 
                                                 
24
 See discussion in Chapter 2. 
25
 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
26
 See Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State; and also discussion in Chapter 3. 
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itself in various ways. The result is that religious expression enjoys only partial 
protection and tends to be relegated to second place when other rights are in play. 
For religious employees, such protection is therefore inadequate. This 
inadequacy, however, has a differential effect on the three areas of 
‘controversial’ manifestation such that negative manifestation (for reasons of 
conscience) and active manifestation are the most exposed. It is submitted that, 
given the arguments considered on the subject of dignity, equality and personal 
autonomy,
27
 not to mention the paramount significance for religious adherents of 
religious obligation, this situation should be addressed and the law reconsidered 
to give greater priority to, and indeed buttress, the ‘protection’ imperative. To 
this end, in the following section, the options for improving legal protection for 
workplace religious expression will be assessed and, where appropriate, 
recommendations made.  
 
The analysis which follows will draw on the framework of the three ‘potentially 
contentious’ forms of religious manifestation which have been employed in this 
thesis. It is true that the key recommendation which follows (the partial 
reframing of the doctrine of indirect discrimination) would benefit all three 
forms. Equally the discussion of reasonable accommodation has a potential 
resonance for at least two of the forms of manifestation (negative and passive). 
However, the threefold division remains useful as there are secondary 
recommendations and discussion points which relate specifically (or most fully) 
to one particular area of contested manifestation (such as the respective 
discussions of conscience clauses and the configuration of ‘harassment’ as a 
form of prohibited conduct). Given the importance of the respective 
considerations of indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation, these 
are debated within the first section dealing with negative manifestation, although 
cross-referenced where appropriate under the later headings. 
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 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
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Negative Manifestation  
 
Within the domain of negative manifestation, it is submitted that requests for 
‘time off’ for religious devotions are a relatively unobtrusive form of 
manifestation, often taking place outside the workplace and seldom engaging 
others in any way who do not share the same religious convictions. Nevertheless, 
there are sometimes clashes between an individual’s religious obligations away 
from the workplace and the demands of the employer. Whereas it became 
evident in Copsey that Article 9 would offer no protections to an individual 
penalised for taking time off for religious obligations, the Religion and Belief 
Regulations 2003 provided a legal recourse. Few cases have progressed beyond 
the employment tribunals and it is therefore difficult to frame a solid critique at 
this stage, beyond noting that cases have been both won and lost depending on 
the employer’s success in offering an adequate ‘practical’ justification for its 
actions. 
 
That qualification notwithstanding, employment judges should be careful to fully 
appreciate the significance of the religious obligations for which employees 
request time off. There also appears to be limited awareness of a Christian’s 
perceived obligation not to work on a Sunday because of its status as the 
Sabbath; in the main, a tribunal’s focus is on a claimant’s desire to worship with 
others at a particular time on a Sunday. This shows only a partial appreciation of 
the motivation of the religious employee. In these areas, it may be helpful to 
provide employment judges with training to ensure that they have a fuller 
appreciation of the religious perspective. 
 
With regard to the rather more contested aspect of negative manifestation, i.e. for 
reasons of conscientious objection, in the first part of this chapter it was noted 
that protection in the workplace would appear to be inadequate, particularly if the 
objection has implications for another protected characteristic. It is submitted 
that there are broadly three options to increase the level of legal protection for 
conscience, whilst remaining inclusive of rival claims in the event of a ‘clash of 
rights’: 
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(a) Statutory exemption  
(b) A duty of reasonable accommodation 
(c) Modifying discrimination law. 
 
Each of these options, and their implications, will be explored in this section.
28
  
 
(a) Statutory Exemption  
 
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that an amendment to the Equality Bill 2006 to 
incorporate a specific statutory exemption for registrars and social workers with 
a conscientious objection to the outworking of the Civil Partnerships Act 2004 
for their respective roles was set out in full.
29
 It is a useful example of a 
‘conscience clause’, or a specific ‘opt-out’, and there are at least four interesting 
points to note from the way in which it is drafted. First, it sets out three situations 
in which employees (in this case, public servants) might wish to invoke a 
conscientious objection – conscientious objection arising from situations not 
covered by this amendment are thus ineligible for protection. Second, the 
situations in which conscientious objection might arise are widely drawn (in 
contrast to s 4(1) of the Abortion Act). Third, the right to conscientiously object 
is specifically referenced to an underlying religion and belief giving rise to the 
objection. Fourth, the right to object, following in the tradition of the Abortion 
Act, is absolute. 
 
Lady O’Cathain’s amendment sets out one formula for identifying and accepting 
conscientious objection. There are however other possible formulae, most of 
which would involve a degree of flexibility around one or more of the four points 
outlined in the preceding paragraph: i.e. the right could apply to more situations; 
                                                 
28
 This section draws heavily on the second part of Hambler, ‘Recognising a right to 
“conscientiously object”’. 
29
 Equality Bill 2005, Amendment No. 191A. 
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it could be more narrowly drawn; the link to religion could be omitted and the 
right could be conditional. If the right to conscientiously object is to be 
conditional, then this conditionality is likely to relate to the availability of other 
employees willing and able to perform the relevant duties. In a US context, 
Wilson proposes a free standing conditional constitutional right to conscientious 
objection to participation in same-sex marriage on religious grounds for 
individuals, but this right does not apply if ‘another government employee or 
official is not promptly available and willing to provide the requested 
government service without inconvenience or delay.’ 30  What is meant by 
‘prompt’, ‘inconvenience’ or ‘delay’ is not of course specified. 
 
This indeed illustrates the problem with specific conscience clauses. The way 
they are drafted and interpreted is crucial. As noted from Janaway the abortion 
conscience clauses are very narrowly understood and potentially strongly-held 
objections to indirect involvement in abortion are not recognised or protected. 
Thus, although the O’Cathain amendment, for example, appears to be carefully 
drawn to be inclusive of direct and indirect participation in civil partnerships, it is 
quite conceivable that an alternative (compromise?) formulation might make a 
distinction for registrars, for example between officiating at a ceremony and the 
simple signing of a register.
31
 In this example the conscience clause could be 
narrowly drafted to apply to participation in ceremonies but exclude the formal 
registration of the civil partnership union. Such a conscience clause would not 
have availed some registrars (such as Ladele) whose conscientious objection 
embraced both activities.  
 
Conscience clauses are also open to criticism on the basis that they are 
potentially inflexible to the needs or rights of others, on the basis that if too many 
people availed themselves of a conscience clause then others might be deprived 
of a service or experience delays in obtaining that service. Whilst it is difficult to 
                                                 
30
 R Wilson, ‘Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-
Sex Marriage Laws’ 5 (2010) Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 368. Such a right 
in theory could be adopted as a statutory right in the UK and applied to civil partnerships.  
31
 The compromise offered to, and rejected by, Ladele; see Ladele (CA) [10]. 
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cite realistic examples of this scenario, to accommodate the theoretical objection, 
there is the additional permutation of a right to conscientiously object being 
conditional on the practicability of accommodating the objection. In principle, 
this has potential to create uncertainty for the would-be conscientious objector, as 
the conscientious objection, having first been accepted, may be at any time later 
denied if the conditions for allowing the conscientious objection no longer apply 
(e.g. demand for civil partnerships comes to outstrip the supply of non-objecting 
registrars). It is submitted that it would provide a greater degree of certainty to 
the dissenting employee if the objection were to be accepted for a given period, 
based on an assessment of capacity at the time the request was made. At the end 
of this period the situation could be reviewed to identify if either the supply of 
similarly qualified employees or the demand for particular services had changed, 
and whether this assessment could justify the withdrawal of the acceptance of the 
conscientious objection. The alternative, an ongoing case-by-case conditionality, 
would create, for the conscientious objector, too great a burden of uncertainty 
and consequent employment insecurity, to be a realistic or fair approach to adopt. 
 
In summary, ‘opt out’ clauses are not a panacea for conscientious objection. 
Much depends on the way they are drafted and the extant examples (in the 
medical field) are generally narrow in nature and thus offer quite limited 
protection. In situations where it is difficult to make the case for absolute as 
opposed to conditional conscientious objection, there are difficulties in 
identifying the exact scope of the relevant opt out. Thus opt out clauses on their 
own are unlikely to provide comprehensive protection for conscience. This 
analysis is not intended to imply that such clauses should be dispensed with. 
Indeed existing conscience clauses should be retained and where possible more 
should be sought (e.g. if assisted euthanasia were to be legalised). However, 
other legal mechanisms, with more general application, are also likely to be 
needed. 
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(b) A duty of reasonable accommodation 
 
Another means of offering greater protection to the religious conscience would 
be to amend the Equality Act to create a statutory duty on employers to 
‘reasonably accommodate’ the needs of religious employees. 32  This would 
require employers to proactively identify and alter workplace rules and practices 
in order to accommodate workers’ religious beliefs where it is ‘reasonable’ to do 
so, not unlike the current obligations they have to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ 
for disabled employees.
33
  
 
There are, however, some potential problems with a duty of reasonable 
accommodation. Firstly, there is no guarantee that case law arising from the 
application of a duty of reasonable accommodation would apply in the same way 
to religion and belief as has a requirement to make reasonable adjustments in the 
case of disability. Reasonable accommodation might develop as a much reduced 
right, not least since religion and belief appears to be lower down the hierarchy 
of protected characteristics than is the case in respect of disability.
34
 In the USA, 
for example, the duty of reasonable accommodation is circumscribed at the point 
that it creates ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’35 The 
US Courts have interpreted this in favour of employers such that undue hardship 
is suffered if the costs of accommodation are more than ‘de minimis’.36 This is 
quite different from the corresponding duty in UK disability discrimination law 
which can require employers to go to considerable lengths and some cost to 
accommodate disability.
37
 If a such a ‘de minimus’ rule were adopted in the UK, 
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 See Hepple and Choudhury, Tackling Religious Discrimination; and also discussion in Chapter 
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Equality Act 2010, s 20.
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 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: an emerging hierarchy?’ 
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 Title VII Civil Rights Act 1964, s 701(j). 
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 Trans World Airlines v Hardison. 
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 See for example Lady Justice Hale’s judgment in Archibald v Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32, 
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and applied to a request by an employee for the reasonable accommodation of 
conscience, this could conceivably lead to a realistic request being ‘legitimately’ 
turned down, depending on the circumstances, in particular how the associated 
‘costs’ of accommodation are interpreted and subsequently calculated.38 
 
A more fundamental problem is that the introduction of a requirement for 
reasonable accommodation would privilege religion and belief (alongside 
disability) ahead of the other protected characteristics in the sense of 
conspicuously endowing the characteristic with an additional (apparent) 
protection not available to the other characteristics. Of course, the need for 
accommodation for other characteristics (except for maternity, where separate 
provisions exist) may not be obvious. Nevertheless, bolstering the protection for 
religion and belief, or more particularly being seen to do so, is likely to prove 
contentious (as a form of special pleading), particularly given the hostility 
towards religious expression in the workplace in particular, from groups such as 
the National Secular Society. Given the negative reaction which the adoption of a 
duty of reasonable accommodation might create, it is particularly important that 
such a duty, if enacted, should truly provide the protections, for example for 
religious conscience, which are required to buttress the protection model in the 
way suggested here. Given that there appears to be no guarantee that this would 
be the result, adopting reasonable accommodation would be costly (politically) 
without necessarily bringing the needed benefits.   
 
To summarise, therefore, as far as reasonable accommodation is concerned, the 
exact value for individual religious expression of adopting the approach is not 
entirely clear and, unless this is known, it may be that focussing on the 
shortcomings of the existing mechanisms for protecting religious expression, in 
particular the concept of indirect discrimination, would be a surer route to 
                                                 
38
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enhancing legal protections. There is a particular attraction in considering this 
area because of the possibility of amending the formula by which employers are 
able to justify prima facie indirect discrimination – something which would 
apply equally to all the protected characteristics (and consequently there would 
be no special pleading). This discussion is the subject of the next section.  
 
Discrimination Law 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, discrimination law in England and Wales penalises 
employers who engage in ‘prohibited conduct’ towards workers because of a 
‘protected characteristic’ one of which is religion and belief. 39  Prohibited 
conduct is defined in various ways, but the two most long-standing definitions 
are direct discrimination and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination refers 
to the unlawful application of ‘less favourable treatment’. 40  Indirect 
discrimination refers to the unlawful application of ‘a provision, criterion or 
practice’ which puts those who share a protected characteristic at a disadvantage 
compared to others, and which the employer cannot justify as ‘a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim’.41  
 
The key authority for how discrimination law applies to conscientious objectors 
is Ladele v Islington Borough Council. The judgments in this case were analysed 
in some detail in Chapter 5 and it was concluded that the reasoning in the EAT 
and Court of Appeal judgments were substantially flawed, not least in allowing 
an employer to trump conscientious objection based on abstract principles rather 
than being required to show an operational justification (which the employer in 
Ladele was unable to show). In endorsing such a position, it has been submitted 
that the courts failed to properly apply the proportionality equation and thus 
allowed the employer to easily defeat the objections of the claimant. 
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 Equality Act 2010, s 10. 
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41
 ibid., s 19. 
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This is unsatisfactory. However, the question arises, could existing 
discrimination law be recalibrated in some way to provide a greater degree of 
recognition of the rights of religious-based conscientious objectors? McCrudden 
argues that judges should be given training to enable them to better understand 
the position of the religious claimant (the ‘internal viewpoint’);42 such training 
might help to ‘rebalance’ the ‘proportionality equation’ to give more weight to 
the claims of the religious conscience. Alternatively, the definition of indirect 
discrimination could be redrafted in an amendment to the Equality Act to 
remould what is meant by the word ‘proportionate’ to mean something much 
closer to ‘necessary’ - thus putting the employer under  a greater burden of 
justification (irrespective of the protected characteristic in question). In fact, such 
a change would more accurately reflect the text of Council Directive 2000/78/EC 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation which requires that indirect discrimination is ‘objectively justified by 
a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary’.43  
Passive Manifestation 
 
It was argued earlier that an individual’s desire to passively manifest his religious 
convictions is impeded by the test of necessity. It is also impeded by the need to 
show plural rather than individual disadvantage to meet the requirements of the 
first stage of an indirect discrimination claim. The two issues are linked to the 
extent that showing that something is necessary to a religious belief would 
strongly support the contention that that belief is shared by others (and so ‘plural’ 
in character). This particular problem is not unique to passive manifestation, and 
indeed can apply to all three forms of manifestation. However, it seems, from the 
case law to date, to have had a particularly significant effect for this particular 
form, and so will be considered here. 
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An alternative approach to the necessity test was considered in Chapter 6. This 
involves the imposition of a test of ‘exceptional importance’ to the individual of 
a particular form of religious expression,
44
 potentially a broader test than the 
necessity test, but a test nevertheless. Another alternative is to remove the need 
for a test at all and consider only the motivation of the individual claimant. This 
involves posing the question, ‘was she motivated by her religion to wear, for 
example, a visible cross, irrespective of any other authorities?’ The problem with 
this approach is that it can be too all-inclusive which, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
has a potentially damaging effect on the scale of the protection offered to 
religious expression. A test of ‘exceptional importance’ is helpful because the 
term has potential to be linked both to individual motivation and to some external 
basis for that motivation, such as the range of sources of religious authority 
presented by Audi.
45
 A form of external validation is helpful as it reduces the 
extent to which a particular form of religious expression can be characterised by 
others as the result of simple personal choice or, worse, individual whimsy. 
 
The application of a test of exceptional importance does not fully resolve the 
problem of the need to show group disadvantage in pursuit of an employment 
claim. Although, as Hepple argues, the conditional aspect of the definition of 
indirect discrimination permits the possibility of using hypothetical persons to 
establish the existence of plural disadvantage,
46
 it is submitted that this is likely 
to be easier to demonstrate if the issue of necessity disappears. Instead, the 
individual would simply need to show that there are other people who believe 
that wearing a particular form of religious dress or symbol is considered by them 
to be of ‘exceptional importance.’  
 
Nevertheless this may not be necessary, as some commentators argue that the 
‘group’ or ‘plural’ aspects implicit in the definition of indirect discrimination are 
in fact unnecessary and that the concept of indirect discrimination, as it is 
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currently configured, can (and should) be stretched to be inclusive of individual 
religious expression.
47
 This argument is doubtful, indeed it was directly 
considered by Lord Justice Sedley in Eweida and rejected.
48
 It is strongly 
arguable that the legislation itself would require amending, to remove plural 
references, for this approach to be followed. Alternatively, a statutory duty to 
reasonably accommodate the religious claimant (as discussed earlier), dependent 
upon drafting and judicial interpretation, may obviate the need to rely on indirect 
discrimination protections, and so the issue could be resolved through this 
alternative means.   
 
Active Manifestation 
 
In the first part of this chapter, it was noted that there is evidence of hostility 
towards active manifestation (or workplace religious speech). In Chapter 7 it was 
posited that a likely justification for such hostility is grounded in an awareness of 
the harassment provisions of the Equality Act 2010, which serve to create an 
incentive for employers, considered under discrimination law to be vicariously 
liable for the actions of its employees,
49
 to ban religious speech, with no 
corresponding incentive to support it.  
 
A large part of the problem then is the way in which harassment is defined under 
the Equality Act, with its recognition of a perceived offensive environment as 
sufficient to trigger claims. It is submitted that a one-size fits all approach to 
harassment, across the protected characteristics to which it applies,
50
 is failing to 
protect legitimate religious speech. To remedy this, the bar needs to be raised for 
religious speech so that greater consideration is given to the religious claim. 
There is possibly more than one legal mechanism to achieve this, but the most 
obvious would be an amendment to the Equality Act to include a separate 
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definition of harassment of others (on both religious and other grounds) as a 
result of religious speech. This definition of harassment would need to be 
carefully considered. What it should not do is allow religious employees free rein 
to intimidate others or create a genuinely hostile environment. However, it may 
be that there are occasions when it is unavoidable that a co-worker is ‘offended’ 
by religious speech, because in that instance the religious right outweighs the 
offence caused. It may be that the word ‘offensive’ which serves to set the bar for 
harassment very low, is the major problem and should be omitted or cast 
differently in respect of harassment related to religious speech. This would still 
allow employers to identify stronger forms of harassment, for example those 
which are animus-related or which can be genuinely said to amount to ‘improper’ 
proselytism (e.g. where a vulnerable member of staff is repeatedly subjected to 
unwanted and ‘strong’ forms of religious speech personally directed at him).51 
Conclusion 
 
Legal approaches to the manifestation and wider expression of religion are 
currently inconsistent, drawing heavily on two fundamentally opposing 
imperatives - protection and exclusion. Such inconsistencies are manifest in a 
number of areas, but most particularly in the treatment of religious speech and 
conscientious objection. In terms of the latter, there may shortly be a movement 
towards a greater degree of protection should the judgments in Ladele v UK and 
MacFarlane v UK be given in favour of the respective applicants. Equally, there 
may be greater protection for individual forms of visual religious manifestation 
should Eweida and Chaplin be successful in their respective applications against 
the UK government. It is submitted that success in these applications would be 
very welcome, not only to achieve justice for the applicants concerned, but also, 
and moreover, for the opportunity which it would create in for a longer and 
deeper look at laws in England and Wales designed to protect religious 
expression in the workplace per se, and, it would be hoped, to remove 
inconsistencies in approach in a manner compatible with the protection model. 
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Some options of how this could be achieved have been considered in this 
chapter. To do otherwise would perpetuate a situation where the significance of 
religious expression continues, in large measure, to be devalued, and the deep 
sense of obligation which can underpin it, underplayed. It is submitted that this 
approach is out of step with core liberal values (of equality, dignity and personal 
autonomy) and, for this reason, there is a pressing case for fundamental revision. 
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